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Abstract
In the decades following adoption of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention coastal
States have dramatically expanded the spatial extent of their respective claims to
maritime zones of national jurisdiction. At present many of the world’s oceans and
seas feature, and are characterised by, extensive maritime spaces where the zones of
national jurisdiction claimed by two or more neighbouring coastal States have not
been delimited by an international maritime boundary and thus overlap with one
another. These spaces – hereinafter referred to as overlapping claims areas (OCAs)
– are likely to be an enduring feature of the world’s political geography given that
maritime boundary delimitation is often a lengthy or intractable process. Maritime
boundary negotiations between several coastal States are impeded by long-standing
and polarised negotiating positions, heightened diplomatic tensions, and/or daunting geographical and technical complexities. In several cases maritime boundary
negotiations are further complicated by disputed claims to territorial sovereignty
over islands and other littoral features.
As an alternative to maritime boundary delimitation, or during the period where
delimitation negotiations are ongoing, several coastal States that assert overlapping
claims have agreed to establish frameworks to manage the relevant OCA on a provisional and joint basis. Provisional joint management is increasingly viewed by
government officials and other policymakers as a useful tool to minimise diplomatic
tensions associated with OCAs, and enable the effective management of such spaces
and the resources contained therein. In recent years several senior government officials, commentators and reports have highlighted a need for further consideration
of options for provisional joint management of OCAs and their implementation in
particular regional contexts.
The present thesis responds to this need by critically examining provisions of international law concerning the provisional joint management of OCAs, in addition
to the design features of provisional joint management frameworks that have been
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established to date. Drawing on the results of the examination, the thesis then proposes legal and policy options for the provisional joint management of OCAs. The
proposed options are intended to inform the future negotiation of provisional joint
management frameworks. The proposed options are also intended to facilitate the
functionally comprehensive management of OCAs by the relevant claimant coastal
States – in other words, they are intended to enable claimant coastal States to collectively implement, within the relevant OCA, all functional components of coastal
State jurisdiction recognised in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
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1 Introduction
In the decades following adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC)1 coastal States have dramatically expanded the spatial extent of
their respective claims to maritime zones of national jurisdiction. At present many
of the world’s oceans and seas feature, and are characterised by, extensive maritime
spaces where the zones of national jurisdiction claimed by two or more neighbouring
coastal States have not been delimited by an international maritime boundary and
thus overlap with one another.
These spaces – hereinafter referred to as overlapping claims areas (OCAs) – are
likely to be an enduring feature of the world’s political geography given that maritime boundary delimitation is often a lengthy or intractable process.2 Maritime
boundary negotiations between several coastal States are impeded by long-standing
and polarised negotiating positions, heightened diplomatic tensions, and/or daunt1

1833 UNTS 3, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
The final Convention text was formally adopted (subject to drafting changes) on 30 April 1982
by a recorded vote at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: see Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, available online at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/final_act_eng.pdf>. For detailed commentary concerning the LOSC and preceding negotiations, see Myron Nordquist
(ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, Volume I (1985);
Myron Nordquist, Neal Grandy, Satya Nandan and Shabti Rosenne (eds), Volume II (1993);
Volume III (1995); Myron Nordquist, Alexander Yankov, Neal Grandy and Shabtai Rosenne,
Volume IV (1991); Myron Nordquist, Shabtai Rosenne and Louis Sohn, Volume V (1989);
Myron Nordquist, Satya Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne, Michael Lodge, Volume VI (2003) (The
Virginia Commentaries). See also United Nations, United Nations Conferences on the Law
of the Sea, Official Records, Third Conference (1980, reprinted 2000).
2
For example, the 2010 delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway concerning overlapping claims in the Barents Sea is a product of negotiations that commenced in the 1960s: See
Royal Norwegian Embassy in London, ‘Arctic Agreement between Norway and Russia’, Press
Release (27 April 2010) and Sun Pyo Kim, Maritime Delimitation and Interim Arrangements
in Northeast Asia (2004).
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ing geographical and technical complexities.3 A number of developing coastal States
also simply lack the administrative and technical capacity to engage in complex maritime boundary negotiations.4 In several cases maritime boundary negotiations are
further complicated by disputed claims to territorial sovereignty over islands and
other littoral features.5
The widespread absence of delimitation agreements is also explained in part by the
varied national interests that underlie and motivate overlapping maritime claims.
Many coastal States are heavily and increasingly reliant on maritime space as a
medium for international trade and as a source of natural resources.6 Maritime
jurisdictional claims represent an attempt by the relevant coastal State(s) to safeguard, and assert greater control in relation to, significant national interests that
may include: access to sea lanes of communication, exploitation of marine living
resources, development of offshore hydrocarbon deposits, and protection of the marine environment.7 When the maritime claims of two or more coastal States overlap,
the resulting competition between these significant national interests may create a
political environment that is less than amendable to diplomatic compromise and,
consequently, to successful boundary delimitation.8
3

See, eg, the following analysis of maritime boundary delimitation disputes in the Asia-Pacific
region: Zou Keyuan, ‘Joint Development in the South China Sea: A New Approach’ (2006) 21
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 83; Gao Jianjun, ‘Joint Development in
the East China Sea: Not an Easier Challenge than Delimitation’ (2008) 23 The International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 39; Robert Smith, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the South
China Sea: Potentiality and Challenges’ (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International Law
214; and Clive Schofield and Ian Townsend-Gault, ‘Choppy waters ahead in "a sea of peace
cooperation and friendship"?: Slow progress towards the application of maritime joint development to the East China Sea’ (2011) 35 Marine Policy 25.
4
Several Commonwealth developing coastal States have relied on the financial and technical support of the Special Advisory Services Unit of the Commonwealth Secretariat in order to establish maritime jurisdictional claims and boundary delimitation agreements: see Newsletter of the
Commonwealth Secretariat Special Advisory Services Division, Issue 5, Spring (2009) available
at <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/190463/FileName/ADVISORY-0309.pdf>.
5
See, eg, ibid.
6
For further discussion, see Section 1.2.
7
For a regional case case study concerning the interaction of such interests see: See also Clive
Schofield et al, From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia (National Bureau of Asian Research Report,
July 2011); Clive Schofield (ed), Maritime Energy Resources in Asia: Energy and Geopolitics
(National Bureau of Asian Research Report, December 2011). Both publications are available
at <available at <http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=233>.
8
See ibid for illustrative examples of boundary negotiations and underlying national interests in
the Asia-Pacific region.
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As an alternative to maritime boundary delimitation, or during the period where
delimitation negotiations are ongoing, several coastal States that assert overlapping
claims have agreed to establish frameworks to manage the relevant OCA on a provisional and joint basis. Provisional joint management is increasingly viewed by
government officials and other policymakers as a useful tool to minimise diplomatic
tensions associated with OCAs, and enable the effective management of such spaces
and the sustainable development of resources contained therein. In recent years several senior government officials, commentators and reports have highlighted a need
for further consideration of options for provisional joint management of OCAs and
their implementation in particular regional contexts.9
The present thesis responds to this need by critically examining provisions of international law concerning the provisional joint management of OCAs, in addition
to the design features of provisional joint management frameworks that have been
established to date. Drawing on the results of the examination, the thesis proposes legal and policy options for the provisional joint management of OCAs. The
proposed options are intended to inform the future negotiation of provisional joint
management frameworks. The proposed options are also intended to facilitate the
functionally comprehensive management of OCAs by the relevant claimant coastal
States – in other words, they are intended to enable claimant coastal States to implement collectively, within the relevant OCA, all functional components of coastal
State jurisdiction recognised in the Law of the Sea Convention.
This introductory Chapter contextualises the thesis and explains how it is developed
in the remaining Chapters. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 provide a brief background to the
emergence of OCAs, their characteristics and the development of State practice
concerning the provisional joint management of such areas. Section 1.3 outlines the
scope of the thesis topic, the specific research questions that it addresses, and the
9

See, eg, Professor S Jayakumar, ‘Consider Joint Development in Disputed Seas’ (keynote
speech delivered at the International Conference on Joint Development and the South
China Sea, National University of Singapore, 16–17 June 2011) excerpt available at
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/review-and-forum-article.pdf>; and
Schofield et al, above n 7 on the preceding page.
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structure of subsequent Chapters. Section 1.4 discusses the significance of the thesis
and how it contributes to existing academic literature concerning OCAs. Finally,
Section 1.5 identifies the study methods employed to produce the thesis and how
these methods were adapted in response to research challenges encountered.

1.1 Overlapping claim areas
Spatial expansion of maritime claims:
In the decades following the end of the Second World War, the geographical scope of
national maritime jurisdiction claimed by coastal States has expanded immensely.
By the end of the war most coastal States had established claims to sovereignty
within a territorial sea extending several miles offshore (most commonly to 3 nautical
miles).10 A key catalyst for the subsequent expansion of claims was a proclamation
made on 28 September 1945 by President Truman of the United States (1945 Truman Proclamation), in which the United States Government unilaterally asserted
jurisdiction and control over the ‘natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United
States’.11 The 1945 Truman Proclamation prompted a quick succession of claims by
other coastal States to jurisdiction over the continental shelf and/or the resources of
the continental shelf subsoil and seabed.12 The Proclamation was also followed by
a succession of coastal State claims to an expanded territorial sea, including claims
extending up to 9, 12 and 200 nautical miles offshore.13
Prompted by these developments, the First United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS I), held in Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, was
convened in an attempt to:
10

See Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed, 1999), 77–81.
Proclamation No. 2667, “Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of
the Subsoil and Sea-Bed of the Continental Shelf”, 28 September 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303;
XIII Bulletin, Dept. of State, No. 327, 30 September 1945, p. 485. See also Churchill and
Lowe, above n 10, 141–145.
12
See Churchill and Lowe, above n 10, 141–145.
13
For discussion of relevant State practice see Arthur Dean, ‘The Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea: What was accomplished’ (1958) 52 American Journal of International Law 607.
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... examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but
also the technical, biological, economic and political aspects ... and to
embody the results of its work in one or more international conventions
or such other instruments as it may deem appropriate.14
The principal achievement of UNCLOS I was the four Geneva Conventions of 1958,15
which codified and consolidated several aspects of the law of the sea including the
nature and components of coastal State jurisdiction within a territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf.16 However, no consensus was reached concerning the
spatial limits of these zones and State practice continued to evolve rapidly.17 A
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II), held in
Geneva from 17 March to 26 April 1960, failed to address this lack of consensus and
did not produce amendments or modifications to the Geneva Conventions.18 During
the 1960s and 1970s many coastal States asserted claims to fishing zones, territorial
seas, and other zones of various breadths including up to 12, 50, 100, 130, 200 and
400 nautical miles.19
The trend evident in the State practice discussed above – towards a dramatic expansion of coastal State jurisdiction – was given firm legal footing in 1982 at the
14

UN General Assembly, 11th Session, Official Records, Supp. No. 17 (A/3572), quoted in Dean,
above n 13 on the previous page.
15
These relevant Conventions are: Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, opened
for signature 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 September 1964) (1958
Territorial Sea Convention); Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature
29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (entered into force 10 June 1964) (1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf ); Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450
UNTS 11 (entered into force 30 September 1962); and Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 559 UNTS 285
(entered into force 20 March 1966).
16
For further discussion see Ram Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea (1983);
Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on the preceding page, 141–145; and Donald Rothwell and Tim
Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2010), 2–8.
17
See Anand, above n 16; Philip Jessup, ‘The Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea: A
Study in International Law-Making’ (1958) 52 American Journal of International Law 730;
and Dean, above n 13 on the preceding page, who notes that: ‘In the eyes of the world ... the
major problem facing the Conference appeared to be the determination of the legal limit of the
territorial sea appertaining to a coastal state.’
18
For further discussion see Derek Bowett, ‘The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea’ (1960) 9 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 415.
19
Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16, 10. See also Anand, above n 16; Churchill and Lowe,
above n 10 on the previous page, 60–162; and Barbara Kwiatowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive
Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea (1989). Several new claims purported to assert
sovereignty in relation to offshore natural resources generally – see, eg, the claims to a ‘patrimonal sea’ advanced by several Latin American coastal States, discussed in: Dolliver Nelson,
‘The Patrimonial Sea’ (1973) 22 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 668.
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Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), through
the adoption and opening for signature of the LOSC. The nature, components and
spatial limits of national jurisdiction recognised by the LOSC are discussed extensively in other literature and will not be addressed in detail here.20 For the present
purposes, it is relevant to highlight the following:
The LOSC is now widely subscribed to: as of June 2012, the Convention has been
ratified or acceded to by a total of 161 States (and also the European Union).21
The vast majority of coastal States – including the United States which is not
currently party to the LOSC22 – attempt to articulate maritime jurisdictional claims
in terms that correspond generally to the requirements set out in the Convention.23
The widespread implementation of the Convention represents considerable progress
towards a global consensus regarding the jurisdictional scope and spatial limits of
national maritime claims. Indeed most of the Convention’s provisions are recognised
as being reflective of customary international law.24
The LOSC recognises the sovereignty of a coastal State over a territorial sea extending up to 12 nautical miles from baselines designated in accordance with the
20

See generally Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7; and Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16
on the previous page.
21
See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the implementation of
Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the
Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks (2011) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf>.
22
The United States nonetheless accepts that LOSC provisions concerning zones of national jurisdiction are customary in character. For further discussion see Ashley Roach and Robert Smith,
United States responses to excessive maritime claims (2nd ed, 1996) 4–6.
23
For an illustrative list of national maritime claims that correspond generally
to LOSC requirements, see United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty
Notices to Mariners:
National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, available at
<http://www.ukho.gov.uk/ProductsandServices/MartimeSafety/AnnualNm/12.pdf>.
A
notable exception is the practice of several Latin American States: See, eg, Paul Stanton Kibel,
‘Alone at Sea: Chile’s Presencial Ocean Policy’, 12 Journal of Environmental Law 43 (2000);
and Jane Dalton, ‘The Chilean Mar Presencial: a harmless concept or a dangerous precedent?’,
8 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 397 (1993). Despite the widespread
acknowledgment and acceptance of the LOSC, there exists entrenched disagreement between
several coastal States concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’s
provisions. Key areas of disagreement relate to the establishment of maximal claims to straight
and archipelagic baselines and the ability of certain littoral features to generate maritime
zones.
24
Writing in 1999, Churchill and Lowe comment that the ‘UN regime for the seas is already almost
universally accepted, and is moving steadily closer to universal subscription’: above n 10 on
page 7, 22).
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Convention.25 Waters located landward of territorial sea baselines constitute the
‘internal waters’ of a coastal State and, with limited exception, are subject to the
full territorial sovereignty of that State.26 The LOSC also recognises a special category of ‘archipelagic’ States that are entitled in certain circumstances to draw
straight ‘archipelagic baselines’ enclosing ‘archipelagic waters’ that are subject to
the sovereignty of the relevant archipelagic State.27 In accordance with LOSC Article 33, a coastal State is also entitled to assert national jurisdiction in defined
circumstances within a contiguous zone extending not more than 24 nautical miles
from territorial sea baselines.
Beyond the territorial sea, the LOSC recognises the entitlement of a coastal State
to claim ‘sovereign rights’28 over the sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters within
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles from its territorial sea baselines.29 Sovereign rights that do not depend on an express coastal
State claim are conferred in relation to natural resources of the continental shelf,30
which may extend 200 nautical miles, or potentially further seaward, from territorial sea baselines in accordance with complex requirements set out in LOSC Part

25

See LOSC Part II, particularly LOSC Articles 27 and 28 regarding jurisdiction in relation to
foreign ships in the territorial sea. For discussion of the Convention’s rules concerning baselines,
see Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16 on page 8, 33–57.
26
Territorial sovereignty over internal waters is qualified by LOSC Article 8(2), which is summarised by Churchill and Lowe as follows: ‘The single exception to this principle is that where
straight baselines are drawn along a coastline that is deeply indented or fringed with islands,
enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right
of innocent passage continues to exist through those newly enclosed waters ...’: Churchill and
Lowe, above n 10 on page 7, 61.
27
See LOSC Part IV. Note also that the breadth of an archipelagic State’s territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf is measured from its archipelagic baselines, provided
they are designated in accordance with the Convention: LOSC Article 48.
28
The term ‘sovereign rights’ is used in the LOSC to refer to several limited, and specifically
enumerated, categories of exclusive jurisdictional entitlements that do not amount to full
sovereignty. See Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 504 for discussion concerning use of the term in the LOSC and 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. For
further discussion concerning development of the term by the International Law Commission
prior to UNCLOS I, see: International Law Commission, ‘Articles concerning the Law of the Sea
with commentaries’ (1956) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 297, available at
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/8_1_8_2_1956.pdf>.
29
See LOSC Part V, particularly Articles 55–57 and Article 73. Thus, assuming a territorial sea
of 12 nautical miles is claimed, an EEZ may be up to 200-12=188 nautical miles in breadth.
30
See LOSC Part VI, particularly Article 77. See also Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7,
151–157.
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VI and Annex II.31 To establish the limit of ‘outer’32 continental shelf rights beyond
200 nautical miles, LOSC States Parties are required to submit information to a
technical body established by the Convention – the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) – which considers the information and makes recommendations as to the relevant limit.33 LOSC Article 76(8) provides continental
shelf limits established by a coastal State ‘on the basis of’ CLCS recommendations
‘shall be final and binding’. It is unclear whether the phrase ‘final and binding’
applies solely to the relevant coastal State, or to LOSC States Parties in general.34
Even if the former interpretation is accepted, the final and binding character of a
declared continental shelf limit beyond 200 nautical miles would emerge gradually
in the absence of protest (or overlapping claims) by other coastal States.35
When a coastal State claims a contiguous zone and an EEZ, waters located beyond
the territorial sea, but within the limit of the contiguous zone, are cumulatively
subject to the different jurisdictional entitlements linked to each zone.36 Beyond the
territorial sea and within 200 nautical miles of territorial sea baselines, there is also
31

See in particular LOSC Article 76-77. See also Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7,
145–150 and Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16 on page 8, 109–117.
32
Continental shelf located beyond 200 nautical miles seaward of territorial sea
baselines is also commonly referred to as ‘extended’ continental shelf:
see,
eg, CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines adopted in 1999, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm>.
The author
prefers to use the term ‘outer’ continental shelf because it does not impliedly (and erroneously)
suggest that sovereign rights over the continental shelf are subject to, or capable of, extension.
For further discussion concerning the usage of both terms see: I Made Andi Arsana and Clive
Schofield, ‘Adding Further Complexity? Extended Continental Shelf Submissions in East and
Southeast Asia’ in Clive Schofield (ed), Maritime Energy Resources in Asia: Legal Regimes
and Cooperation (National Bureau of Asian Research Report, February 2012), available at
<http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=233>.
33
For further discussion and references see Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16 on
page 8, 98–118.
Detailed information concerning CLCS recommendations and the
current status of coastal State submissions to the Commission is available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.
34
See Dolliver Nelson, ‘The Settlement of Disputes Arising from Conflicting Outer Continental
Shelf Claims’ (2009) 24 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 409; cf Ted McDorman, ‘The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body
in a Political World’ (2002) 17 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301.
35
McDorman, above n 34. See also Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16 on page 8, 114–115.
36
Per LOSC Article 33, coastal State jurisdiction in the contiguous zone enables the exercise
of control necessary to prevent or punish of infringements of customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitary laws within a coastal State’s territory or territorial sea. Per LOSC Article 56,
coastal State jurisdiction in the EEZ is focuses on the management and exploitation of natural
resources. For further information see Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7.
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a degree of jurisdictional overlap between the continental shelf and EEZ: In both
of these zones a coastal State is attributed a package of sovereign rights concerning
the seabed and subsoil.37 Consistency between both packages of sovereign rights is
maintained by LOSC Article 56(3), which provides that EEZ sovereign rights with
respect to the seabed and subsoil are to be exercised in accordance with LOSC Part
VI (concerning the continental shelf).38
National jurisdiction in each of the maritime zones mentioned above is curtailed by
various duties and rights conferred to other States, reflecting a compromise between
different negotiating interests at UNCLOS III.39 For example: Within the territorial
sea, foreign vessels are afforded a right of innocent passage.40 Foreign vessels navigating in archipelagic waters are afforded a right of innocent passage41 in addition
to a broader right of archipelagic sea lanes passage42 within certain sea lanes and air

37

See LOSC 56 (concerning the EEZ) and 77 (concerning the continental shelf). The Virginia
Commentaries note that, during UNCLOS III, there was considerable debate ‘between those
States wishing to retain the continental shelf as a legal institution and those asserting that the
rights relating to the continental shelf should be absorbed into the new concept of the EEZ.’:
Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 844. Churchill and Lowe observe
that ‘[h]ad it not been for a strong desire on the part of many coastal States, now reflected
in the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, to include within the legal continental
shelf those parts of the continental margin extending beyond 200 nautical miles, the legal
regime of the continental shelf could have been subsumed within the EEZ.’: Churchill and
Lowe, above n 10 on page 7, 166. The strong desire to establish an express entitlement in the
LOSC to continental shelf rights beyond 200 nautical miles was in a part a consequence of the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), in which the International Court of Justice recognised the ‘inherent
rights’ of the coastal State in relation to ‘the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea ...’: see Judgment of 20 February 1969,
1969 ICJ Rep, 19.
38
The Virginia Commentaries note that this ‘dovetailing diminishes the potential for confusion
between the EEZ and continental shelf’: See Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on
page 4, 491.
39
For comprehensive documentation of the various positions and their evolution, see the Virginia
Commentaries, above n 1 on page 4.
40
LOSC Article 17. For further information see Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7.
41
LOSC Article 52.
42
LOSC Article 53.
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routes.43 Foreign vessels in the EEZ enjoy navigational freedoms afforded to vessels
on the high seas, subject to several functional sovereign rights of the coastal State.44
Maritime delimitation and overlapping claims:
The location of the world’s coastlines, and the manner in which they are divided
politically amongst different coastal States, creates significant potential for coastal
States to claim maritime zones recognised by the LOSC that overlap with one another. For example, no presently existing coastal State could claim a full-breadth
EEZ that would not overlap in part with an equivalent claim of a neighbouring State.
The obvious (though not necessarily straightforward) method for removing overlapping claims is maritime delimitation – the establishment of a maritime boundary
(or boundaries) delineating the adjoining limits of national jurisdiction claimed by
neighbouring coastal States.
Maritime boundary delimitation is subject to treaty obligations and customary rules
of international law that have been analysed and applied in a large body of jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.45 These rules are discussed extensively
in other literature46 and are not the focus of this thesis. For the present purposes
it is however relevant to highlight two features of the international legal framework
concerning boundary delimitation:

43

For further discussion concerning navigation rights in archipelagic waters see Martin Tsamenyi,
Clive Schofield and Ben Milligan, ‘Navigation through archipelagos: current state practice’ in
Myron Nordquist et al (eds), 32nd Oceans Conference: Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights, and
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (2009).
44
See LOSC Articles 56, 60. As noted previously, these rights are focused generally on the management and exploitation of natural resources. For further information see Churchill and Lowe,
above n 10 on page 7.
45
For a succinct overview of relevant rules and jurisprudence see Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16
on page 8, 383–411. At the time of writing the most recent example of relevant jurisprudence is:
Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar
in the Bay of Bengal, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judgment of 14 March
2012, available at <http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1C16_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf>.
46
See, eg, Arthur Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (1989); Robert Kolb,
Case law on equitable maritime delimitation: digest and commentaries (2003); Nuno Antunes,
Towards the conceptualisation of maritime delimitation: Legal and technical aspects of a political
process (2003); Rainer Lagoni and Daniel Vignes, Maritime Delimitation (2006); Yoshifumi
Tanaka, Predictability and flexibility in the law of maritime delimitation (2006).
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The first noteworthy feature is that an international maritime boundary can only
be established by, or in accordance with agreement between, the relevant claimant
coastal States.47 In the 1951 Fisheries case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
stated as follows:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed
in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is
necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent
to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other
States depends on international law ...48
In the 1984 Gulf of Maine Case the Court noted that ‘no maritime delimitation
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one
of those states.’49 A clear and unequivocal acceptance of unilaterally designated
boundary by another coastal State may, however, prevent that State from disputing
the boundary subsequently.50 The requirement to effect delimitation by agreement is
clearly articulated in the relevant treaty obligations concerning maritime boundary
delimitation, namely: Article 12 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention (concerning
delimitation of the territorial sea); Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf (concerning delimitation of the continental shelf); and LOSC Articles
47

Note that the UN Security Council is empowered to take action in accordance with Chapter
VII of the UN Charter with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression. This authority has been used to designate maritime boundaries in the aftermath of
armed conflict. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 687 provided, inter alia, for the
establishment of a maritime boundary between Kuwait and Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War.
See: Jan Klabbers, ‘No More Shifting Lines? The Report of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission’ (1994) 43 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 904.; Harry
Brown, The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute: Historical Background and the UN Decisions of
1992 and 1993 (1994) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 66. Note also that
48
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway), 1951 ICJ Reports 116, 132. See also Fisheries
Jurisdiction cases (United Kingdom v Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v Iceland), 1974
ICJ Reports 3, 22, 175, 191; and Gulf of Maine case,1984 ICJ Reports 246, 299.
49
Gulf of Maine Case, above n 48.
50
See Cameroon v Nigeria [1998] ICJ Rep p 275 and 303, where the International Court of Justice
discussed the application of the principle of estoppel to a maritime boundary dispute. In
the context of the case, the Court noted that ‘An estoppel would only arise if by its acts
or declarations Cameroon had consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle
the boundary dispute submitted to the Court by bilateral avenues alone. It would further
be necessary that, by relying on such an attitude, Nigeria had changes position to its own
detriment or had suffered some prejudice.’ See also the Temple of Preah Vihear (Thailand v
Cambodia) [1962] ICJ Rep 6,23,31-32 and discussion in Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th
ed, 2008) 517-519.
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15, 74 and 83 (concerning, respectively, delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone, and continental shelf).51
The second noteworthy feature is that international legal obligations concerning
maritime boundary delimitation are highly general in nature – they do not prescribe detailed principles or methods of delimitation.52 Indeed there are on-going
disagreements between many coastal States regarding the manner in which various
principles and methods should influence the course of a boundary line.53 A key area
of ongoing disagreement concerns the application of ‘natural prolongation’ principles
to delimitation of the continental shelf (see Chapter 2.3.6 for further discussion).54
Delimitation principles and methods proposed and debated during the UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea can be loosely divided into two opposing groups: The
first sought to determine the course of a maritime boundary primarily by reference
to an equidistance/median line.55 The second emphasised the achievement of an
equitable result, taking into account a broad range of relevant circumstances.56
At present, more than 200 maritime boundaries have been established either by
direct agreement (i.e. negotiated designation of a maritime boundary) or indirect
agreement (i.e. mutual acceptance of a boundary determined by a third-party such
51

A detailed analysis of these obligations and their implications for the provisional joint management of OCAs is undertaken in Chapter 2.
52
See: Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 132–143, 796–816, 948–985; and
Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16 on page 8, 181–202.
53
See ibid. For a detailed technical discussion of various delimitation methods see Antunes, above
n 46 on page 13; and International Oceanographic Commission, International Hydrographic
Organisation, and International Association of Geodesy, A Manual on Technical Aspects of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (4th ed, March 2006) (TALOS Manual).
54
As mentioned above in n 37 on page 12, the natural prolongation principle was introduced by
the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases as a criterion for
determining the spatial extend of coastal State rights over the continental shelf. The Court also
considered the principle to be relevant to delimitation, stating that ‘delimitation is to effected
in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each party all those parts of the continental
shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of another State’: Judgment
of 20 February 1969, 1969 ICJ Rep, 19, [101]. For an illustrative example of disagreement
concerning application of the principle to maritime delimitation in the East China Sea, see:
Schofield and Townsend-Gault, above n 3 on page 5.
55
Ibid. For further discussion see Chapters 2.3.2, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6, below. The terms equidistance
line and median line are used interchangeably to refer to a line every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest basepoints on two coasts: see Antunes, above n 46 on page 13,152–168; and
TALOS Manual, above n 53, Chapter 6.
56
Ibid. For further discussion see Chapters 2.3.2, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6, below.
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as an international court or tribunal).57 According to recent estimates, this number
represents less than half of the world’s potential maritime boundaries.58
Overlapping claim areas:
In the absence of maritime boundaries, many of the world’s oceans and seas currently
feature maritime spaces where the zones of national jurisdiction claimed by two
or more neighbouring coastal States overlap with one another. As noted in the
introduction to this Chapter, OCAs are likely to be an enduring feature of the world’s
political geography given the various complications and competing national interests
that often impede maritime boundary negotiations. The total area of maritime space
currently subject to overlapping claims is extensive. For example, the total area of
maritime space subject to overlapping outer continental shelf entitlements is more
than 2.7 million square kilometres.59 The global distribution of OCAs is illustrated
by Table 1.1, which identifies (as of September 2010) the number and percentage of
potential maritime boundaries that have not been delimited.
From a legal perspective, there are four key characteristics of these OCAs that are
important to bear in mind while reading this thesis.
The first characteristic is that the nature of claimed national jurisdiction within a
particular OCA may vary. Assuming that claims asserted by two or more neigh57

For a comprehensive identification and discussion of delimited international maritime boundaries, see Jonathan Charney and Lewis Alexander (eds) International Maritime Boundaries,
Volumes I and II (1993), Volume III (1998); Jonathan Charney and Robert Smith (eds) International Maritime Boundaries, Volume IV (2002); David Colson and Robert Smith (eds)
International Maritime Boundaries, Volume V (2005). The statistic is taken from: Robert van
de Poll and Clive Schofield, ‘A seabed scramble: a global overview of extended continental shelf
submissions’ (Paper presented at 5th International Conference of the Advisory Board on the
Law of the Sea, Monaco, 25–27 October 2010). The number of maritime boundaries worldwide
varies significantly depending on what assumptions are made: for further discussion see Clive
Schofield, ‘The delimitation of maritime boundaries: an incomplete mosaic’ in Doris WastlWalter (ed) The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies (2011) 665–681. The number
of 200 given above assumes that boundaries composed of multiple distinct segments count as a
single boundary.
58
See Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 217–
218; Clive Schofield, ‘Blurring the Lines? Maritime Joint Development and the Cooperative
Management of Ocean Resources’ (2009) Issues in Legal Scholarship Article 3 available at
<http://www.bepress.com/ils/oceanresource>; and Van de Poll and Schofield, above n 57.
59
Van de Poll and Schofield, above n 57. The total area of outer continental shelf OCAs is expected
to grow considerably as the CLCS continues to issues recommendations for deposited coastal
State submissions. Detailed information concerning the status of deposited submissions is
published on the CLCS website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.
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Region
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
Oceania
South America
Total

Potential maritime
boundaries
141
106
95
122
34
22
520

Boundaries not
delimited
92 (65.3%)
66 (62.2%)
45 (47.4%)
78 (63.9%)
23 (67.7%)
7 (31.8%)
311 (59.8%)

Table 1.1: Global progress towards maritime boundary delimitation, by continental
region. Source: Van de Poll and Schofield, footnote 57 on the previous
page, which documents the various assumptions on which the numbers
are based.
bouring coastal States have a recognised basis in the LOSC, an OCA can arise from
several scenarios, including the following: (1) overlapping claims to internal waters;
(2) overlapping claims to territorial sea; (3) overlapping claims to a contiguous zone;
(4) claims overlapping with claimed archipelagic waters;60 (5) overlapping claims to
an EEZ; and/or (6) overlapping entitlements to continental shelf. All of these scenarios have arisen in practice (see Chapter 3 for illustrative examples).61 Note that
there are many practical examples of OCAs in which scenarios 5 and 6 occur concurrently (i.e. each claimant coastal State asserts both an EEZ claim and continental
shelf entitlement concerning a certain area).62 Note also that, in addition to the
scenarios listed above, it is possible for certain neighbouring coastal States to assert
claims in a manner that generates a spatial overlap solely between an EEZ claimed
by one coastal State and the continental shelf entitlement of another. This scenario
has arisen in several locations as a consequence of maritime boundary agreements,63
60

This scenario is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.3.3 below.
Notionally, sufficiently proximate opposite coastal States could also assert claims in a manner
that generates overlap between (1) an EEZ claimed by one coastal State and Territorial Sea,
Contiguous Zone or Internal Waters claimed by another; (2) a continental shelf claimed by
one coastal State and territorial sea or internal waters claimed by another. These situations
could only arise if at least one of the opposite coastal States had a highly indented coast and
designated straight baselines whose validity under the LOSC was disputed by the relevant
opposite coastal State. As far as the author is aware, neither situation has arisen in practice.
62
See, eg: Schofield and Townsend-Gault, above n 3 on page 5, which discusses overlapping claims
in the East China Sea.
63
See Max Herriman and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The 1997 Australia–Indonesia maritime boundary
treaty: a secure legal regime for offshore resource development?’ (1998) 29 Ocean Development
and International Law 361; and Chapter 3.3.4 below.
61
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and most recently as a consequence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea’s judgment in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case.64 In keeping with the focus of
this thesis on management of maritime spaces prior to boundary delimitation, it
will not be addressed in detail.65
The second key characteristic is that the spatial limits of an OCA may be unclear,
or actively disputed, by the relevant claimant coastal States. The former situation
arises when baselines or the spatial limits of maritime zones have not been declared
by one or more of the claimant coastal States.66 The latter situation arises when
coastal State A asserts that coastal State B has no legal entitlement to assert a claim
in a particular location claimed by coastal State A. For example, coastal State A
might assert that baselines designated by coastal State B are inconsistent with the
relevant rules contained in the LOSC.67 Another example is where coastal State A
asserts that an insular feature claimed by coastal State B is not capable, according
64

Judgment of 14 March 2012, available at <http://www.itlos.org/>, which established a maritime
boundary (delimiting the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf) between Bangladesh and
Myanmar. The Tribunal’s delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
gave rise to a so-called ‘Grey Area’ located beyond 200 nautical miles from Bangladesh, but
within 200 nautical miles from Myanmar, and on the Bangladeshi side of the continental shelf
delimitation line. The Tribunal held that this area is subject to the continental shelf entitlement
of Bangladesh, and, with respect to the superjacent waters, to the EEZ of Myanmar. Citing
LOSC Articles 56, 58, 78 and 79, the Tribunal also noted that, in relation to the Grey Area,
‘each coastal State must exercise its rights and perform its duties with due regard to the rights
and duties of the other’: see paragraphs [463]–[476] of the Judgment. It is important to note
that, pursuant to LOSC Article 56(3), the water-column rights of Myanmar are curtailed to
the extent that they conflict with the seabed rights of Bangladesh, and, as noted above, both
States must afford due regard to their respective rights and duties.
65
See ibid, and Herriman and Tsamenyi, above n 63, for a detailed analysis of the applicable legal
issues.
66
The most common practice for establishing maritime zones is to: (1) designate territorial sea baselines; and (2) assert an ambit claim/entitlement to a particular maritime
zone that is defined spatially by its maximum limit as measured from territorial sea baselines. See, for example, the Declaration by the Government of Indonesia concerning the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia (21 March 1980), which declares, inter alia, that
‘The Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia is the area beyond the Indonesian Territorial
Sea ... the breadth of which extends 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the Indonesian Territorial Sea is measured.’ The full text of the Declaration is reproduced at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/>.
An alternative approach is to simply designate coordinates of the limits of a maritime zone: see, eg, the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 (Act No.
311), which establishes an ambit claim to a 200 nautical mile EEZ, subject to any
specific limits designated by the Malaysian Government.
The Act is reproduced at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/MYS.htm>.
67
For further discussion concerning relevant provisions of the LOSC, see Churchill and Lowe, above
n 10 on page 7, 31–59.
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to LOSC rules,68 of generating the maritime zones projected from that feature by
coastal State B.69
The third key characteristic is that OCAs are not necessarily bounded by the maximum seaward limit of coastal State jurisdiction recognised in the LOSC. Claimant
coastal States frequently do not claim the full extent of their respective maritime
zones. For example, they may only claim waters located landward of what they
assert to be the correct course of the relevant maritime boundary. In such circumstances, and assuming that all claimant coastal States agree that their respective
claims are consistent with the LOSC, the limits of the OCA are defined by the
competing asserted locations of the maritime boundary.
Finally, OCAs may arise from an unresolved sovereignty dispute. For example, if
two or more States both claim a single piece of coastal or insular territory, any
equivalent maritime zones projected from that territory by each State overlap with
one another.70 Maritime zones projected from territory claimed by more than one
coastal State may also, depending on the coastal geography of the region in question,
68

For further discussion of relevant LOSC provisions, in particular LOSC Article 121, see
Johnathan Charney, ‘Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation’ (1999) 93 The American
Journal of International Law 863; Alexander Elferink, ‘Clarifying Article 121 (3) of the Law
of the Sea Convention: The Limits Set by the Nature of International Legal Processes,’ (1998)
6(2) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 58; Barbara Kwiatkowska and Alfred Soons, ‘Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks Which Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic
Life of Their Own,’ (1990) 21 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 139; Jon Van Dyke
and Robert Brooks, ‘Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’
Resources,’ (1983) 12 Ocean Development and International Law 265.
69
A practical example of this scenario occurred during a maritime boundary dispute between Romania and Ukraine, which was resolved following the designation of a maritime boundary by
the International Court of Justice. During the dispute Romania disagreed with Ukraine’s assertion that a Ukrainian insular feature (‘Serpent’s Island’) was an island capable of generating
an EEZ/continental shelf. See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine),
Judgment of 3 Feburary 2009, 2009 ICJ Reports, 61.
70
Non-equivalent zones projected from the territory would not generate an OCA. For example, if two or more States both claim sovereignty over an island, and one asserts an EEZ
around that island while the other(s) does not, the claimed EEZ does not represent an OCA.
The entitlement to claim an EEZ would, however, remain in question and there would still
be a need to manage the waters on a provisional basis prior to settlement of the relevant
sovereignty dispute. A practical example of this scenario is the dispute between Argentina
and the United Kingdom concerning the Islas Aurora / Shag Rocks, which are small insular
features located 150 nautical miles northwest of South Georgia in the South Atlantic Ocean.
Both States claim territorial sovereignty over the features. Argentina claims that they are
capable of generating an EEZ and continental shelf. The United Kingdom asserts that the
features are ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own’
that per the LOSC Article 121 are only capable of generating an EEZ or continental shelf.
See International Boundaries Research Unit, ‘Claims and potential claims to maritime juris-
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overlap with other zones projected from other territories whose sovereignty is not
disputed.

1.2 Provisional joint management of OCAs
To the extent that they provoke diplomatic tensions and jurisdictional confusion,
overlapping maritime claims have adverse implications for oceans management.71
The sustainable management of living marine resources and the marine environment
within several OCAs has been hampered by a lack of policy coordination between
coastal States, including failures to cooperatively regulate fishing activities72 and
reluctance to apply unilateral regulatory measures for fear of inflaming diplomatic
tensions.73 Tensions and confusion associated with several OCAs has also impeded
or forestalled the exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon deposits located therein.74 Commentators have also noted the absence within several OCAs of

diction in the South Atlantic and Southern Oceans by Argentina and the UK’, available at
<http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/south_atlantic_maritime_claims.pdf>.
71
See, eg, Clive Schofield, ‘Maritime Cooperation in Contested Waters: Addressing Legal Challenges in East and Southeast Asian Waters’ in Schofield (ed), above n 32 on page 11.
72
See, eg, Ian Townsend-Gault, ‘Legal and Political Perspectives on Sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands’ (1999), in David Rosenberg (ed) South China Sea Virtual Library, available at
<http://www.southchinasea.org/pub.html>; Ian Townsend-Gault, ‘Preventative Diplomacy
and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea’ (1998) 20 Contemporary Southeast Asia (1998)
171–190; Pakjuta Khemakorn, ‘Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South
China Sea Region’, United Nations Nippon Foundation Fellow Report (2006) available at
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/>.
73
See, eg, ‘Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands’
(2002) 3(6) IBRU Boundary & Territory Briefings, which describes a diplomatic exchange
between China and Japan arising from action taken by the Japanese Coast Guard against
Taiwanese fishing vessels operating in an OCA surrounding the Pinnacle Islands/Senkaku
Islands/Diao-yu-tai.
74
See, eg, Yann-Huei Song ‘The Potential Marine Pollution Threat from Oil and Gas Development
Activities in the Disputed South China Sea/Spratly Area: A Role that Taiwan Can Play’
(2008) 39 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 150, 151-154. For discussion
of negotiating processes regarding hydrocarbon deposits in OCAs, see, eg, Gao Jianjin, ‘A Note
on the 2008 Cooperation Consensus Between China and Japan in the East China Sea’ (2009)
40 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 291; Clive Schofield, ‘Minding the
Gap: The Australia–East Timor Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea
(CMATS)’ (2007) 22 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 189.
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effective marine scientific research, search and rescue, monitoring and enforcement,
and provision for navigational safety.75
These management issues are particularly serious given the widespread distribution
of OCAs, the enduring character of such areas, and the potential strategic importance of OCAs for the relevant claimant coastal States. Living marine resources
located in OCAs are a major contributor to the economy of many coastal States, an
important source of livelihood for coastal communities, and a significant source of dietary protein for millions of people globally.76 In the context of rapidly rising global
energy demand, offshore hydrocarbon resources located within OCAs represent a
potential source of economic wealth for the relevant claimant coastal States and a
potentially significant contributor their domestic energy security.77 Several coastal
States are also highly and increasingly reliant on major sea lanes of communication
passing through OCAs as a medium for international trade.78
As an alternative to maritime boundary delimitation, or during the period where
delimitation negotiations are ongoing, several coastal States that assert overlapping
claims have agreed to establish frameworks to manage the relevant OCA on a provisional and joint basis. Several of these frameworks predate the LOSC, however
75

See, eg, See Clive Schofield, ‘Cooperative Mechanisms and Maritime Security in Areas of Overlapping Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction’ in Peter Cozens and Joanna Mossop, Capacity Building
for Maritime security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (2005) and Townsend-Gault, above n 72.
76
For detailed relevant statistics see:
UN Food and Agricultural Organisation,
The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010 available at
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1820e/i1820e.pdf>; and Serge Garcia and Andrew
Rosenberg, ‘Food security and marine capture fisheries: characteristics, trends, drivers and
future perspectives’ (2010) 365 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 2869.
77
For detailed quantitative analysis of relevant global and regional energy trends, see International
Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2011. See also Clive Schofield et al, above n 7 on page 5,
which notes that ‘International Energy Agency ... figures suggest that growth in demand
in Southeast Asia and China, coupled with maturing production there, will mean that net
oil imports are likely to quadruple by 2030’; in addition to Nick Owen and Clive Schofield,
‘Disputed South China Sea hydrocarbons in perspective’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 809.
78
For a relevant regional case studies, concerning the strategic importance of OCAs in the South
China Sea and East China Sea, see: Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea’ (2010) 41 Ocean Development
and International Law 315; and Schofield (ed), above n 7 on page 5. A report published in
2011 by the UN Conference on Trade and Development estimated that 90% of global cargo is
carried by sea. Seaborne trade has important energy security implications. For example, the
combination of maturing domestic energy production and increasing domestic energy demand
is predicted to dramatically increase the reliance of several coastal States on seaborne imports
of oil and gas: Schofield (ed), above n 7 on page 5.
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the majority have been established in the three decades following first signature
of the Convention. As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, provisional joint
management is increasingly viewed by government officials and other policymakers
as a useful tool to minimise diplomatic tensions associated with OCAs and any associated boundary negotiations. Crucially, it offers a potential means to address
pressing management concerns within such areas when the prospects of achieving
delimitation are remote.
At present there are at least 25 bilateral or multilateral treaties that establish frameworks for the provisional joint management of an OCA.79 Several OCAs are also
managed in accordance with a wide variety of non-binding instruments and informal political agreements.80 The central aim of the present thesis is to closely analyse
this diverse and growing body of State practice, in an attempt to: (1) develop a detailed collection of legal and policy options for the management of OCAs; and (2)
thereby inform the progressive development and implementation of provisional joint
management frameworks. Figure 1.1 illustrates the approximate geographic distribution of provisional joint management frameworks that are surveyed in this thesis.
It is immediately apparent that provisional joint management of OCAs is a global
phenomenon (although there is a high concentration of relevant frameworks in the
Asia-Pacific region). The numeric references in Figure 1.1 correspond to index entries in Table 1.2, which identifies the relevant participating coastal States and the
thesis Chapters in which each surveyed framework is discussed in detail.

79
80

See Chapter 3 on page 79 for further discussion.
Ibid.
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Figure 1.1: Approximate geographic distribution of surveyed provisional joint management frameworks
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Map ref
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Participating coastal States
Thesis chapter
Pacific Ocean excluding the Asian rim
Canada – United States
3.2.1
El Salvador – Honduras – Nicaragua
3.2.2
Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean
Argentina – United Kingdom
3.3.1
Argentina – Uruguay
3.3.2
Barbados – Guyana
3.3.3
Canada – United States
3.3.4
Colombia – Jamaica
3.3.5
Denmark – United Kingdom
3.3.6
Equatorial Guinea – Gabon
3.3.7
Guinea-Bissau – Senegal
3.3.8
Nigeria – São Tomé and Príncipe
3.3.9
Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela
3.3.10
Red Sea and Persian Gulf
Iran – United Arab Emirates (Sharjah)
3.4.1
Saudi Arabia – Sudan
3.4.2
North East Asia
Japan – People’s Republic of China
3.5.1
Japan – Republic of Korea
3.5.2
Japan – Russia
3.5.3
People’s Republic of China – Republic of Korea
3.5.4
South East Asia and Australia
Australia – Indonesia
3.6.1
Australia – East Timor
3.6.2
Cambodia – Thailand
3.6.3
Cambodia – Vietnam
3.6.4
The South China Sea (several claimants)
3.6.5
Indonesia – Malaysia
3.6.6
Malaysia – Thailand
3.6.7
Malaysia – Vietnam
3.6.8
Polar Regions
Norway – Russia
3.7.1
Canada – United States
3.7.2
Antarctic waters (several claimants)
3.7.3

Table 1.2: Index of surveyed provisional joint management frameworks
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1.3 Thesis structure and research questions
The thesis develops a response to the following research question:
1. What legal and policy options are available for coastal States to engage in
provisional joint management of OCAs in a manner that fully utilises their
rights, and is consistent with their obligations, under international law?
As a prerequisite for addressing this primary question, the thesis also develops responses to several underlying questions, including the following:
2. As a matter of international law, what rights does a coastal State possess to
manage activity in a zone of national jurisdiction that it claims?
3. As a matter of international law, to what extent are these rights curtailed or
otherwise modified within the spatial area where claims to zones of national
jurisdiction have not been delimited and thus overlap?
4. To what extent does current State practice concerning the provisional joint
management of OCAs enable the functionally comprehensive management of
such spaces?
Chapter 2 of the thesis addresses research questions 2 and 3 by examining relevant
provisions of the LOSC and customary international law. It examines the framework
of national jurisdiction set out in the LOSC, concluding that in each zone of national
jurisdiction recognised by the Convention, a coastal State is entrusted with a package of exclusive rights to manage human activity in one or more of the following six
functional contexts, namely: artificial structures, environmental protection, marine
scientific research, maritime security, navigational safety and resources exploitation.
Chapter 2 also examines the impact of relevant provisions of international law on the
entitlement of a coastal State to assert these functional components of its jurisdiction within an OCA. The central conclusion reached is that, unless a management
agreement is concluded between the relevant claimant coastal States, international
law does not establish a detailed framework for implementation within an OCA
of the functional components of coastal State jurisdiction. Accordingly, it falls to
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the relevant claimant coastal States to develop legal and policy frameworks enabling
them to manage human activity within OCAs on a functionally comprehensive basis
(thereby fully utilising their coastal State rights under international law).
Chapter 3 focuses on the development by coastal States of frameworks for the provisional joint management of OCAs. A global survey and critical analysis of 25
bilateral or multilateral treaties and other relevant State practice is presented. The
design features of current State practice are analysed in order to develop a response
to the research question 4.
The analysis identifies great variation in the functional coverage of surveyed provisional joint management frameworks. It concludes that several frameworks may
be characterised as functionally comprehensive because they contain provisions enabling the assertion of coastal State jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional contexts. In other words, these frameworks establish a clear
basis for one or more of the claimant coastal States to undertake, within the relevant
OCA, management activities relating to: artificial structures, environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational safety and resource
exploitation. Chapter 3 also concludes that several provisional joint management
frameworks exhibit clear functional gaps that may undermine the ability of claimant
coastal States to engage in management of the relevant OCA in one or more of the
functional contexts listed above.
Drawing on the responses developed in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 addresses the
primary research question by proposing detailed legal and policy options for the provisional joint management of OCAs. The proposed options are intended to inform
the future negotiation of provisional joint management frameworks. Each proposed
option is accompanied by explanatory commentary, suggested legal drafting, and
references to representative examples of current State practice. The proposed options are also intended to facilitate the functionally comprehensive management of
OCAs by the relevant claimant coastal States. They offer potential avenues towards
‘filling’ the functional gaps evident in current State practice by enabling the col-
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lective implementation within OCAs of all functional components of coastal State
jurisdiction. The author’s intention is to be suggestive rather than prescriptive – in
deference to the fact that functional gaps in provisional joint management frameworks often arise from compelling political and strategic factors that impede further
cooperation concerning the management of OCAs.
Thesis findings and suggested areas of further research are consolidated in Chapter
5, which also contains concluding recommendations for coastal States that are actively engaged in the provisional joint management of OCAs, or the negotiation of
prospective provisional joint management frameworks.

1.4 Contribution to existing literature
OCAs have been discussed and analysed by a considerable and growing body of
literature. The following paragraphs contain a succinct review of this literature
and identify the three key scholarly contributions made by this thesis. Sources
cited in the footnotes are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive – many
other examples of relevant literature are referenced and discussed where appropriate
throughout the thesis.
The bulk of literature concerning OCAs focuses on maritime jurisdictional disputes
and their resolution through maritime boundary negotiations. For example: The
five-volume series International Maritime Boundaries 81 contains essays on the development of international maritime boundary practice, global analyses of the design
features of maritime delimitation agreements, in addition to a compendium of primary source material concerning maritime delimitation (and the management of
OCAs). In The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Prescott and Schofield
present a complementary study that focuses on the political geography of delimited
and un-delimited maritime claims.82 Other works consider the substantive content
81
82

Above, n 57.
Prescott and Schofield, above n 57.
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of international law concerning maritime delimitation83 , analyse and document jurisprudence developed by international courts and tribunals,84 or investigate the
conceptual foundations of relevant international obligations.85
In relation to the provisional management of OCAs prior to boundary delimitation,
several publications analyse State practice in specific geographic contexts and focus on the use of provisional joint management generally as a means of resolving a
particular boundary dispute or disputes. Generally, this body of literature selects
illustrative examples of OCA management frameworks, analysing their relevance
and applicability to a particular instance of overlapping claims. For example: Sun
Pyo Kim develops a detailed analysis of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction
in North East Asia, incorporating discussion of maritime delimitation principles
and the development of provisional joint management arrangements in the region.86
His analysis is informed by a general overview and categorisation of State practice
concerning the provisional joint management of OCAs.87 Valencia et al, develop a
detailed analysis of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction in the South China
Sea, incorporating discussion concerning the merits of relevant territorial and maritime claims under international law, in addition to political factors underlying the
various claims.88 The authors also propose models for cooperative management of
the region’s marine resources, drawing on several examples from other regions of
State practice concerning OCA management.
A growing body of literature focuses on the management of OCAs in specific functional contexts. Oil and gas development in OCAs has received the most scholarly
83

See, eg, Lagoni, above n 46 on page 13; Vignes, above n 46 on page 13; Evans, above n 46 on
page 13.
84
See, eg, Kolb, above n 46 on page 13.
85
See, eg, Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and flexibility in the law of maritime delimitation
(2006); Nuno Antunes, Towards the conceptualisation of maritime delimitation: Legal and
technical aspects of a political process (2003).
86
Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2.
87
Sun Pyo Kim proposes the following categories of State practice: Joint Development Zones, Joint
Fishing Zones, Fisheries Arrangements on the Basis of De Facto Boundaries, Comprehensive
Joint Exploitation Zones and Single Provisional Fisheries Boundaries.
88
Mark Valencia, Jon van Dyke and Noel Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea
(1997).
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treatment in this context.89 Perhaps the most influential analysis of OCA management was written in 1989/90 by Fox et al,90 who present a detailed analysis of
State practice concerning the joint development of offshore oil and gas and propose
a model ‘joint development’ agreement for coastal States. The scope of the model
agreement is confined to commercial oil and gas exploitation and ancillary management issues in areas of overlapping continental shelf or EEZ jurisdiction.91 Several
authors develop general classifications of State practice concerning the provisional
joint management of marine living resources within OCAs.92 Other publications
focus on issues of environmental protection,93 maritime security and enforcement,94
or the implications for the development of customary international law of State
practice concerning the provisional joint management of OCAs.95
The research presented in this thesis makes three key contributions to the literature
discussed above:
1. Detailed systematic and critical global survey of current State practice: The
thesis provides an up-to-date reference of current State concerning the provi89

There is also a considerable body of scholarship concerning the development of oil and gas
deposits that straddle maritime boundaries. See, eg, Rainer Lagoni, ‘Oil and Gas Deposits
Across National Frontiers’ (1979) 73 The American Journal of International Law 233; Alberto
Szekely, ‘The International Law of Submarine Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources: Legal
Limits to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico’ 26 Natural Resources Journal
766 (1986); Schofield, above n 57; Ana Bastida et al, ‘Cross-Border Unitization and Joint
Development Agreements: An International Law Perspective’ (2006) 29 Houston Journal of
International Law 355.
90
Hazel Fox (ed) Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Model Agreement for States for
Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary, Volumes I and II (1989 and 1990).
91
The authors note that their ‘research and discussions have been confined to the joint sharing of oil
and gas. This term covers joint commercial exploitation of oil and gas, and ancillary questions of
security, jurisdiction, title, navigation, taxation, health and safety, and environmental matters
relating to that development.’: Fox et al, above n 90, Volume I, 12.
92
See, eg, Thang Nguyen Dang, ‘Fisheries Co-operation in the South China Sea and the
(Ir)relevance of the Sovereignty Question’ (2011) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 59;
Robin Churchill, ‘Fisheries Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ (1993) 17 Marine Policy 44.
93
See, eg,David Ong, ‘The Progressive Integration of Environmental Protections within Offshore
Joint Development Agreements’ in M Fitzmaurice and M Szuniewicz (eds), Exploitation of
Natural Resources in the 21st Century (2003).
94
See Schofield, above n 75.
95
See, eg, Juha Rainne, ‘The Work of the International Law Commission on Shared Natural
Resources’ (2006) 75 Nordic Journal of International Law 321; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Review of
Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law and Optimal Resource Use’ (2005) 54
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 521; David Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common
Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law?’ (1999)
93 The American Journal of International Law 771.
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sional joint management of OCAs. In contrast to previous works, it attempts
to develop (1) a global systematic survey of provisional joint management
frameworks; and (2) a critical assessment of the functional coverage and specific design features of those frameworks. In order to avoid replication of
existing literature, the spatial characteristics of overlapping claims, and legal
or technical issues associated with maritime delimitation, are only addressed
to the extent they are contextually relevant. In comparison to the model
agreement developed by Fox et al in 1989/1990,96 the thesis does not contain a
‘narrow and deep’ treatment of oil and gas development within OCAs. Rather,
it contains a ‘shallow and broad’ analysis of OCA management in a range of
functional contexts (including living resources management, maritime security
and environmental protection). Another distinctive contribution of the thesis
is that it identifies the considerable growth and diversification of relevant State
practice that has occurred in the two decades following the model agreement’s
publication.
2. Detailed legal and policy options for provisional joint management: The thesis is the first study since the Fox et al97 model agreement to undertake a
fine-grained98 global examination and identification of different approaches to
drafting legal and policy frameworks for the provisional joint management of
OCAs. Existing analyses of OCA management are either fine-grained and regionally or functionally focused (e.g. Valencia et al, above n 88 on page 28), or
coarse-grained and globally focused (e.g. Schofield, above n 58 on page 16).99
A distinctive contribution of the thesis is that it attempts to develop a globallyrelevant template for designing particular components of OCA management.
96

Above n 90.
Above n 90.
98
Granularity is the extent to which something is divided into subcomponents, or the level of
detail or complexity at which something is described: see Mehdi Khosrowpour, Dictionary of
Science and Technology (2007), 290. A commonly used example of increasingly fine-grained
descriptions is: A list of UN member States, a list of all provinces in those States, a list of all
counties in those provinces, etc.
99
SP Kim’s work, above n 2 on page 4, engages in both types of analysis – it contains a fine-grained
examination of relevant State practice in North East Asia, contextualised by a coarse-grained
analysis of relevant State practice globally.
97
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3. Focus on functionally comprehensive management: The thesis is the first
global study of OCA management that focuses holistically on all aspects of
human interaction with such spaces, as opposed to the targeted management
of particular functional contexts or resources. A distinctive contribution of
the thesis is that it identifies functional gaps in existing frameworks for OCA
management and proposes template options for filling those gaps.

1.5 Study methods and challenges
The thesis presents a typical example of qualitative document analysis.100 The objects of analysis are primary and secondary documents concerning a defined body
international law and associated State practice (relating to the provisional joint
management of OCAs). The document analysis is argument-based, falling within
the field of applied doctrinal legal research.101 The analysis not, however, doctrinal
in the strict sense of that term – extraneous technical, policy and political considerations are frequently taken into account.102 The analysis is ‘applied’ in character
because it was developed primarily to serve the needs of a professional (as opposed to
purely academic) constituency, and has a particular purpose in mind (i.e. to develop
a set of legal and policy options for coastal States).103 The following paragraphs
provide an overview of document collection methods and the context in which documents were analysed. They also discuss how the scope of the thesis and associated
research methods were adapted in response to challenges encountered.
International law and State practice concerning the provisional joint management of
OCAs was identified by collection and review of publicly available primary and secondary sources. Primary source material that was identified includes bilateral and
100

For a detailed overview of this research method see Glenn Bowen, ‘Document Analysis as a
Qualitative Research Method’ (2009) 9(2) Qualitative Research Journal 27.
101
For further discussion concerning doctrinal legal research methods see Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal
Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built
Environment (2008).
102
See ibid.
103
See ibid.
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multilateral international instruments (both binding and non-binding), legislation
and policy documents promulgated by national governments, and official documents
published by international organisations. Secondary source material that was identified includes books, journal articles, conference papers and reports written by academic commentators and other relevant experts. The collection and review process
was undertaken in the following manner:
In the first instance, an attempt was made to develop a list of all currently existing
OCAs by reference to reliable secondary sources. To this end the author reviewed
the contents of The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World 104 in addition to
all reports published in the International Maritime Boundaries series105 and the
International Boundaries Research Unit Boundary News.106
For each OCA identified in the above manner, the author undertook an internet and
physical library search in order to identify primary and secondary sources of documentary information concerning provisional joint management of that area. Primary
and secondary sources of documentary information were also obtained through iterative unstructured consultation with government officials and other experts working
in relevant fields. In contrast to structured interviews, the use of unstructured
consultations allowed for source material to be obtained without pre-imposing limitations on the range and interpretation of that material.107 Unstructured consultations were undertaken via email, in person in a variety of informal settings, and
in person at: the 2011 International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference (Taipei, 29 May – 1 June 2011); 2011 International Conference on Joint
Development and the South China Sea (National University of Singapore, 16 – 17
June 2011); 2011 UC Berkley Law of the Sea Institute Conference (Wollongong, 28
November – 2 December 2011); and a ‘Visiting Fellows’ Roundtable’ hosted by the
104

Prescott and Schofield, above n 57.
Above, n 57.
106
Available online at <http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/>.
107
See A Fontana and JH Frey, ‘The Interview: From Structured to Negotiated Text’ in NK Denzin
and YS Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd edition, 2000), who also note that
structured interviews seek to collect data of a codable nature.
105
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Lauterpacht Centre for International Law (University of Cambridge, 18 November
2009).
During internet and physical library searches, attempts were made to obtain primary
source material in the United Nations Treaty Collection database,108 the International Maritime Boundaries series109 , and in official reports published by relevant
governments and international organisations. When primary source material could
not be obtained, the author relied exclusively on secondary literature. To the extent
possible, the accuracy of secondary source material was critically appraised by: (1)
comparison to relevant primary source material; and (2) the aforementioned iterative unstructured consultation with government officials and other experts working
in relevant fields. No systematic attempt was made to obtain information concerning the management of OCAs that was not publicly disclosed or whose publication
would depend on the consent of government officials. Any information obtained by
the author and satisfying those exclusionary criteria has not been disclosed in this
thesis.
Document analysis was undertaken at various locations, including the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, Australia;
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, United Kingdom;
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom; Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore; and The
George Washington University Law School, Washinton DC, USA.
The methods discussed above were progressively refined in response to challenges
encountered during the course of the research. Two challenges had a significant
impact on the eventual scope of the thesis and the manner in which research was
conducted:
First, in order to develop options for OCA management, the author originally
planned to conduct a detailed global analysis of the extent to which OCA man108
109

This database is available online at <http://treaties.un.org/>.
Above, n 57.
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agement frameworks have implemented in practice by the relevant claimant States.
It became apparent at an early stage of the research that this approach would require
a combination of extensive consultation with government officials and/or extensive
travel and fieldwork. Both of these data collection methods are clearly impractical given the funding constraints of a PhD candidature. To address this challenge,
the scope of the thesis and associated data collection methods were narrowed. The
thesis in its present form focuses primarily on the de jure characteristics of OCA
management frameworks, as evidenced by, and developed by reference to, publicly
disclosed legal instruments and policy documents. De facto characteristics of OCA
management frameworks are only examined to the extent that they are: (1) documented in publicly disclosed primary or secondary sources; or (2) may be reasonably
inferred given publicly identified socio-political circumstances in relevant claimant
coastal States. Issues, challenges and options relating specifically to the de facto
implementation of OCA management frameworks are significant potential areas of
further (interdisciplinary) study.
Second, it became apparent at an early stage of the research that a global study of
OCA mangement would be difficult to complete solely through desk-based study at
a single academic institution: such an approach would reduce opportunities to obtain relevant primary and secondary source material, and, more importantly, would
preclude close interaction and consultation with a global community of relevant
experts. To address this challenge the author arranged visiting fellowships at academic institutions with a strong record of research in the thesis topic area,110 and
secured opportunities to present preliminary thesis findings at relevant international
conferences.111

110
111

The relevant institutions are listed in the sixth paragraph of this Sub-section.
The relevant conferences are listed in the fourth paragraph of this Sub-section.
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2 Management of overlapping claim
areas under international law1
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter examines the entitlement of claimant coastal States to manage activity
within OCAs in the context of relevant international law. As a necessary preliminary
matter, Section 2.2 focuses on the framework of national jurisdiction set out in the
LOSC, identifying key functional components of a coastal State’s jurisdiction to
manage activity within its maritime zones. The remaining Sections analyse the
impact of relevant provisions of international law on the entitlement of a coastal
State to assert the functional components of its jurisdiction on a provisional basis
within an OCA. Section 2.3 identifies and analyses several obligations that relate
most specifically to this issue, including LOSC Articles 15, 74 and 83. As noted in
Chapter 1.1, these obligations are primarily concerned with boundary delimitation
but specifically address the issue of OCA management to varying extents. Section
2.4 identifies and discusses the general features of several other legal obligations
that do not relate specifically to the management of OCAs but prescribe certain
modes of conduct that remain applicable in that context. Section 2.5 provides
an overview of the dispute settlement mechanism set out in LOSC Part XV and
1

Unless otherwise indicated, material in this Chapter has been adapted from the author’s contribution to a previous work: Ben Milligan and Clive Schofield, ‘Filling governance gaps in
the Asia-Pacific: Legal and policy options for achieving functionally comprehensive management of maritime spaces subject to overlapping jurisdictional claims’ (Paper presented at the
International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei, 29 May – 1 June 2011).
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examines the implications of this mechanism (and the relevance of principles of State
responsibility) for OCA management. The provisions of LOSC Part XV are relevant
because they determine the ability of international dispute settlement bodies to
influence or prescribe modalities of OCA management (for example through the
publication of legally binding judgments or provisional measures).

2.2 National jurisdiction under the LOSC
As noted in Chapter 1.1, the LOSC recognises several zones of national jurisdiction
that can be claimed by coastal States (or to which they are automatically entitled)
in accordance with rules set out in the Convention. The relevant zones are: internal waters, the territorial sea, archipelagic waters; the contiguous zone, EEZ, and
continental shelf. Within each of these zones, the LOSC attributes rights and obligations to coastal States that enable them to regulate activity on an exclusive basis
in one or more of the six functional contexts listed in the first column of Table 2.1.
The regulatory competence of a coastal State within its maritime zones has both a
‘prescriptive’ component (i.e. the jurisdictional entitlement under international law
to establish laws and regulations that apply in the relevant zone) and an ‘executive’
or ‘enforcement’ component (i.e. the jurisdictional entitlement under international
law to take action to enforce applicable laws and regulations, including via domestic
judicial procedures).2 Throughout this Thesis, unless otherwise stated, reference
to the ‘exercise’ of jurisdiction by a coastal State refers to implementation of the
enforcement component of that jurisdiction, supported by the relevant prescriptive
national laws and regulations.3
2

Brownlie notes that a State exercises enforcement jurisdiction when it takes executive action
‘in pursuance of or consequent on the making of [domestic] decisions or rules’: Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law (6th ed, 2003) 297. See also Shaw, above n 50 on page 14,
576–578. For further discussion concerning principles of jurisdiction under international law,
see M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972) 46 British Yearbook of International
Law 145 and B. Oxman, ‘Jurisdiction of States’ (1997) 3 Encyclopedia of Public International
Law 55.
3
An OCA represents the extent of spatial overlap between the respective prescriptive jurisdictions
of the claimant coastal States. This Thesis focuses on the issue of how OCAs can be managed
through agreed implementation, on a provisional joint basis, of the enforcement jurisdiction
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The second column of Table 2.1 identifies provisions of the LOSC that enable (or
restrict) the entitlement a coastal State to exercise jurisdiction in each listed functional context. For example, the fourth row of the second column identifies LOSC
provisions bearing upon the right of coastal State to manage marine scientific research in each maritime zone recognised by the Convention. In practice, each of the
listed functional contexts are closely interrelated. For example, the entitlement to
exercise coastal State jurisdiction concerning maritime security (including surveillance, vessel interdiction and enforcement of criminal laws) has implications for the
effectiveness of environmental protection and exploitation of marine living resources.
The functional competence of a coastal State is most extensive within internal waters, the territorial sea and archipelagic waters: In these zones the LOSC recognises
the sovereignty of a coastal State, which provides a basis for managing all functional
components of human activity subject to various navigational freedoms and duties
owed to other States. The functional competence of a coastal State is more limited
in zones where it does not enjoy sovereignty, namely: the contiguous zone, EEZ or
the continental shelf. Rather, the functional components of coastal State jurisdiction in these zones are specifically enumerated, with high seas freedoms prevailing
in all other contexts.

2.3 Specific obligations concerning OCA management
In the spatial area where claims to zones of national jurisdiction have not been
delimited and thus overlap, to what extent are each of the claimant coastal States
entitled to manage the OCA on a provisional basis by implementing the various
functional components of their jurisdiction? The following paragraphs identify, and
examine the meaning and application of, several international legal obligations that
relate most specifically to this question. As noted in Chapter 2.1, the identified
obligations are primarily concerned with boundary delimitation, but address the
of those States (including any necessary or desirable amendments to the content and spatial
extent of their prescriptive jurisdiction).
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Functional context
Artificial structures:
including oil and gas installations, artificial
islands, submarine cables and renewable
energy infrastructure.
Environmental protection:
including management of marine pollution
and the preservation of marine biodiversity.

Relevant LOSC provisions
Territorial sea: Articles 2, 19, 21
Archipelagic waters: Articles 49, 51, 52
Exclusive economic zone: Articles 56, 58, 60
Continental shelf: Articles 77, 79, 80, 81, 85
Territorial sea: Articles 2, 19, 21
Archipelagic waters: Articles 49, 52, 54
Contiguous zone: Article 33
Exclusive economic zone: Articles 56, 60, 61
Continental shelf: Articles 79, 80
Generally: Part XII concerning protection
and preservation of the marine environment
Territorial sea: Articles 2, 19, 21
Archipelagic waters: Articles 49, 52, 54
Exclusive economic zone: Articles 56, 62
Continental shelf: Article 77, 78
Generally: Part XIII concerning marine
scientific research
Territorial sea: Articles 2, 27, 28, 30
Archipelagic waters: Articles 49, 52, 54
Contiguous zone: Article 33
Exclusive economic zone: Articles 58, 73
Continental shelf: Article 77, 78
Generally: Part XII Section 6, concerning
enforcement with respect to the protection
and preservation of the marine environment.
Territorial sea: Articles 2, 21, 22, 24, 25
Archipelagic waters: Articles 49, 52, 53, 54
Exclusive economic zone: Articles 56, 58, 60
Continental shelf: Articles 77, 80.

Marine scientific research:
including hydrographic surveys and biological
research.

Maritime security:
including surveillance, vessel interdiction and
enforcement of criminal laws.

Navigational safety:
including the designation of sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes, and the conduct of
maritime search and rescue.
Resources exploitation:
including exploitation of living resources such
as fisheries and non-living resources such as
offshore hydrocarbon deposits.

Territorial sea: Articles 2, 21
Archipelagic waters: Articles 49, 51, 54
Exclusive economic zone: Articles 56, 61–72
Continental shelf: Articles 77, 78, 80–82.

Table 2.1: Functional components of coastal State jurisdiction and relevant LOSC
provisions
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issue of OCA management to varying extents. A separate investigation and analysis
is conducted for each of the following scenarios that, as noted in Chapter 1.1, each
give rise to an OCA: (1) overlapping claims to internal waters; (2) overlapping
claims to territorial sea; (3) overlapping claims to a contiguous zone; (4) claims
overlapping with claimed archipelagic waters; (5) overlapping claims to an EEZ;
and/or (6) overlapping claims to continental shelf.

2.3.1 Overlapping claims to internal waters
Several adjacent coastal States have designated straight territorial sea baselines in
a manner that generates overlapping claims to internal waters. For illustrative examples of this scenario see Chapter 3.3.2 (concerning overlapping claims asserted by
Argentina and Uruguay) and Chapter 3.6.4 (concerning overlapping claims asserted
by Cambodia and Vietnam). The LOSC contains only limited references to internal
waters,4 none of which concern delimitation or OCA management. The absence of
detailed provisions in this context flows from the characterisation of internal waters
under customary law: Such waters appertain to the land territory of a coastal State
and are subject, with limited exception, to full territorial sovereignty.5 The absence
in the law of the sea of detailed rules concerning internal waters is a deliberate
deference to the territorial rights of coastal States.6

4

For an overview of these references see Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7, 60–70; Rothwell
and Stephens, above n 16 on page 8, 52–57.
5
Churchill and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7, 61. Key exceptions to coastal State sovereignty over
the territorial sea are noted in Chapter 1.1 on page 7.
6
Rothwell and Stephens note that prior to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, being ‘[s]ensitive to the
fact that these [internal] waters had traditionally not been the subject of international concern
and had overwhelmingly been the subject only of municipal legal systems, the [International
Law Commission] was careful in its considerations not to attempt to suggest the development
of a distinctive regime for this area.’: Rothwell and Stephens, above n 16 on page 8, 52. This
caution was maintained during UNCLOS II and III.
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2.3.2 Overlapping claims to territorial sea
Many opposite and adjacent coastal States assert overlapping claims to territorial
sea. Such areas are subject to LOSC Article 15, which provides as follows:7
Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite
or adjacent coasts
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to
the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States
is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it
is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to
delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
therewith.
This provision in a near-verbatim reproduction of the equivalent provision of the
1958 Territorial Sea Convention.8 It reflects a compromise reached at UNCLOS I –
and again at UNCLOS III – between two general proposed methods of delimitation.9
The first proposed method emphasised application of an equidistance/median line;
while the second emphasised application of equitable principles taking into account
range of relevant circumstances.10 The compromise language does not prescribe a
particular method of delimitation.11
LOSC Article 15 also stipulates that territorial sea boundaries are to be delimited
by agreement between the coastal States advancing overlapping claims. This is
consistent with the long-standing position of customary international law that a
7

For background, see Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 132–143.
See 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 12(1).
9
See Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 132–143.
10
Ibid. Relevant negotiations at UNCLOS III appears to have been quite circular in result: The
UNCLOS I compromise reflected in Article 12(1) of 1958 Territorial Sea Convention was reopened and delimitation of the territorial sea was a live issue. The final compromise between
competing proposals returned to the original language contained in the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention. Advocates of equitable approaches had more success during negotiations concerning EEZ and continental shelf delimitation: As noted in Chapters (2.3.5) and (2.3.6), the
provisions concerning delimitation of these zones (LOSC Articles 74 and 83 respectively) contain no express reference to equidistance-based approaches.
11
However, in contrast to Articles 74 (concerning delimitation of the EEZ) and 83 (concerning
delimitation of the continental shelf), the equidistance method is preferred unless departure
from that line is justified: (57).
8

40

unilateral determination of a maritime boundary by a coastal State is not binding
upon other coastal States.12
LOSC Article 15 does not establish detailed substantive or procedural obligations
concerning the provisional management of a territorial sea OCA.13 Proposals by several States to include such obligations were not incorporated into the final text of the
Convention.14 However, the first sentence of LOSC Article 15 does not prohibit a
coastal State from extending its territorial sea on a unilateral basis within an OCA,
provided that the zone is not extended beyond the relevant equidistance line between opposite or adjacent coasts. Accordingly, it notionally facilitates provisional
management of a territorial sea OCA on a unilateral basis and prevents unilateral management measures from overlapping spatially.15 In such circumstances, an
equidistance line would act as a provisional de facto territorial sea boundary.
The second sentence of LOSC Article 15 excludes the application of the first sentence
(concerning extension of the territorial sea within an OCA) where the presence
of historic title or ‘other special circumstances’ renders it ‘necessary’ to designate
a boundary that departs from the equidistance line. This exclusion dramatically
curtails the ability of a coastal State to rely on Article 15 as a basis for undertaking
unilateral management measures within a territorial sea OCA, for the following two
reasons:
First, the exclusion is framed in broad terms and the LOSC does not elaborate
upon the range of ‘special circumstances’ necessitating the departure of a boundary
from an equidistance line. Consequently, Article 15 provides offers little guidance
12

For further discussion see above, n 48 on page 14.
However, disputes concerning a territorial sea OCA are subject to several procedural dispute
settlement obligations set out in LOSC Part XV. These obligations are discussed further in
Chapter 3.4.
14
See, eg, the proposals and statements by Morocco, Argentina and Venezuela documented in the
Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 139–141)
15
This also provides a notional basis for coastal States to comply with various duties imposed
by international law relating to management of the territorial sea. Such duties include the
provision of basic navigational services such as lighthouses and rescue facilities: See Churchill
and Lowe, above n 10 on page 7, 100. However, it is important to note that opposite or adjacent
coastal States may disagree in relation to the baselines employed by each other as a basis for
generating maritime claims, and consequently in relation to the location of the equidistance
line between them.
13
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regarding the locations in which claimant coastal States are entitled to implement
unilateral provisional management measures. During UNCLOS III several States
proposed the inclusion of additional procedural and substantive rules that would
apply in the context of historic title or other special circumstances.16 However, these
proposals were not incorporated into the final text of the Convention. Nonetheless,
international courts and tribunals – in particular the International Court of Justice – have developed an increasingly clear and consistent approach to determining
when a boundary should depart from an equidistance line.17 The approaches used
by these bodies to delimit the territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ are also increasingly convergent.18 In recent cases international courts and tribunals have first
determined a presumptive equidistance line and then proceeded to enquire whether
relevant or special circumstances warrant a change in that line in order to achieve
an ‘equitable result.’19 Relevant or special circumstances identified and applied by
international courts and tribunals are diverse, and, critically for the present purposes, may have countervailing effects on the course of a maritime boundary. They
include the configuration and length of relevant respective coastlines, the existence
of islands, security considerations and the prior conduct of parties.20
Second, LOSC Article 15 conceptually links obligations concerning unilateral provisional management with obligations concerning boundary delimitation. This linkage
arises because the principles that determine the course of the delimitation line (i.e.
the presumptive median line, with broadly framed exceptions for ‘historic title or
16

See, eg, the proposals by Morocco, documented in the Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above
n 1 on page 4, 139–140.
17
For a concise overview see Robert Beckman and Clive Schofield, ‘Moving Beyond Disputes
Over Island Sovereignty: ICJ Decision Sets Stage for Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the
Singapore Strait’, 40 Ocean Development and International Law 1 (2009) 11–17.
18
See ibid.
19
See,
eg,
Dispute
concerning
delimitation
of the
maritime
boundary
between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal,
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Judgment of 14 March 2012,
available
at
<http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1C16_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf>; Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), [2001] ICJ Reports 40, [230];
and Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria;
Equatorial Guinea intervening), [2002] ICJ Reports 303, [288]. See also Beckman and Schofield,
above n 17, 12–13.
20
Ibid.
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other special circumstances’) also determine the spatial extent of a State’s entitlement to undertake unilateral management measures on a provisional basis. As a
result, any disagreement between coastal States concerning the location of a territorial sea boundary (involving disagreement concerning the extent to which historic
title or other special circumstances justify departure from the median line) automatically entails disagreement concerning the locations in which the claimant coastal
States are entitled to undertake unilateral provisional management measures.

2.3.3 Overlapping claims to a contiguous zone
LOSC Article 33 addresses the scope and spatial limits of national jurisdiction in
the contiguous zone,21 but does not contain specific obligations concerning the provisional management of OCAs or the delimitation of overlapping claims. The effect
of this silence has been explained as follows:
There is no provision in the Convention for the delimitation of contiguous
zones. Such a zone cannot, by definition, be extended into the territorial
sea of another state. Since the nature of control to be exercised in the
contiguous zone does not create any sovereignty over the zone or its resources, it is possible for two states to exercise control over the same area
if their zones should overlap, for the purpose of prevention of or punishment for infringement of their respective customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations within their respective territories or
territorial sea.22
A paragraph concerning delimitation of the contiguous zone and based on Article
24(3) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention was removed from the early negotiating
texts at UNCLOS III.23 There does not appear to be a single clear rationale that
21

LOSC Article 33(1) sets out the entitlement to claim a contiguous zone and enumerates the
jurisdictional competencies associated with the zone. LOSC Article 33(2) provides that the
contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines.
22
Commonwealth Group of Experts, Ocean Management: A Regional Perspective-The Prospects
for Commonwealth Maritime Co-operation in Asia and the Pacific 39 (Chaired by Satya Nandan, 1984), quoted in Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 273–274. Cf
Antunes, above n 85 on page 28, 100–102, who discusses difficulties associated with concurrent
exercise of jurisdiction and argues that the exclusive nature of powers set out in LOSC Article
303(2) concerning archaeological and historical objects found at sea impedes their concurrent
exercise.
23
For an overview of the negotiating process, see Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on
page 4, 266–275.
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contributed to its removal.24 Antunes identifies three contributing factors: (1) a
reluctance to further complicate difficult negotiations concerning maritime delimitation; (2) a view that provisions concerning delimitation of the contiguous zone
were unnecessary given the existence of specific obligations concerning delimitation
of the EEZ (which as noted in Chapter 1.1 overlaps spatially with the contiguous
zone); and (3) a view that in light of the nature of jurisdictional powers in the
contiguous zone, such powers could overlap.25
Article 24(3) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention provides as follows:
Where coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither
of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the
contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of the two States is measured.
The above provision employs a strict equidistance approach to maritime delimitation and does not prohibit a coastal State from extending its contiguous zone on
a unilateral basis within an OCA, provided that the zone is not extended beyond
the relevant equidistance line between opposite or adjacent coasts. In contrast to
LOSC Article 15 (discussed above, concerning delimitation of the territorial sea),
it does not limit the ability of a coastal State to undertake unilateral provisional
management measures within an OCA in the context of historic title or other circumstances.26
For States Parties to both the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and the LOSC, the
effect of Article 24(3) of the former Convention on management of a contiguous zone
24

Indeed, there does not appear to have been explicit and official discussion during UNCLOS III
relating to the removal of Article 24(3): see Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on
page 4, 274.
25
Antunes, above n 85 on page 28, 100.
26
However, it is important to keep in mind that opposite or adjacent coastal States often disagree
in relation to other issues impacting upon the ability of a coastal State to undertake unilateral
management measures in a territorial sea OCA. Common disagreements of this nature include:
competing claims to territorial sovereignty, disputes concerning the applicability of LOSC Article 121 to certain insular features (concerning the ability of such features to generate an EEZ
and continental shelf), and disputes concerning the baselines employed by each claimant State
as a basis for generating maritime claims. All of these circumstances would entail disagreement
concerning the spatial limits and location of an OCA, preventing clear determination of an
equidistance line.

44

OCA is unclear.27 LOSC Article 311(1) provides in general terms that the Convention ‘shall prevail, as between States Parties’ over the 1958 Geneva Conventions.
On one hand it could be argued that silence in LOSC Article 33 is insufficient to
‘prevail’ over the express provision set out in Article 24(3) of the 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention. However, it could also be argued that Article 24(3) of the 1958
Territorial Sea Convention is inconsistent with the LOSC because it employs a strict
equidistance approach to delimiting and managing OCAs that was clearly rejected
at UNCLOS III.
If the former interpretation is accepted Article 24(3) provides a basis for unilateral
provisional management of a contiguous zone OCA on each side of the relevant
equidistance line. If the latter approach is accepted the LOSC establishes concurrent
jurisdiction within a contiguous zone OCA for the reasons quoted above.
The uncertainty discussed in the previous paragraphs is of little practical relevance
in the many situations where a contiguous zone OCA also consists of overlapping
claims to an EEZ or continental shelf. In such situations LOSC Articles 74 and 83
establish specific obligations concerning maritime delimitation and the provisional
management of OCAs. These provisions are discussed in further detail in Chapters
2.3.5 and 2.3.6.

2.3.4 Claims overlapping with claimed archipelagic waters
As noted in Chapter 1.1, LOSC Part IV recognises a special category of ‘archipelagic’
States and provides the rules under which these States may draw straight ‘archipelagic
baselines’ around their constituent islands.28 Waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines, described as ‘archipelagic waters’, are subject to the sovereignty of the relevant
archipelagic State, which is qualified by certain navigational rights afforded to for-

27
28

For further discussion see Antunes, above n 85 on page 28, 100–102.
See Martin Tsamenyi, Clive Schofield and Ben Milligan, ‘Navigation through archipelagos: current state practice’ in Myron Nordquist et al (eds), 32nd Oceans Conference: Freedom of Seas,
Passage Rights, and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (2009).
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eign vessels.29 LOSC Part IV has not been comprehensively implemented to date.
Many coastal States with notional or claimed archipelagic status have not declared,
or have only partially declared, archipelagic baselines enclosing archipelagic waters.30
There are two notional scenarios where an archipelagic State could claim archipelagic
waters in a manner that generates an OCA. First, an archipelagic State could declare
archipelagic baselines that encircle or intersect claims of another coastal State to
other maritime zones. This scenario has arisen in the waters surrounding Timor Island, where a 2009 revision by Indonesia of its archipelagic baseline system produced
an overlap between Indonesian archipelagic waters and maritime zones claimed by
East Timor appertaining to the Oeccussi District (see Figure 2.1 for an illustrative
map).31
The second notional scenario is where two opposite or adjacent archipelagic States
declare archipelagic baselines in a manner that generates overlapping claims to
archipelagic waters. As far as the author is aware, this scenario has not arisen
globally.
LOSC Article 47 contains two paragraphs of relevance to the provisional management of archipelagic OCAs. Both paragraphs were drafted in order to ‘to reduce
the impact of the claiming of straight archipelagic baselines and the establishment
of archipelagic waters on the rights and interests of neighboring States.’32
Article 47(5) provides that a system of archipelagic baselines ‘shall not be applied by
an archipelagic State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive
economic zone the territorial sea of another State’. This provision limits the potential
29

Ibid. Apart from the traditional right of innocent passage through some parts of archipelagic
waters , there is also the broader right of ‘archipelagic sea lanes passage’.
30
See Ibid, for an overview of State practice.
31
For further discussion see Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, ‘Closing the loop: Indonesia’s revised archipelagic baselines system’ (2009) 1(2) Australian Journal of Marine and
Ocean Affairs 57. For backgroung see also Victor Prescott, ‘The Question of East Timor’s
Maritime Boundaries’ (1999–2000) 7(4) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 72. Subject to
several bilateral agreements (which are discussed in Chapter 3.6.2), East Timor asserts fullbreadth ambit claims to the full suite of maritime zones: National Parliament Law No. 7/2002
Maritime Borders of the Territory of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/>.
32
Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 431.
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Figure 2.1: Indonesian archipelagic baselines in the vicinity of East Timor. Source:
Arsana and Schofield, note 31 on the preceding page.
size of an OCA subject to an archipelagic waters claim by restricting the ability of
a coastal State to claim archipelagic waters that encircle or intersect with maritime
zones claimed by another coastal State. It is unclear whether the provision prohibits
the declaration of encircling or intersecting archipelagic baselines, or merely the
ability of declared baselines to generate archipelagic waters in a particular area.33
As shown in Figure 2.1, Indonesia’s archipelagic baselines completely encircle East
Timorese maritime claims projected from the Oeccussi District, and are thus more
consistent with the latter interpretation.
Article 47(6) provides that ‘If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State lies between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, exist33

This uncertainty would be an interesting area of further research, particularly in the context
of relations between Indonesia and East Timor. The Virginia Commentaries do not document
any detailed discussion during UNCLOS III of the meaning and scope of LOSC Article 47(5).
Rather, they note that the provision echoes the general language found in LOSC Article 7(6)
(concerning the declaration of straight baselines) that was inherited from the Article 4(5) of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone: Virginia Commentaries,
Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 103, 431. LOSC Article 7(6) was drafted in order ‘to protect
the access of a coastal State to any open sea area where it enjoys the freedom of navigation.’:
Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 103. This policy rationale is narrower
than that informing LOSC Article 47(5), which also seeks to protect the ability of a neighbouring
coastal State to claim zones of national jurisdiction.
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ing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State has traditionally
exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by agreement between those States
shall continue to be respected.’ This provision prevents a coastal State from invoking claims to archipelagic waters to invalidate or prevail upon within an OCA
certain rights and interests of another coastal State.34 In relation to the provisional
management of an archipelagic OCA, it supports the continuation of prior practice
between adjacent coastal States. Malaysia was key proponent of including LOSC
Article 47(6) in the Convention. It was concerned about the potential for Indonesia,
through the declaration of archipelagic baselines, to assert jurisdiction in the waters
between the Malay Peninsula and Malaysian territory in Northern Borneo.35

34

It is unclear what exactly interests are protected because the meaning of the term ‘traditionally’
was not discussed or negotiated during UNCLOS III: Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above
n 1 on page 4, 432.
35
Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 421. Malaysia’s concerns were also
addressed on a bilateral basis through the Jakarta Treaty, which was signed by Indonesia and
Malaysia on February 25 1982 and entered into force on 25 May 1984. The Treaty is an example
of a bilateral implementation of LOSC Article 47(6) – it designated areas in which Malaysian
traditional fishermen could continue to exercise their traditional fishing rights and guaranteed
rights of access and communication for Malaysian ships operating in Indonesian archipelagic
waters between peninsular Malaysia and Sabah/Sarawak: see Barbara Kwiatkowska and Etty
Agoes, ‘Archipelagic Waters: An Assessment of National Legislation’ in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed)
Law of the Sea at the Crossroads: The Continuing Search for a Universally Accepted Regime
(1991); and Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Archipelagic Regime in Practice in the Philippines
and Indonesia – Making or Breaking International Law?’ (1991) 6 The International Journal
of Estuarine and Coastal Law 1.
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2.3.5 Overlapping claims to an exclusive economic zone
During UNCLOS III, several frameworks were proposed for managing overlapping
claims to the EEZ.36 The framework that was eventually incorporated into the LOSC
for managing overlapping EEZ claims forms part of Article 74 of the Convention,
which provides as follows:
Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on
the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an
equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time,
the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in
Part XV [regarding the settlement of disputes].
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements
shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned,
questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
LOSC Article 74 is a product of a difficult compromise at UNCLOS III between two
approaches to delimitation of the EEZ – one emphasizing application of an equidistance/median line, the other emphasizing the use of equitable principles.37 The
language of the provision was famously characterised by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in the Eritrea/Yemen case as ‘a last minute endeavour ... to get agreement on a very controversial matter’, having been ‘consciously designed to decide as
little as possible.’38 Reflecting the position of customary international law discussed
36

For background, see Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 796–816 and Sun
Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, 32–37.
37
See Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 796–816.
38
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage – Maritime Delimitation (17 December 1999)
[19], available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160>.
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in Chapter 1.1, LOSC Article 74(1) requires in general terms that delimitation of the
EEZ must be effected ‘by agreement’ based on ‘international law’. The requirement
to effect delimitation by agreement necessitates entry into meaningful negotiations
where modification of negotiating positions is contemplated.39
At UNCLOS III several proposals were advanced to deal with deadlocked negotiations concerning delimitation of overlapping EEZ claims, including provision for a
compulsory conciliation procedure or compulsory dispute settlement.40 The wording eventually incorporated in LOSC Article 74(2) refers to LOSC Part XV, which,
as discussed in Chapter 2.5, provides for compulsory dispute settlement procedures
but enables States to exclude their operation for disputes concerning maritime delimitation.41
In the early stages of UNCLOS III several States advocated the use of a median
line as an interim maritime boundary pending agreement on overlapping claims.42
Other competing proposals included a moratorium on resource exploitation pending delimitation of an EEZ boundary,43 and a requirement that States implement
provisional measures in a disputed zone taking into account equitable principles.44
Reference to an interim median line was removed from the 1976 Part II of the Revised Single Negotiating Text, Part II.45 Introducing this text, the Chairman of the
Second Committee noted as follows:
39

Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 813. See also North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, 1969 ICJ Rep 3, 47.
40
See, eg, proposal by the Netherlands documented in the Virginia Commentaries, Volume II,
above n 1 on page 4, 804.
41
The application of LOSC Part XV to OCAs is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.5.
42
See in particular the proposals of the Netherlands, Greece, Spain and Japan discussed in Sun
Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, 33. See also A/CONF.62/C.2/L.14 (1974), Official Records
of the UNCLOS III, Vol 3, 190; Article 61 of Informal Single Negotiating Text/Part II, which
provides that ‘Pending Agreement, no State is entitled to extend its exclusive economic zone
beyond the median line or the equidistance line.’: A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part II (ISNT, 1975),
Article 61, Official Records of the UNCLOS III, Vol 4, 151 (Chairman, Second Committee).
See also Platzoder, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol
IV, 467 (regarding 1977 Spanish proposal). See also Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above
n 1 on page 4, 803–809.
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Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, 33. See also A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43 (1974), Official Records
of the UNCLOS III, Vol 3, 220 (Ireland) and the Article 83 proposal by Papua New Guinea:
Platzoder, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, Vol IX, 406.
44
Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, 33-35.
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See UN Doc A/CONF/.62/WP/.8/Rev.1/Part II.
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However, paragraph 3 of former articles 61 and 70 [of the 1975 Informal
Single Negotiating Text] posed a problem. Since the Conference may not
adopt a compulsory jurisdictional procedure for the settlement of delimitation disputes, I felt that the reference to the median or equidistant line
as an interim solution might not have the intended effect of encouraging
agreements. In fact such reference might defeat the main purport of the
article as set out in paragraph 1 [by preferring a median line approach
over an equitable principles approach]. Nonetheless, the need for an interim solution was evident. The solution was, in my opinion, to propose
wording in paragraph 3 which linked it more closely to paragraph 1.46
The final wording that was eventually incorporated into LOSC Article 74(3) establishes a general framework for the provisional management of maritime spaces
subject to overlapping EEZ claims. It was drafted in an attempt two fulfil aims:
the first to encourage management of the OCA; and the second to limit activity
within an OCA having a detrimental impact on negotiation of a final delimitation
agreement.47
The meaning of LOSC Articles 74(3) was analysed in detail by the Arbitral Tribunal tasked with resolving certain legal aspects of a long running maritime boundary dispute between Guyana and Suriname.48 A flashpoint of this dispute was the
so-called ‘CGX incident’ of June 2000 which involved a confrontation between
Suriname naval vessels and the C.E. Thornton, a mobile drilling rig operated by a
CGX Resources Inc. (CGX), a Canadian company. In 1998 Guyana granted an
oil exploration concession to CGX, part of which was located in an area subject
to overlapping continental shelf and EEZ claims promulgated by Guyana and Suri46

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1 (1976), Introductory Note, para. 12, V Off. Rec. 151,
153. See also Virginia Commentaries, Volume 2, above n 1 on page 4, 809–810.
47
For discussion see Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 815. See also Rainer
Lagoni, ‘Interim Measures Pending Delimitation Agreements’ (1984) 78 American Journal of
International Law 345.
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See Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration Between
Guyana and Suriname, Award of 17 September 2007 (Guyana–Suriname Award), available
at the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at <www.pca-cpa.org>. For discussion
of the arbitral proceedings and background to the dispute, see: Peggy Hoyle, ‘The Guyana–
Suriname Maritime Boundary Dispute and its Regional Context’ (2001) 9 IBRU Boundary
Security Bulletin 99; TW Donovan, ‘Suriname–Guyana Maritime Boundary and Territorial
Disputes: A Legal and Historical Analysis’ (2003) 13 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy
41; Stephen Fietta, ‘Guyana–Suriname Award’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International
Law 119; Patricia Jiminez Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections
on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’
(2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 49.
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name.49 Figure 2.2 depicts the relevant OCA, bounded in this case by competing
asserted positions as to the correct course of the maritime boundary, in addition to
associated hydrocarbon concessions.
In 1999 CGX arranged for seismic testing and exploratory drilling to be conducted
in the concession area and in May 2000 Suriname demanded that Guyana and CGX
cease all oil exploration activities in the OCA.50 On June 3 2000 two Suriname naval
vessels approached the C.E. Thornton, which at the time was operating within the
portion of the concession area subject to overlapping claims, and ordered the rig
and its service vessels to leave ‘Suriname waters’ within twelve hours.51 The crew of
the C.E. Thornton subsequently detached the rig from the sea floor and withdrew
from the OCA.52
In the arbitral proceedings both Guyana and Suriname claimed that the other party
had failed to comply with LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3). As discussed in Chapter
2.3.6, LOSC Article 83 (concerning delimitation of the continental shelf) is identical in substance, mutatis mutandis, to LOSC Article 74. The Tribunal made the
following comments about both articles in an award published 17 September 2007:53
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the Convention impose two obligations upon
States Parties in the context of a boundary dispute concerning the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone respectively. The two obligations simultaneously attempt to promote and limit activities in a dispute
maritime area. The first obligation is that, pending a final delimitation,
States Parties are required to make “every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature.” The second is that the States Parties must, during that period, make “every effort ... not to jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of the final agreement.”
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The factual background of the dispute is summarised in Guyana–Suriname Award, above n 48,
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Ibid. In communications between the rig crew and the naval vessels, Suriname naval personnel
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Figure 2.2: Guyana – Suriname dispute: overlapping maritime claims and hydrocarbon concessions. Source: Hoyle, note 48 on page 51.
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In relation to the first obligation set out in LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3), concerning provisional arrangements of a practical nature, the Tribunal noted as follows
(footnotes omitted):54
Although the language “every effort” leaves “some room for interpretation by the States concerned, or by any dispute settlement body”, it is
the opinion of the Tribunal that the language in which the obligation is
framed imposes on the Parties a duty to negotiate in good faith. Indeed,
the inclusion of the phrase “in a spirit of understanding and cooperation” indicates the drafters’ intent to require of the parties a conciliatory
approach to negotiations, pursuant to which they would be prepared to
make concessions in the pursuit of a provisional arrangement. Such an
approach is particularly to be expected of the parties in view of the fact
that any provisional arrangements arrived at are by definition temporary
and will be without prejudice to the final delimitation.
To what extent does the obligation to negotiate in good faith set out in LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) limit the ability of claimant coastal States to undertake provisional management measures within an OCA on a unilateral basis? Both Guyana
and Suriname were found by the Tribunal to have breached their respective obligations to negotiate in good faith concerning the establishment of provisional arrangements of a practical nature.55 Suriname was found to have breached its obligation
due to, inter alia, the lack of active attempts to maintain or seek negotiations with
Guyana concerning the overlapping claim area and the oil exploration activities of
CGX, and the failure to engage in a last-minute dialogue proposed by Guyana prior
the CGX incident.56 Guyana was found to have breached its obligation due to,
inter alia, the failure to directly inform Suriname of plans for exploratory drilling
in the OCA, and the failure to seek to engage Suriname in discussions concerning
any drilling operations.57 The Tribunal proceeded to specify several actions that
54
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in threatening the CGX rig, in violation of the Convention.’ Note also that the Tribunal held
that the actions of the Suriname Navy during the CGX incident ‘constituted a threat of the
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international law.’: Guyana–Suriname Award, above n 48, [445].
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Guyana could have been taken in accordance with the obligation to negotiate in
good faith concerning provisional management of the OCA. These included:
(1) giving Suriname official and detailed notice of the planned activities,
(2) seeking cooperation of Suriname in undertaking the activities, (3)
offering to share the results of the exploration and giving Suriname an
opportunity to observe the activities, and (4) offering to share all the
financial benefits received from the exploratory activities.58
The approach of the Arbitral Tribunal to interpreting and applying the obligation to
‘make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature’ does
not prohibit unilateral provisional management of an OCA, provided that active and
continuous steps are taken to (1) inform the other claimant State of proposed actions
and (2) engage that State in discussions concerning the proposed actions.59 These
steps notwithstanding, a refusal to modify unilateral provisional management measures would likely be inconsistent with the conciliatory approach that was mandated
by the Tribunal.
In relation to the second obligation set out in LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3), concerning actions that may jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final agreement,
the Tribunal noted as follows:60
The second obligation ... is an important aspect of the Convention’s
objective of strengthening peace and friendly relations between nations
and of settling disputes peacefully. However, it is important to note that
this obligation was not intended to preclude all activities in a disputed
maritime area ... 61
The Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 74(3) and 83(3) provides scope for coastal
States asserting overlapping EEZ or continental shelf claims to undertake certain
provisional management measures on a unilateral basis within the OCA. Only activities that may jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement
58
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Interestingly, both Guyana and Suriname had been issuing fishing licenses and patrolling the
waters within the OCA: Guyana–Suriname Award, above n 48, [149].
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Guyana–Suriname Award, above n 48, [465].
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At [465] the Tribunal also quoted the following observation made in the Virginia Commentaries:
‘[the obligation] does not exclude the conduct of some activities by the States concerned within
the disputed area, so long as those activities would not have the effect of prejudicing the final
agreement’: Virginia Commentaries, Volume II, above n 1 on page 4, 815.
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are prohibited. Drawing on jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals on
the application of provisional measures,62 the Tribunal proposed an analytical framework for determining what unilateral management activities are permitted within
an OCA, noting that:63
It should not be permissible for a party to a dispute to undertake any
unilateral activity that might affect the other party’s rights in a permanent manner. However, international courts and tribunals should also be
careful not to stifle the parties’ ability to pursue economic development
in a disputed area during a boundary dispute, as the resolution of such
disputes will typically be a time-consuming process. This Tribunal’s
interpretation of the obligation to make every effort not to hamper or
jeopardise the reaching of a final agreement must reflect this delicate
balance. It is the Tribunal’s opinion that drawing a distinction between
activities having a permanent physical impact on the marine environment and those that do not, accomplishes this and is consistent with
other aspects of the law of the sea and international law.
Applying this distinction (between activities having a permanent physical impact
on the marine environment and those that do not) to oil exploration activities, the
Tribunal held that Guyana’s authorisation of exploratory drilling was contrary to
the obligation not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement.64 The Tribunal also took pains to emphasise that oil exploration activities
having a non-permanent environmental impact were generally permissible, noting
that, in contrast to exploratory drilling, ‘[s]eismic activity on the other hand should
be permissible in a disputed area.’65
For reasons unrelated to environmental impact, Suriname was also found by the
Tribunal to have acted contrary to the obligation not to jeopardise or hamper the
reaching of a final delimitation agreement.66 The Tribunal noted that ‘Suriname
had a number of peaceful options to address Guyana’s authorisation of exploratory
drilling’, namely entry into discussions with Guyana concerning provisional joint
62
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management of the OCA and recourse to the compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures set out in LOSC Part XV.67 In this context the actions of the
Suriname navy during the CGX incident, which were characterised as a ‘threat of
force’, were deemed to have jeopardised the reaching of a final delimitation agreement between Guyana and Suriname.68
To what extent does the obligation not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a
final delimitation agreement limit the ability of claimant coastal States to undertake
provisional management measures within an OCA on a unilateral basis? The approach of the Arbitral Tribunal to interpreting and applying this obligation clearly
proscribes unilateral activities within the OCA having a permanent physical impact
on the marine environment – including exploratory drilling but excluding seismic
surveys. The Tribunal’s approach is arguably permissive of environmentally damaging activities, including unsustainable fishing practices and high levels of marine
pollution, that are not manifestly permanent.69 Also, it is unclear whether the use
of the word physical was intended to proscribe only certain non-biological impacts.
As noted above, the actions of the Suriname navy during the CGX incident were proscribed because, in the opinion of the Tribunal, there were several less-confrontational
options available for responding to Guyana’s actions in the context of the dispute.
This finding implicitly recognises an ill-defined category of activities that jeopardise
the reaching of a final delimitation agreement due to their detrimental effect on relations between the claimant States. It is unclear whether actions falling short of
a threat to use force fall within this category. As discussed in Chapter 4, claimant
coastal States are often highly sensitive to activities conducted by another claimant
coastal State within or relating to the relevant OCA. A wide variety of coastal
State actions, including the enactment of domestic legislation, fisheries regulation,
issuing of hydrocarbon concessions, and operations conducted within OCAs by law67
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enforcement and military vessels, have attracted strong diplomatic protests from
other coastal States asserting an overlapping jurisdictional claim.70

2.3.6 Overlapping entitlements to the continental shelf
LOSC Article 83 establishes a framework for managing continental shelf OCAs71
that, as discussed above, is identical in substance, mutatis mutandis, to LOSC Article 74 (concerning delimitation of the EEZ). The consistency between LOSC Articles
74 and 83 is a sensible drafting choice given the jurisdictional overlaps and functional relationship between the EEZ and continental shelf: As noted in Chapter 1.1,
in both of these zones a coastal State is attributed a package of sovereign rights
concerning the seabed and subsoil, with both packages of sovereign rights being
expressly harmonised by LOSC Article 56(3).
Negotiations at UNCLOS III concerning LOSC Articles 74 and 83 were conducted
together and similar negotiating positions were applied to both articles.72 In particular, long-standing positions on the delimitation of the continental shelf were
determining influences in the negotiation of provisions concerning delimitation of
the exclusive economic zone.73
Despite the consistency between LOSC Articles 74 and 83, the legal framework
concerning overlapping continental shelf entitlements retains distinct components.
Several coastal States continue to claim continental shelf entitlements based on the
principle of natural prolongation.74 In addition to obligations set out in the LOSC,
70
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States Parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf are also subject to
the following obligation concerning the delimitation of overlapping claims:
Article 6
1. Where the same continental shelf boundary is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other,
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States
shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary line is the median line, every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of
two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of
the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured.
3. ....
The language quoted above notionally permits a coastal State to unilaterally manage
the part of a continental shelf OCA located seaward of an equidistance line, unless
‘special circumstances’ justify the designation of an alternative boundary. For the
same reasons discussed in Section 2.3.2 (in relation to territorial sea OCAs), the
broad reference to ‘special circumstances’, and the diverse range of such circumstances recognised in ICJ jurisprudence, dramatically curtail the ability of a coastal
State to rely on Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental shelf as a basis for
undertaking unilateral management measures within a continental shelf OCA.75
In any event, and as noted in Chapter 2.3.3, LOSC Article 311(1) provides in general
terms that the Convention ‘shall prevail, as between States Parties’ over the 1958
Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, for States Parties to both the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf and the LOSC, the provisions concerning maritime delimitation and management of OCAs set out in LOSC Article 83 prevail over those set
out in Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
75
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2.4 Other obligations applicable to the management
of OCAs
The obligations discussed in Section 2.3 are supplemented and qualified by several
obligations that do not relate specifically to the management of OCAs but are
nonetheless relevant because they prescribe certain modes of conduct that remain
applicable in that context. The following paragraphs identify and discuss the general
features of these obligations.
The fundamental principles of international law set out in the UN Charter prescribe
general modalities of behaviour for coastal States engaged in a dispute concerning
an OCA. Article 2(3) of the UN Charter provides that ‘All Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.’ The effect of UN Charter obligations on cooperation between States is addressed in the following paragraph of the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:76
The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter
States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the
differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in order to maintain international
peace and security and to promote international economic stability and
progress, the general welfare of nations and international co-operation
free from discrimination based on such differences.
Coastal States are therefore obliged to conduct their international relations concerning OCAs in a peaceful cooperative manner without prejudice to international peace
and security.
The LOSC contains several obligations concerning the conduct of international relations that impact upon the management of OCAs. LOSC Article 300 incorporates
customary principles of good faith into the LOSC, providing that ‘States Parties
76
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shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall
exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.’ LOSC Article 301 reiterates
UN Charter obligations in the context of the law of the sea, providing as follows:
Peaceful uses of the seas
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
The LOSC also contains a wide variety of obligations that emphasise, call for or mandate cooperation in specific functional and geographic contexts.77 These obligations
remain applicable in the context of overlapping jurisdictional claims and thereby
impact upon the management of OCAs by the relevant claimant coastal States. Of
particular relevance is LOSC Article 123, which establishes an obligation concerning
cooperation, including in specific functional contexts, relating to the management
of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (including those that contain OCAs).78 It provides
as follows:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with
each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their
duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly
or through an appropriate regional organization:

77

See, eg, LOSC, Article 41 ‘Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in straits used for international navigation’; Article 43 ‘Navigational and safety aids and other improvements and the
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a. to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea;
b. to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with
respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
c. to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
d. to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions
of this article.
The language quoted above encourages States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed
sea to cooperate but does not include language mandating them to do so. Rather,
States ‘should cooperate’ to establish cooperative measures and, through the use
of the phrase ‘shall endeavour’, are required to attempt to do so in the specifically
enumerated functional contexts. The Virginia Commentaries characterise LOSC
Article 123 as being ‘couched in the language of exhortation’.79 During UNCLOS
III a proposal to replace the word ‘should’ in the first sentence of the Article with
‘shall’ was not accepted.80
Another relevant provision is LOSC Article 197, which requires States to cooperate
in relation to the protection and preservation of the marine environment (including
the marine environment within OCAs). It provides as follows:81
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Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations,
in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention,
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking
into account characteristic regional features.
LOSC obligations are supplemented by a wide variety of binding and non-binding
cooperative frameworks that establish modalities for the exercise of national jurisdiction in specific functional contexts. Key binding instruments include the:
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (London Convention) and the 1996 Protocol;82 1973 Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES);83 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL Convention);84 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD);85
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement);86 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and the many subsequent amendments to the Convention;87 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
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(SUA Convention) and associated Protocols;88 and International Convention on
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC Convention).89
A detailed discussion of these instruments and their implementation within OCAs
falls beyond the scope of this thesis, and is a potential area of further research.
For the present purposes it is relevant to note that they contain several obligations
to exercise particular functional components of coastal State jurisdiction, including
coastal State jurisdiction within an OCA, in a specified manner. In contrast to
the specific obligations discussed above in Section 2.3 they have no bearing on the
spatial or functional entitlement to exercise coastal State jurisdiction within an OCA
(or elsewhere). Critically, none of the instruments listed in the previous paragraph
contain specific guidance concerning how they are to be implemented in the context
of overlapping claims and/or within OCAs. Accordingly, the presence of OCAs
creates significant ambiguities concerning the implementation of a wide variety of
international instruments.

88

Adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992. See also Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992. Protocols to both 1988 instruments were adopted 14 October 2005 and entered into force 28
July 2010. For further information see the International Maritime Organisation website:
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>.
89
Adopted 30 November 1990, entered into force 13 May 1995.
For further
information
see
the
International
Maritime
Organisation
website
at
<http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-conventionon-oil-pollution-preparedness,-response-and-co-operation-(oprc).aspx>.
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2.5 Dispute settlement under LOSC Part XV90
States Parties to the LOSC are obliged to conduct any dispute concerning maritime
delimitation and OCA management in accordance with the framework set out in
LOSC Part XV.91 As noted in Section 2.1, the provisions of LOSC Part XV (and
any applicable principles of State responsibility) are relevant to consider because
they determine the ability of international dispute settlement bodies to influence or
prescribe modalities of OCA management (for example through the publication of
legally binding judgments or provisional measures). Part XV contains a complex
series of provisions that are divided into the following sections:
• Section 1 – General provisions (including non-compulsory procedures);
• Section 2 – Compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions;
• Section 3 – Limitations and exceptions to the applicability of Section 2.
The procedures set out in Part XV Section 2 are of particular interest because
they empower international dispute settlement bodies (including the International
Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)) to
mandate modalities of coastal State behaviour concerning OCAs in certain circumstances. The following paragraphs provide an overview of each Section of the dispute
settlement mechanism set out in LOSC Part XV and examine their implications for
OCA management.

90

Material in this sub-Chapter is drawn from the author’s contribution to a previous work: Martin
Tsamenyi, Ben Milligan and Kwame Mfodwo, ‘Dispute settlement under the Law of the Sea
Convention: current practice in the Western and Central Pacific region’ in Quentin Hanich and
Martin Tsamenyi (eds) Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific Region
(2009).
91
See Churchill and Lowe, above n 10, 447-462; Andronico Adede, The System for Settlement
of Disputes under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (1987); Natalie Klein, Dispute
Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (2005).

65

2.5.1 General provisions and non-compulsory procedures
LOSC Part XV Section 1 reiterates fundamental obligations of peaceful dispute settlement set out in the UN Charter92 and establishes a framework of non-compulsory
dispute settlement procedures. States Parties to the Convention are subject to an
obligation to exchange views93 and may resolve their dispute by recourse to a noncompulsory conciliation procedure.94 In accordance with LOSC Articles 280-282,
States Parties are afforded considerable flexibility to resolve a dispute by peaceful
means of their own choice and thereby preclude the operation of dispute settlement
procedures in the Convention.
Article 282 of the Convention establishes a specific deferral to compulsory and binding procedures in other international agreements by providing that such procedures
apply in lieu of LOSC procedures unless the Parties otherwise agree. In accordance
with Article 281 of the Convention, States Parties may have recourse to LOSC
dispute settlement procedures where no settlement has been reached under an alternative procedure, ‘unless agreement between the parties excludes any further
procedure.’ As discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.9, the meaning of these Articles and their interaction with ‘compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions’
set out in the LOSC has been a central issue in several international disputes and
is the subject of considerable scholarly debate.95

92

LOSC, Article 279, which refers to the following Charter obligations: Article 2(3) of the UN
Charter establishes a fundamental obligation of members States to ‘settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered.’Article 33(1) of the UN Charter refers to an indicative list of peaceful means,
providing in full: ‘The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.’
93
LOSC, Article 283.
94
LOSC, Article 284.
95
See, eg: David Colson and Peggy Hoyle, ‘Satisfying the Procedural Prerequisites to the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Did the Southern
Blue-fin Tuna Tribunal Get It Right?’ (2003) 34 Ocean Development and International Law
59; Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal Did Get It Right: A
Commentary and Reply to the Article by David A. Colson and Dr. Peggy Hoyle’ (2003) 34
Ocean Development and International Law 369.
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2.5.2 Compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions
LOSC Part XV Section 2 sets out a number of such procedures, which become operative in accordance with Articles 286 and 287 of the Convention where no settlement
has been reached by recourse to the procedures referred to in Part XV Section 1. Article 287 refers to four alternative fora for compulsory dispute settlement procedures,
namely: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); the International Court of Justice; an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex
VII of the Convention; and a special Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VIII of the Convention.
States are entitled to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of these
dispute settlement fora at any time on or after becoming party to the Convention.
State Parties that have not made a declaration indicating their choice of fora are
deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention. If the parties to a dispute have chosen the same forum for dispute settlement
under Article 287, the dispute may be submitted only to that forum unless the parties otherwise agree. If the parties to a dispute have not chosen the same forum for
dispute settlement under Article 287, the dispute may be submitted only to ‘Annex
VII’ arbitration unless the parties otherwise agree.
If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal which considers that
prima facie it has jurisdiction under Part XV or Part XI, Section 5, the court
or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate
under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute
or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.96
ITLOS is empowered to prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures pending
the constitution of the court or tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted.97
Article 292 of the LOSC establishes a specific compulsory procedure for disputes
concerning LOSC article 73, which requires the prompt release of vessels and crews
96
97

LOSC, Article 290.
LOSC, Article 290(5).
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detained in exercise of a coastal State’s right to enforce its laws and regulations
regarding the conservation and management of living resources in its EEZ. Where
the authorities of a coastal State have detained a vessel flying the flag of another
State, disputes regarding the requirement of prompt release may be heard by ITLOS
or a tribunal accepted by the detaining State under article 287.98 The tribunal
hearing the dispute is empowered to determine, without prejudice to the merits of
any case before national fora, a reasonable bond or security and order the release of
the detained vessel or its crew.99

2.5.3 Limitations and exceptions to the applicability of Section
2 of Part XV
The requirement set out in Part XV Section 2 of the LOSC to participate in compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions is subject to a number of exceptions.
The exceptions described below are particularly relevant to disputes concerning the
management of OCAs. They can be invoked by claimant coastal States in order to
limit the ability of dispute settlement bodies referred to in LOSC Part XV Section
2 to prescribe modalities of OCA management.100
Article 298 of the LOSC enables States to exclude the application of compulsory
dispute settlement procedures by opting out of such procedures in relation to one
or more of three categories of dispute, namely:
(a)

disputes concerning the interpretation and application of LOSC Articles
15, 74 and 83 ‘relating to’ the delimitation of maritime boundaries and
claims to historic waters;

(b)

disputes concerning military and law enforcement activities;101
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LOSC, Article 292(1).
LOSC, Article 292(4).
100
These are set out in LOSC Part XV Section 3, entitled ‘Limitations and Exceptions to Applicability of Section 2’.
101
It is unclear whether the optional exception regarding law enforcement activities by a coastal
State may be invoked in relation to disputes where law enforcement activities of one coastal
State intrude into the territorial sea of an adjacent or neighbouring coastal State (for example
99
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(c)

disputes in respect of which the UN Security Council is exercising the
functions assigned to it by the UN Charter.

A State may invoke an optional exception by special declaration, at or after ratification of the LOSC.102 Exception (a) has been invoked by many coastal States that
assert overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction.103 It encompasses all disputes
‘relating to’ the delimitation of territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf OCAs.104
Exception (a) does not explicitly refer to disputes concerning the management of
OCAs, or the entitlement to exercise jurisdiction within such areas. However, such
matters are in practice very closely associated with maritime boundary disputes,
and do not appear to have been treated as distinct issues during the negotiation
of Article 298 at UNCLOS III.105 In the author’s view, such matters are therefore
‘related to’ maritime boundary delimitation for the purposes of exception (a), and
may be excluded by declaration from compulsory binding dispute settlement.
Disputes relating to delimitation of maritime boundaries (per LOSC Articles 15, 74
and 83) and claims to historic waters remain subject to a compulsory conciliation
procedure under Section 2 of Annex V of the LOSC that may be initiated at a disputant’s request.106 States are obliged to negotiate an agreement on the basis of the
report presented by the conciliation commission.107 The commission is prohibited
from accepting submissions concerning a dispute that ‘necessarily involves the conas a result of the continuation of a hot pursuit into such a zone). Intrusion into the territorial
sea is clearly not permitted by international law, as under LOSC Article 111(3), Article 23(2) of
the High Seas Convention, and customary law, hot pursuit is required to cease in the territorial
sea (unless the relevant coastal State agrees otherwise). For this reason, arising from the
sovereignty of States over their territorial sea, it is arguable that disputes arising from such an
intrusion could not be excluded from compulsory dispute settlement by the law enforcement
activities exception set out in LOSC Article 298(1)(b).
102
LOSC Article 298(1).
103
For a list of these States see: United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the
Law of the Sea, Settlement of dispute mechanism under the Convention: Choice of
procedure under article 287 and optional exceptions to applicability of Part XV, Section 2, of the Convention under article 298 of the Convention (2010) available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm>.
104
A dispute between Indonesia and East Timor concerning LOSC Part IV and the designation
by Indonesia of archipelagic baselines (discussed in Chapter 2.3.4) would not be excluded by
Article 298 from compulsory and binding dispute settlement.
105
See Virginia Commentaries, Volume V, above n 1 on page 4, 107–141.
106
See LOSC, Article 298(1)(a)(i)-(iii).
107
LOSC, Article 298(1)(a)(ii).
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current consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights
over continental or insular land territory’.108 . This language is indicative of an important jurisdictional limitation of LOSC procedures: To the extent that a dispute
concerning the management of an OCA is linked to questions of sovereignty, such
a dispute would fall beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the LOSC and the
compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures set out in the Convention.109
LOSC Article 297 also exempts certain disputes from the application Part XV Section 2 procedures. Article 297(1) provides that disputes concerning ‘the exercise
by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction’ shall not be subject to the
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions set out in LOSC Part XV Section
2 except in the following cases:
(a)

when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the
provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of
navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or
in regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article
58;

(b)

when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned freedoms,
rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention or of laws
or regulations adopted by the coastal State in conformity with this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this
Convention; or

(c)

when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified international rules and standards for the protection and preservation
of the marine environment which are applicable to the coastal State and

108
109

LOSC, Article 298(1)(a)(i).
Note that LOSC Article 293(1) provides that ‘A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this
section [Part XV Section 2] shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Convention.’ Could a court or tribunal use this provision as a basis for
adjudicating a territorial sovereignty dispute? In the author’s opinion, no. The jurisdiction of
a court or tribunal seized of a matter pursuant to the compulsory binding procedures set out in
LOSC Part XV Section 2 would, in accordance with LOSC Article 286, be confined to disputes
concerning the interpretation and application of the LOSC. None of the rules and principles
set out in the Convention impact upon the validity of claims to territorial sovereignty.
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which have been established by this Convention or through a competent
international organization or diplomatic conference in accordance with
this Convention.
To what extent does this exemption cover disputes concerning activity within OCAs?
The default component of Article 297(1) is broadly framed, covering the ‘exercise’
by a coastal State of ‘sovereign rights or jurisdiction’ both within and outside of
OCAs. However, compulsory binding procedures remain available if one or more
claimant coastal States were alleged to have infringed, within an OCA, the navigational and other freedoms referred to in exceptions (a) and (b) above. Similarly,
exception (c) does not prohibit compulsory binding settlement of certain disputes
concerning marine environmental protection in OCAs. However, it is difficult to see
how a dispute settlement body could pass judgment on the allegations referred to
in exceptions (a), (b), and (c), without first determining which coastal State was
entitled to exercise jurisdiction in the relevant area. For disputes relating to territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf OCAs, the dispute settlement body would
lack jurisdiction to make this determination on a compulsory binding basis if one
or more of the State Parties had invoked the optional exclusion set out in LOSC
Article 298(1)(a).
Paragraph 2 of Article 297 provides that disputes concerning marine scientific research (including such activity within OCAs) shall be subject to Part XV Section
2 procedures. This provision is heavily qualified by a requirement that States shall
not be ...
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute arising
out of: (i) the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in
accordance with article 246 [concerning maritime scientific research in
the EEZ and on the continental shelf]; or (ii) a decision by the coastal
State to order suspension or cessation of a research project in accordance
with article 253.
Paragraph 3 of Article 297 establishes a basic position that disputes with regard
to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with the procedures set out in Part XV
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Section 2 of the Convention. This basic position is qualified by a requirement that
States shall not be . . .
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement [compulsory procedures under article 287] of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights
with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or
their exercise, including its discretionary power for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other
States and the terms and conditions established in its conservation and
management laws and regulations.
However, in three specified circumstances where sovereign rights are flagrantly exercised to the detriment of other States, a ‘compulsory conciliation’ procedure under
Section 2 of Annex V of the LOSC may be initiated at a disputant’s request.110
The three specified circumstances comprise areas of potential dispute concerning
the OCA management, namely allegations that:
a)

a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not
seriously endangered; or

b)

a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living resources
with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in fishing; or

c)

a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under
articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the terms and conditions established by
the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or part of
the surplus it has declared to exist.

110

LOSC, Article 297(3)(b).
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2.5.4 Principles of State responsibility
If an OCA management dispute is subject to compulsory binding dispute settlement
per LOSC Part XV, the ability of the international court or tribunal to prescribe
modalities of OCA management is also influenced by principles of State responsibility. Essentially, these principles determine whether or not the States Parties, as
a matter of international law, are (1) responsible for particular acts that form the
subject matter of the dispute, and (2) are obliged to make reparation (e.g. modalities of OCA management) to the extent that particular acts are unlawful.111 At
a conceptual level, the responsibility of a State arises from two cumulative factors:
First, the State must owe an international legal obligation to another State or States
(e.g. the various obligations surveyed previously in this Chapter); second, an act or
omission must occur which violates that obligation, and which is imputable to the
State.112
111

Shaw, above n 50 on page 14, notes that ‘State responsibility is a fundamental principle of international law arising out of the nature of the international legal system and the doctrines
of State sovereignty and equality of States. It provides that whenever one State commits an
internationally unlawful act against another State, international responsibility is established
between the two. A breach of an international obligation gives rise to a requirement for reparation.’ See also Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923) 2 RIAA 615, 641, where it is commented
that ‘responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character
involve international responsibility. Responsibility results in the duty to make reparation if
the obligation in question is not met.’ See also Chorzów Factory (Merits) (1928) PCIJ (Series
A) No. 17, 29, where the Permanent Court of International Justice emphasised that ‘it is a
principle of international law, and even a greater conception of law, that any breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation.’
112
See Articles 1 and 2 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility: ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) available at
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/>. See also James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002). See also
Shaw, above n 50 on page 14, 696. Shaw identifies a third requisite factor, namely, that ‘loss or
damage has resulted from the unlawful act or omission.’ A general requirement of loss or damage is arguably redundant, as, in the context of relations between States, the ‘loss or damage’
suffered may be the breach of a legal duty itself. The violation of jurisdictional rights conferred
by the LOSC, for example illegal navigation in the territorial sea, or the illegal boarding of
a foreign-flagged vessel on the high seas, is an example of such loss or damage: see Brownlie
above n 2 on page 36, 441–442. In Total S.A v Argentine Republic, an arbitral tribunal convened pursuant to the ICSID Convention commented that ‘[a] basic issue in the present dispute
is whether Argentina has committed an internationally wrongful act, that is whether it has
breached the international obligations contained in the BIT by conduct attributable to it . . .
these two conditions are sufficient to establish such a wrongful act giving rise to international
responsibility. Having caused damage is not an additional requirement, except if the content
of the primary obligation breached has an object or implies an obligation to cause damages’:
(ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01), Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 August 2006, Para
89.
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A variety of principles have been formulated to address the question of whether
acts or omissions are imputable to a State, notwithstanding the lawfulness of such
actions. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility
(ILC Articles) represent the most substantial contribution to the development of
principles of this nature.113 On the basis of an extensive review of State practice, the
ILC Articles set out various principles of imputability, including tests that identify
whether acts or omissions are capable of being ‘attributed’ to a State, independently
of the conduct of other States.114 Key principles include the following:
ILC Article 4 provides that the conduct of any State organ or official is considered
an act of the State concerned under international law, whether the organ or official
exercises legislative, executive or judicial functions.115 ILC Articles 5 and 6 set
out principles which would impute to a coastal State, respectively, the conduct
of persons or entities exercising elements of government authority,116 and or the
conduct of organs placed at the disposal of the coastal State by another State.117
ILC Article 7, which is ‘firmly established ... by international jurisprudence, State
practice and the writings of jurists’118 provides that:
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered
to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered
as an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or
entity acts in that capacity, even if its exceeds authority or contravenes
instructions.
The above principles significantly curtail the ability of States involved in an OCA
management dispute to distance themselves from activities undertaken or authorised
by their respective governments and government officials.

113

ILC Articles, above n 112 on the previous page. See also Gillian Triggs, International Law:
Contemporary Principles and Practices (2005) 417–421.
114
See ILC Articles, above n 112 on the preceding page, Articles 4–11. See also Crawford, above
n 112 on the previous page, 91–123, 145.
115
Shaw, above n 50 on page 14, 701–702. See also Crawford, above n 112 on the previous page,
94–99.
116
See Crawford, above n 112 on the preceding page, 100–102, regarding ILC Article 5 and associated State practice.
117
See ibid, 103–105, regarding ILC Article 6 and associated State practice.
118
Ibid, 107.
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Although principles of imputability set out in the ILC Articles are derived from State
practice, their relevance, in the present context, as indicia of the legal responsibility
of a State (and the ability of a court or tribunal to prescribe modalities of OCA
management) is limited by the factors outlined below:
Redundant nature of principles of imputability:
The nature of a breach of an international legal obligation by a State may render
an enquiry into questions of imputability unnecessary of redundant.119 As Brownlie
notes:
In general, broad formulae on state responsibility are unhelpful ... it
is often said that responsibility only arises when the act or omission
complained of is imputable to a state. Imputability would seem to be a
superfluous notion, since the major issue in a given situation is whether
there has been a breach of duty: the content of ‘imputability’ will vary
according to the particular duty, the nature of the breach, and so on.120
This observation is especially pertinent for any disputes concerning the obligations
surveyed previously in this Chapter, many of which contain positive duties, which
if breached would be inherently imputable to the relevant State. For example, a
key breach of duty at issue in the Guyana–Suriname dispute – the obligation under
LOSC Article 74(3)/83(3) to make every effort to develop provisional management
arrangements and refrain from jeopardising the final delimitation – was alone sufficient to establish Guyana and Suriname’s legal responsibility.121 In cases where acts
or omissions are not inherently imputable to a State (e.g. the threat of force by a
patrol vessel in the Guyana–Suriname dispute) international courts and tribunals
have also preferred to consider State responsibility as arising implicitly from unlawful conduct alone.122 In such cases, concepts of imputability are most commonly
119

See, generally, Brownlie, above n 2 on page 36, 419–456.
Ibid, 422.
121
See also discussion in Brownlie, above n 2 on page 36, 11–18.
122
The threat of force undertaken by the patrol vessel was only imputable to Suriname to the extent
that, for example, the patrol vessel was exercising elements of Suriname government authority.
If available evidence was supportive, it would have been open to Suriname to argue that the
vessel was not doing so. For further discussion regarding the use of imputability principles by
international courts and tribunals see Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Issues of State Responsibility before
the International Court of Justice’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dan Sarooshi (eds) Issues of
State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (2004) 1, 7-8. See also Military
120
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employed to determine a breach of substantive law, rather than develop a ‘freestanding’ finding that State responsibility is incurred as a consequence of unlawful
conduct.123
Principles of imputability unlikely to be relevant or a matter of dispute:
In practical terms it is extremely unlikely that a judicial / arbitral dispute concerning OCA management would focus on anything other than the lawfulness of
an unambiguous exercise (and/or alleged infringement) of coastal State jurisdiction
by one or more of the relevant claimant States.124 In such cases the application
of principles of imputability would not be relevant and or disputed by the States
Parties during arbitral / judicial proceedings. In any event, as discussed above,
the principles set out in ILC Articles 5–7 significantly curtail the ability of States
to distance themselves from activities undertaken or authorised by their respective
governments and government officials.

2.6 Conclusion: management implications of the
international legal framework
This Chapter has examined the entitlement of claimant coastal States to manage activity within OCAs in the context of relevant international law. The key conclusions
of the Chapter are as follows:
Within each zone of national jurisdiction recognised by the LOSC, a coastal State
is entrusted with a package of exclusive rights to manage human activity in one
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 62, 65, where the International Court of Justice applied a test of
effective control to determine whether the activities of the Contras were attributable to the
United States. See also La Grand (Germany v. United States of America) (Merits) [2001] ICJ
Rep 466, 485; Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep
15.
123
Ibid.
124
Indeed none of the disputes submitted to compulsory binding settlement under LOSC XV have
involved a disagreement between the States Parties about whether coastal State jurisdiction
was in fact exercised.
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or more of the following six functional contexts, namely: artificial structures, environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational
safety and resources exploitation. This Chapter has demonstrated that provisions of
international law concerning the assertion of these rights within OCAs are general
in nature, emphasising restraint, peaceful cooperation and commitment to negotiations. They do not establish a detailed or functionally comprehensive template
for the provisional and cooperative implementation within an OCA of the functional components of coastal State jurisdiction. Rather, international law defers to
claimant coastal States to reach agreement enabling them to manage activity within
OCAs on a functionally comprehensive basis.
In the absence of such a management agreement, international law does not establish
clear entitlements to undertake provisional management of an OCA on a unilateral
basis. Within an OCA arising from territorial sea claims, LOSC Article 15 notionally
permits each claimant coastal State to undertake unilateral OCA management up
to the limit of the relevant equidistance line, except in the context of ‘historic title
or other special circumstances’. The ‘historic title or other special circumstances’
exception dramatically curtails the ability of coastal States to rely on LOSC Article
15 as a basis for unilateral OCA management because: (1) it is drafted in broad
ambiguous terms that do not clearly define the locations in which unilateral OCA
management is permitted; and (2) claimant States will inevitably disagree about
the application of the exception, because it is also determinative of the course of the
maritime boundary. In relation to the contiguous zone, the LOSC Article 33 does
not contain specific obligations concerning the provisional management of OCAs
or the delimitation of overlapping claims. Concerning archipelagic waters, LOSC
Articles 47(5) and (6) limit the impact of archipelagic baseline claims on the rights
and interests of neighbouring States but do not contain specific obligations concerning overlapping claim areas or maritime delimitation. Within an OCA arising from
claims to an EEZ and/or continental shelf, LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) each
contain two obligations that simultaneously attempt to promote and limit activity
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undertaken or authorised by the claimant coastal States. Unilateral management of
an OCA is constrained, but not prohibited, by the requirement to make ‘every effort
to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature’ and by the requirement
to make ‘every effort ... not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.’ As discussed in Chapter 2.3.5, the Guyana–Suriname Award provides some
analytical guidance to coastal States concerning the interpretation and application
of LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) to specific factual circumstances.
The dispute settlement framework set out in LOSC Part XV – and in particular
the popular optional exclusion set out in LOSC Article 298 – allow coastal States
involved in disputes concerning OCAs to insulate themselves from the Convention’s
compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures. Consequently, in the absence of consent between the relevant claimant coastal States, there is limited scope
for international court and tribunals to prescribe modalities for OCA management
in particular cases. Furthermore, any territorial sovereignty disputes associated with
an OCA fall beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the Convention’s compulsory
and binding dispute settlement procedures. In the event that an OCA management
dispute was submitted to compulsory binding dispute settlement under LOSC Part
XV, principles of State responsibility are unlikely to be a significant feature of the
judicial or arbitral proceedings.
Chapter 1.1 highlighted several serious management issues associated with OCAs.
The absence of a clear legal entitlement to engage in OCA management is problematic in this context. The next Chapter will examine efforts to address this problem,
focusing on the development by coastal States of legal and policy frameworks for
the provisional joint management of OCAs.
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3 Management of overlapping claim
areas in current State practice
3.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1.2, several coastal States have attempted to address the practical management challenges associated with OCAs and difficulties associated with
maritime boundary negotiations by supplementing the international legal framework
through development of frameworks for the provisional joint management of OCAs.
This Chapter identifies current State practice concerning the provisional joint management of OCAs and critically evaluates the effectiveness of current provisional
joint management frameworks.
Sections 3.2 – 3.8 present a global survey of provisional joint management frameworks that have been established to date through 25 bilateral or multilateral treaties,
a wide variety of non-binding instruments, and informal political agreements. The
survey identifies key design features of each provisional joint management framework
and briefly discusses the regional context in which each framework operates. It also
evaluates the holistic effectiveness of each framework – with the primary assessment
criterion being the extent to which each framework enables the functionally comprehensive management of activity within the relevant OCA (see below for further
details). The findings of the survey – including several different types of functional
gaps that are evident in the surveyed provisional joint management frameworks –
are summarised in Section 3.8. In the interest of avoiding repetition, additional
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comparative assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of specific design features
common to several of the surveyed frameworks is presented in Chapter 4.
As highlighted in Chapter 1.5, the evaluation undertaken in this Chapter focuses on
de jure characteristics of OCA management frameworks, as evidenced by, and developed by reference to, publicly disclosed legal instruments and policy documents.
The de facto implementation of OCA management frameworks (including their implementation status and degree of acceptance by third States) is only examined to
the extent that it is: (1) documented in publicly disclosed primary or secondary
sources; or (2) may be reasonably inferred given publicly identified socio-political
circumstances in relevant claimant coastal States. Attention is drawn to gaps evident in provisional joint management frameworks that may undermine the ability of
the claimant coastal States to assert, within the relevant OCA, particular functional
components of their coastal State jurisdiction.
The surveyed OCA management frameworks cannot be neatly categorised according to their functional coverage. Indeed several of the surveyed frameworks exhibit
different combinations of multiple types of functional gaps, which are strongly influenced by their regional geographic and geopolitical context. To clearly illustrate this
context, the results of the survey are organised geographically, with relevant State
practice being divided into the following regional groups: Pacific Ocean excluding
the Asian Rim; Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean; Red Sea and Persian Gulf; North
East Asia; South East Asia and Australia; and the Polar Regions. Within each
of these regional groups, provisional joint management frameworks are categorised
according to the specific OCAs to which they relate.
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3.1.1 Assessment criterion and coastal State jurisdiction
Taking into account the findings of Chapter 2, the primary assessment criterion is
satisfied when a provisional joint management framework features:
• Comprehensive participation: The framework must involve all of the relevant
claimant coastal States. If one or more claimant coastal States do not participate in the provisional joint management framework, ambiguities of the
international legal framework concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs continue to impact upon relations between all claimant
coastal States and, consequently, on management of the relevant OCA.
• Comprehensive allocation of coastal State jurisdiction: The framework must
enable each of the claimant coastal States to clearly identify the circumstances
(and locations) in which they are entitled (or not entitled) to implement all
LOSC rights and obligations concerning: artificial structures, environmental
protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational safety
and resource exploitation.1
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, the regulatory competence established by the LOSC
rights and obligations referred to above has both a ‘prescriptive’ component (i.e. the
jurisdictional entitlement under international law to establish laws and regulations
that apply in the relevant zone) and an ‘executive’ or ‘enforcement’ component (i.e.
the jurisdictional entitlement under international law to take action to enforce applicable laws and regulations, including via domestic judicial procedures). Throughout
this Chapter, unless otherwise stated, reference to the ‘exercise’ of jurisdiction by a
coastal State refers to implementation of the enforcement component of that jurisdiction, supported by the relevant prescriptive national laws and regulations.

1

In other words, a mutually agreed basis must be established for the exercise of all functional,
prescriptive and enforcement components of coastal State jurisdiction in the relevant OCA.

81

3.2 Pacific Ocean excluding the Asian rim
3.2.1 Canada – United States2
Background:
Canada and the United States assert overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction in
two locations adjacent to their Pacific coastline:
• west of the maritime boundary terminus in the Juan de Fuca Strait, adjacent
to Vancouver Island, British Columbia and Washington State (see Figure 3.1);
• in and seaward of the Dixon Entrance, between and adjacent to the Alexander
Archipelago of Alaska and the Queen Charlotte Islands, and mainland, of
British Columbia (see Figure 3.2).3
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Activity in the OCAs generated by these overlapping claims is managed in accordance with diverse array of functionally specific management frameworks that also
apply to contiguous areas of non-overlapping jurisdiction.4 Several government agencies from each State cooperate closely within their field of operational responsibility
and have developed detailed cooperative management arrangements in this context.5
The Canadian and United States Governments have also formalised several cooper2

See: Ted McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours: International Ocean Law Relations between the
United States and Canada (2009) and Ted L. McDorman, ‘Canada–U.S. International Ocean
Law Relations in the North Pacific: Disputes, Agreements and Cooperation’ in Seoung-Yong
Hong, Jon M. Van Dyke, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes and the Law of
the Sea (2009).
3
For additional illustrative maps and further information concerning the specific jurisdictional
claims, see McDorman (both publications), above n 2 and David Gray, ‘Canada’s Unresolved
Maritime Boundaries’ (1997) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Autumn. See also Prescott
and Schofield, above n 57 on page 16, 418–421. For background on jurisdictional questions in
the Dixon Entrance, see: C.B. Bourne and D.M. McRae, ‘Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon
Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-Examined’ (1976) 14 Canadian Yearbook of International
Law 175.
4
The OCAs in question are relatively small in area (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and are thus readily
integrated into more general cooperative management frameworks.
5
For example, McDorman observes that ‘Overall, the Canadian and U.S. Coast Guards, the
government agencies with the direct operational responsibilities regarding shipping, have a close
relationship fostered through memoranda of understanding and regular meetings, regarding, for
instance, search and rescue and oil spill response.’: McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above
n 2, 210.
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Figure 3.1: Canada – United States: overlapping claims west of the maritime boundary terminus in the Juan de Fuca Strait. Source: Gray, note 3 on the
previous page.
ative management frameworks in bilateral legal instruments, which are examined in
the following paragraphs:
In 1974 both States agreed to establish a Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan
(JCP) concerning spills of oil and other noxious substances.6 The JCP applies in
6

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America concerning a Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, 19 June 1974,
entered into force 19 June 1974, CTS 1974/22. See McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours,
above n 2, 210. The JCP was revised in 2003 – see Letter of Promulgation, signed 22 May
2003, available at <http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/folios/00025/docs/canusletter-eng.pdf> and the
text of the Plan at Environment Canada, Contingency Planning at <http://www.ec.gc.ca/eeue/default.asp?lang=en&n=0187A1E9#marine>. The JCP excludes radiological incidents (see
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Figure 3.2: Canada – United States: overlapping claims in and seaward of the Dixon
entrance. Source: Gray, note 3 on page 82.
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several specified areas of ‘contiguous waters’ in the Atlantic, Pacific (including the
Juan de Fuca region), Great Lakes and the Dixon Entrance7 and is expressed to
apply without prejudice to the maritime claims of both States.8 The purpose of the
Plan is expressed as follows:
... to provide for a coordinated system for planning, preparedness and
responding to harmful substance incidents in the contiguous waters. The
plan does so by supplementing the existing national response system of
each Party for areas covered by the JCP by ensuring cooperative bilateral
response planning at the local and national level.9
The JCP contains Geographic Annexes that set out detailed procedures and information concerning the Plan’s implementation in each of the specified areas of
contiguous waters.10 The Plan is explicitly characterised as an implementation of
Canada and the United States’ obligations arising under the 1990 International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation.11
A 1979 Agreement establishes a detailed framework for cooperative vessel traffic
management in the Juan de Fuca region12 that applies without prejudice to the
maritime claims of both States.13 Joint traffic separation schemes implemented in
accordance with the Agreement have been submitted and adopted by the IMO.14
Section 103.6), which are covered by the Canada/United States Joint Radiological Emergency
Response Plan 1996.
7
JCP, above n 6, Section 104 contains detailed geographic descriptions of these waters.
8
See Exchange of Notes, above n 6. The relevant paragraph reads: ‘Maintenance of the Plan
and actions thereunder would be without prejudice to the positions of the Governments of
the United States and of Canada, with respect to coastal State jurisdiction over pollution,
and without prejudice to any other positions of the two Governments regarding the extent of
territorial or maritime jurisdiction.’
9
JCP, above n 6, Section 103.1.
10
See JCP, above n 6, Appendix 4 – Guidelines for the Development of a Geographic Annex.
11
JCP, above n 6, Section 101.2. For citation of the Convention see above, n 89 on page 64.
12
Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement on Vessel Traffic Management for the Juan de
Fuca Region, signed 19 December 1979, entered into force 19 December 1979, 1221 UNTS 67,
CTS 1979/28. See McDorman in Seoung-Yong Hong and Van Dyke, above n 2, 185–188. Note
that the area of ‘Applicable Waters’ specified in Section 101 of the Agreement only covers part
of the OCA. However, McDorman observes that ‘Since the Canada-U.S. maritime boundary
discussions of the late 1970s, the small area of disputed waters seaward of the Juan de Fuca
Strait has caused little concern and has not been the subject of Canada-U.S. discussions.’:
McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 175.
13
Article 205.1 of the Agreement, above n 12, provides: ‘This Agreement and actions hereunder
shall be without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States and Canada
with respect to the character of, an the nature and extent of coastal state jurisdiction over the
applicable and adjacent waters.’
14
See IMO, New and Amended Existing Traffic Separation Schemes, Doc COLREG.2/Circ.57, 26
May 2006, Annex 2, adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee in May 2006 and McDorman,
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Canada and the United States have also established an understanding concerning
the passage of US submarines through the Dixon entrance to a noise measurement
facility in Behm Canal, Alaska.15
Management of shared living marine resources in waters adjacent to the Pacific coast
has been a longstanding point of both cooperation and contention in Canada–US
relations.16 At present, a series of bilateral agreements establish complex cooperative management frameworks for salmon,17 halibut,18 hake/whiting19 and albacore
tuna.20 As mentioned above, each of these frameworks applies both within OCAs
and more broadly to contiguous areas of non-overlapping jurisdiction.
Enforcement jurisdiction within the OCAs is allocated by reference to the flag State
of the vessel: Canada and the United States have an understanding that the two
States will only exercise jurisdiction within OCAs over vessels flying their respective flags.21 This understanding is articulated in at least two legal instruments. In
relation to the Dixon Entrance, Canada and the United States exchanged notes in
August 1980 ‘reaffirming that each side would continue to observe flag State enforcement respecting fisheries.’22 A 1979 Protocol concerning the northern Pacific and
Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 276–278. See also Article 202 of the Agreement, above n
12, setting out an obligation to submit joint traffic separation schemes and harmonise relevant
regulations.
15
See State practice discussed in McDorman in Seoung-Yong Hong and Van Dyke, above n 2,
184–185.
16
For an detailed overview, see McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 281–320.
17
See, eg, Canada–United States Pacific Salmon Treaty, signed 28 January 1985, entered into
force 18 March 1985, CTS 1985/7; Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States
Constituting an Agreement Relating to the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 30 June 1999, CTS 1999/58,
reproduced in Pacific Salmon Commission, 1999/2000 15th Annual Report (2001) 109–169.
18
See, eg, Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Preservation of
the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, signed 2 March 1953, CTS
No. 14 (1953); Protocol Amending the Convention between Canada and the United States of
America for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering
Sea, signed 29 March 1979, CTS No. 44 (1980).
19
Agreement on Pacific Hake/Whiting, signed 21 November 2003, entered into force 25 June
2008, available at <http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/commercial/ground-fond/trawlchalut/hake_agreement-eng.htm>.
20
See Treaty on Pacific Coast Albacore Tuna, signed 26 May 1981, entered into force 29 July 1981,
CTS 1981/19, 1274 UNTS 247; Agreement Amending the Treaty on Pacific Coast Albacore
Tuna, notes exchanged 21 August 2002 and 10 September 2002, entered into force 28 May
2004, CTS 2004/12.
21
McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 172, 285.
22
See Department of State, Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law
1981–1988 (1994) 1930. Quote from McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 172.
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Bering Sea halibut fishery establishes a flag-based enforcement mechanism and also
permits the concurrent exercise of enforcement jurisdiction against vessels flagged
to third parties.23 Article 16 of the Protocol’s Annex provides as follows:24
Pending delimitation of maritime boundaries between Canada and the
United States in the Convention area, the following principles shall be
applied as interim measures in the boundary region:
a. as between the Parties, enforcement of the Convention shall be
carried out by the flag State;
b. neither Party shall authorise fishing for halibut by vessels of third
parties;
c. either Party may enforce the Convention with respect to fishing for
halibut, or related activities, by vessels of third parties.
Regular consultations between law enforcement agencies of each State take place on
an annual basis in accordance with a 1990 Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement,25
which, inter alia, obliges both States to consult in relation to ‘standard fisheries law
enforcement practices in the vicinity of maritime boundaries.’26
The United States and Canada engage in cooperative management of their Pacific
OCAs in accordance with a complementary collection of international legal instruments, cooperative management arrangements developed by equivalent government
agencies in each State, and coordinated national policy-making. When viewed in
isolation, each of these frameworks exhibits functional gaps, focusing on a particular functional context or management challenge (e.g. marine pollution, navigational
safety, maritime law enforcement, and marine resources management). However, the
coherent and spatially overlain application of the various frameworks establishes a
functionally-broad allocation of coastal State jurisdiction within the relevant OCAs.
It is also worth noting that the issue of OCA management is not addressed in an
23

McDorman notes that the Protocol ‘addressed specific fishing matters up to 1981 and was not
renewed, although the ... [Protocol] ... did not contain a termination clause’: McDorman, Salt
Water Neighbours, above n 2, 172.
24
Article 16 of the Annex to the 1979 Protocol amending the 1953 Convention for the Preservation
of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, above n 18
25
Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement, signed 26 September 1990, entered into force 16 December
1991, CTS 1991/36, TIAS 11753.
26
Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement, Article II(c). For further discussion see McDorman, Salt
Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82, 151.
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isolated fashion. It is instead integrated into a broader cooperative response to
transboundary oceans management. For further discussion of this design feature,
see Chapter 4.4.

3.2.2 El Salvador – Honduras – Nicaragua
Background:
El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua have engaged in a series of territorial and
maritime jurisdictional disputes that date back to the formation of the three States
following the chaotic dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America in the
1830s.27
The three States have adjacent coastlines bordering the Gulf of Fonseca, a bay
located on the Pacific coast of Central America (see Figure 3.3). In 1900 Honduras
and Nicaragua established a maritime boundary terminating in the central portion
of the Gulf (see Figure 3.3).28 In 1916 El Salvador commenced proceedings in the
Central American Court of Justice, alleging that Nicaragua was infringing upon
co-ownership rights it possessed in the waters of the Gulf.29 Impugned Nicaraguan
actions in this context included an agreement with the United States authorising
the construction of a US naval base in the Gulf.30 In a 1917 Judgment31 the Court
held that the Gulf of Fonseca was an ‘historic bay’ and declared that El Salvador,
Nicaragua and Honduras were co-owners of its waters.32
In 1986 El Salvador and Honduras concluded an agreement (Special Agreement)
requesting that a Chamber of the ICJ be established to (1) delimit undefined segments of the two States’ land boundary and (2) determine the legal status of certain
27

For a general historical overview, see Thomas Karnes, The Failure of Union: Central America,
1824–1960 (1961).
28
See Prescott and Schofield, above n 57, 422–425.
29
Malcolm Evans, ‘Case concerning the land, island and maritime frontier dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras)–The Nicaraguan Intervention’ (1992) 41 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 896.
30
Ibid.
31
The text of the judgment is reproduced at (1917) 11 American Journal of International Law
674.
32
(1917) 11 American Journal of International Law 674, 716.
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Figure 3.3: El Salvador – Honduras – Nicaragua: overlapping claims in the Gulf of
Fonseca. Source: Prescott and Schofield, note 57 on page 16.
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islands and waters in the general area of the Gulf of Fonseca.33 Nicaragua filed an
application to intervene in the proceedings on 17 November 1989 and was permitted
to do so in relation to certain issues concerning the legal status of waters in the Gulf
of Fonseca.34
Four findings of the Chamber’s Judgment of 11 September 199235 are relevant to
the present discussion. The first relates to the legal status of waters in the Gulf
of Fonseca. The Chamber characterised the Gulf as an ‘historic bay’ consisting
of certain waters subject to a sui generis legal regime of ‘condominium’ or ‘coownership’.36 It held that all waters located landward of a defined closing line (Gulf
closing line),37 and beyond a 3 nautical mile zone subject to the exclusive and sole
sovereignty of each of the three States (Coastal belt), were ‘held in sovereignty
by the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of Honduras and the Republic of
Nicaragua, jointly ... unless and until a delimitation of the relevant maritime area be
effected.’38 Reliance was placed on the 1917 judgment of the Central American Court
of Justice, which was deemed to be ‘a relevant precedent decision of a competent
court’.39 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Oda argued that the three States were simply

33

The agreement referring the dispute to the Court (signed 24 May 1986, entered into force 1
October 1986, filed with the Court Registry 11 December 1986) is reproduced in Spanish in
the Chamber’s Judgment of 13 September 1990: Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment [1990] ICJ Reports 92. See also
Evans, above n 29.
34
See Judgment of 13 September 1990, above n 33 and Evans, above n 29.
35
Case concerning the land, island and maritime frontier dispute (El Salvador/Honduras:
Nicaragua Intervening), Judgment of 11 September 1992 [1992] ICJ Reports 35. In 2002 ElSalvador unsuccessfully sought revision of aspects of the judgment concerning land boundary
delimitation: Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning the Land Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua
intervening) (El Salvador v. Honduras), Judgment of 18 December 2003 [2003] ICJ Reports
392.
36
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 601–602, 605, 617. See also Malcolm Shaw, ‘Case
concerning the land, island and maritime frontier dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua
Intervening), Judgment of 11 September 1992’ (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 929.
37
The closing line was defined as extending ‘between a point on a line 3 miles (1 marine league)
from Punta Amapala and a point on that line 3 miles (1 marine league) from Punta Cosiguina’:
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 616. See also Prescott and Schofield, above n 57
on page 16, 422–423.
38
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 616–617. The Gulf closing line and 3 nautical mile
limit of the Coastal belt are depicted in Figure 3.3.
39
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 601.
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entitled to a 12-mile territorial sea subject to delimitation in accordance with LOSC
Article 15.40
The second relevant finding relates to navigational freedoms in the Gulf of Fonseca.
The Chamber held that the claimant coastal States each enjoyed a right of innocent
passage in the Coastal belt, and that vessels of other States also enjoyed a right of
innocent passage in the waters seaward of the Coastal belt in order to provide those
vessels with ‘access to any one of the three coastal States’.41
The third relevant finding concerns maritime delimitation of waters enclosed by the
Gulf closing line. After examining the Special Agreement between El-Salvador and
Honduras, the Chamber concluded that the Agreement not establish jurisdiction to
‘effect any delimitation of ... maritime spaces, whether within or outside the Gulf.’42
The fourth relevant finding relates to waters located seaward of the Gulf closing
line. The Chamber held that the three claimant coastal States were entitled to
claim maritime zones measured from a 13-mile central portion of the Gulf closing
line.43 It noted that:
Since the legal situation on the landward side of the closing line is one of
joint sovereignty, it follows that all three of the joint sovereigns must have
entitlement outside the closing line to territorial sea, continental shelf
and exclusive economic zone ... Whether this situation should remain in
being, or be replaced by a division and delimitation into three separate
zones is, as inside the Gulf also, a matter for the three States to decide.44

40

See Shaw, above n 36.
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 605. Shaw, above n 36, highlights uncertainties
associated with the Chamber’s findings concerning innocent passage, noting that ‘it is unclear
whether each of the three States has the right to challenge the innocence of a vessel’s passage
in the Gulf, irrespective of its port of destination. Similarly, it is unclear whether the right can
be suspended, and if so, by whom, or whether each of the three States is entitled to exercise
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction.’
42
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 617.
43
Two 3nm portions of the Gulf closing line (one at each extremity) represented the seaward
boundary of the Coastal belt. The Chamber noted that ‘the problem, whether of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, or the exclusive economic zone, must be
confined to the area off the baseline but excluding a 3-mile, or 1 -marine-league, strip of it at
either extremity, corresponding to the existing maritime belts of El Salvador and Nicaragua
respectively.’: Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 608.
44
Judgment of 11 September 1992, above n 35, 608 – 609.
41
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Oda argued that, as a consequence of coastal geography, Honduras was not entitled to claim a continental shelf or exclusive economic
zone outside the Gulf.45
There are several ambiguities in the Chamber’s judgment, which generate considerable legal uncertainties concerning maritime claims both landward and seaward
of the Gulf closing line.46 Concerning claims located landward of the Gulf closing
line, Prescott and Schofield identify several problems with the Chamber’s judgment,
noting as follows:
The first [problem] concerns the statement that each state is entitled
to a belt of presumably internal waters 3nm wide which is subject to
the 1900 delimitation. Honduras and Nicaragua are affected by this
delimitation, but it is not clear whether they may claim as far as the
line of delimitation, which is up to 6nm from the coast of both states, or
whether the delimitation is only recognised up to 3nm from the coast.
Part of the 1900 boundary lies less than 3nm from the coast of Nicaragua.
The second problem arises from the statement about waters in the mouth
of the bay adjacent to the closing line. Those waters are defined as lying
between points 3nm from Punta Amapala and Punta Cosiguina. In fact,
if Nicaragua is entitled to a belt of waters 3nm wide, that belt intersects
the closing line 4nm from Punta Cosiguina.47
Concerning claims located seaward of the Gulf closing line, Shaw notes the following:
Once again, the Chamber gave no indication as to how three States can
simultaneously exercise the rights of a coastal State in a territorial sea or
exploit the seabed and subsoil resources of the continental shelf. Can one
or two of the three States claim an exclusive economic zone seawards of
the entire line if a second or third does not? How can a claim by one third
of the presence at the closing line generate an entitlement to the entire
seawards area? Certainly, these sorts of problems can be resolved by the
parties but the Chamber’s failure to work fully through the consequences
of its sui generis approach may well generate difficulties. This might be
compared with the solution of Judge Oda, who thought that Honduras
was not entitled to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone outside
the Gulf. This, he felt, simply reflected geographic reality.48
45

See Shaw, above n 36.
Concerning passage rights in waters enclosed by the Gulf closing line, see above n 41 on the
previous page. More generally, Shaw, above n 36 on page 90, notes that ‘In indicating a sui
generis regime, the Chamber has, arguably, increased, rather than lessened, the potential for
future disputes.’
47
Prescott and Schofield, above n 57, 422–425.
48
Shaw, above n 36 on page 90.
46
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These uncertainties have not been addressed by subsequent delimitation agreements49 and Nicaragua is not legally bound to adhere to the Chamber’s judgment.50
For El Salvador and Honduras, a key implication of the legally binding judgment
is that landward of the Gulf closing line, there exists overlapping claims to 3-mile
belts of exclusive jurisdiction, in addition to a zone in which sovereignty is shared
by the three States.51 Seaward of the closing line defined in the Judgment, the three
States assert overlapping claims to a contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf.52
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The author is not aware of any cooperative frameworks developed by the three
States for the provisional joint management of OCAs located seaward of the Gulf
closing line. For waters located landward of the Gulf closing line, the legal regime
of condominium and co-ownership prescribed by the Chamber’s judgment provides
a basic, ambiguous and incomplete jurisdictional basis for cooperative management.
Key ambiguities include the following:
• Does the condominium arrangement and/or the 1917 Judgment of the Central
American Court of Justice automatically entitle each of the three States to
exercise jurisdiction in the Gulf’s waters on a concurrent basis?
• Alternatively, do the three States require each others’ consent before exercising
jurisdiction within the waters subject to the condominium / co-ownership?
49

See ibid.
See Shaw, above n 36. However, Nicaragua remains bound by the 1917 Judgment of the Central
American Court of Justice providing for co-ownership of the Gulf’s waters.
51
See discussion and maps in Prescott and Schofield, above n 57, 422–425.
52
See Prescott and Schofield, above n 57, 422–425. For an overview of jurisdictional claims
present in national legislation, see United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law
of the Sea, Table of claims to maritime jurisdiction (as at 15 July 2011), available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summar
y_of_ claims.pdf>. This document notes that El-Salvador claims a 200nm territorial
sea. That conclusion is perhaps based on an over-broad interpretation of Article 84 of
the El-Salvador Constitution of 13 December 1983, which asserts that El-Salvador ‘exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea, sea bed and subfloor to a distance of
200 nautical miles ..., all in accordance with international law’: translation and reference
taken from Ashley Roach and Robert Smith, United States responses to excessive maritime
claims (2nd ed, 1996) 157. A more reasonable interpretation would be that El-Salvador
asserts the full range of maritime jurisdiction permitted under international law, including
a contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf. See also the relevant entry in the United
States Department of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual (2005) available at
<http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf>.
50
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• How would the unilateral exercise of jurisdiction by one or more of the three
States in the waters subject to condominium / co-ownership impact upon their
legal obligations owed to each other?
The condominium and co-ownership arrangement has however been supplemented
by more concrete subsequent management frameworks, including:
• the 1993 Amapala Agreement – affirming the three States’ mutual interest
in, and commitment to, conserving and preserving the Gulf of Fonseca on a
cooperative basis;
• ‘PROGOLFO’ – a project established in 1999 concerning cooperative coastal
ecosystem conservation in the Gulf of Fonseca, involving regional cooperation
between environment ministries of the three States;
• the July 2003 Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Mesoamerican Sustainable Development Initiative, under which the Gulf of Fonseca was
designated as a priority area.53
In 2004 the three States requested support from the Inter-American Development
Bank and the Global Environment Facility, which subsequently established a project
entitled ‘Integrated Ecosystem Management of the Ecosystems of the Gulf of Fonseca’.54 A central objective of the project is to enhance and develop inter-agency and
institutional mechanisms concerning cooperative management of the Gulf’s waters.55
The condominium / co-ownership arrangement applicable to parts of the Gulf of
Fonseca does not clearly allocate functional components of coastal State jurisdiction
within the area(s) concerned. Accordingly, it does not add clarity to the general
and ambiguous provisions of international law concerning the assertion of coastal
State jurisdiction within OCAs. However, it is perhaps arguable that the condominium / co-ownership arrangement entitles El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua
to exercise jurisdiction within relevant waters on a concurrent, unilateral and func53

See: Global Environment Facility, Project Document, Integrated Management of the Ecosystems
of the Gulf of Fonseca, available online at <http://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/Fsp_11295551987>.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
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tionally comprehensive basis. Alternatively, it could be argued that the presence
of an agreement between the Parties may be a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction within the relevant waters. The surveyed cooperative arrangements that
supplement the condominium / co-ownership arrangement are functionally limited
to the contexts of environmental management in the Gulf of Fonseca. Implementation of other functional components of coastal State jurisdiction is not explicitly
enabled or contemplated.

3.3 Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean
3.3.1 Argentina – United Kingdom56
Background:
Argentina and the United Kingdom both claim sovereignty over the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands,57 and assert a variety of
overlapping maritime claims appertaining to these South Atlantic features (see Figure 3.5). Several features currently occupied and administered by the United Kingdom and were the focus of an armed conflict between the two States in 1982.58 In
the immediate aftermath of the conflict the United Kingdom declared a 150 nautical
mile ‘Falkland Island Protection Zone’ (FIPZ) designed to restrict and control the
navigation of Argentinean vessels in waters surrounding the Islands.59 In 1986 the
56

See Clive Symmons, ‘The Maritime Zones around the Falkland Islands’ (1988) 37 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 283; Malcolm Evans, ‘The Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom’ (1991) 40 The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 473; Robin Churchill, ‘Falkland Islands – Maritime Jurisdiction
and Co-operative Arrangements with Argentina’ (1997) 46 The International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 463; Luis Rodriguez-Rivera, ‘Joint Development Zones and other Cooperative
Management Efforts Related to Transboundary Maritime Resources: A Caribbean and Latin
American Model for Peaceful Resolution of Maritime Boundary Disputes’ (2009) Issues in Legal
Scholarship Article 2 available at <http://www.bepress.com/ils/oceanresource>.
57
For background, see Evans, above n 56 and Churchill, above n 56.
58
For a comprehensive overview of the conflict, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of
the Falklands Campaign, Volume I: The origins of the Falklands war (2005) and Volume II:
War and diplomacy, revised and updated edition (2007).
59
Argentina was requested to ensure that its military vessels did not enter the FIPZ. Further,
Argentinian civilian vessels were also requested not to enter the zone without the prior consent
of the United Kingdom. The FIPZ replaced a 200-mile ‘total exclusion zone’ that was declared
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United Kingdom supplemented its 3 nautical mile territorial sea claim around the
Falkland Islands by (1) declaring an ‘Interim Conservation and Management Zone’
(FICZ) projected 150 nautical miles from a fixed point located in the centre of
the Islands, and (2) reiterating its claim to the continental shelf surrounding the
Islands.60 The limits of the FIPZ and FICZ are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
The primary concern influencing the declaration of the FICZ was the rapid and
unsustainable escalation of commercial fishing in waters surrounding the Islands between 1982 and 1986.61 The declaration of the FICZ and reiterated continental shelf
claim prompted Argentina to issue a protest note reaffirming its sovereignty claim
to the Islands and ‘its rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the surrounding
maritime waters, sea-bed and marine sub-soil, rights which it will continue to exercise in its capacity as a coastal State in accordance with international law.’62 In
1989 both States entered into negotiations with a view to normalising diplomatic
relations after they were broken off during the 1982 conflict.63
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Following talks held in Madrid in October 1989, both States issued a Joint Statement (1989 Joint Statement) concerning the sovereignty dispute, consular rela-

around the Islands during the 1982 conflict. See Symmons, above n 56 on the preceding page
and Evans, above n 56 on the previous page.
60
See British Government Declaration on the Conservation of Fish Stocks and on Maritime Jurisdiction around the Falkland Islands, 29 October 1986; and Proclamation No. 4 of 1986 of
the Governor of the Falkland Islands (1992). Both documents are reproduced in (1987) 9 Law
of the Sea Bulletin 18. The south-west boundary of the FICZ was modified to be closer than
150 nautical miles from the basepoint in order ‘to reduce the area of potential overlap with
Argentina’s then 200-mile territorial sea’: Churchill, above n 56 on the preceding page. For a
discussion of why a 200 nautical mile zone was not declared, see Symmons, above n 56 on the
previous page. Concerning the United Kingdom’s continental shelf claim, the 1986 Declaration
noted that, ‘for the avoidance of doubt’, the claim extended to a distance of 200 nautical miles
‘or to such other limit as is prescribed by the rules of international law, including those concerning the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction between neighbours’: Churchill above n 56 on
the preceding page.
61
See Symmons, above n 56 on the previous page.
62
Note dated 31 October 1986, sent ... through the Embassy of Brazil in Buenos Aires, regarding
the Declaration by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain in the House of
Commons on 29 October, reproduced in (1987) 9 Law of the Sea Bulletin 44.
63
See Evans, above n 56 on the preceding page.
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Figure 3.4: Argentina – United Kingdom: certain maritime claims surrounding the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Source: Symmons, note 56 on page 95.
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Figure 3.5: Argentina – United Kingdom: overlapping claims in the South Atlantic
and Southern Oceans. Source: International Boundaries Research Unit,
note 100 on page 105.
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tions and several cooperative measures.64 Paragraph 2 of the 1989 Joint Statement
contains a ‘formula on sovereignty’ (Madrid formula on sovereignty) reflecting an agreement to set aside and protect overlapping claims to sovereignty and
maritime jurisdiction. It provides as follows:
Both Governments agreed that:
1. Nothing in the conduct or content of the present meeting or of any
similar subsequent meetings shall be interpreted as:
2. A change in the position of the United Kingdom with regard to
sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and
the surrounding maritime areas;
a) A change in the position of the Argentine Republic with regard
to sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the
Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding areas;
b) Recognition of or support for the position of the United Kingdom or the Argentine Republic with regard to sovereignty or
territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands,
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas.
3. No act or activity carried out by the United Kingdom, the Argentine
Republic or third parties as a consequence and in implementation
of anything agreed to in the present meeting or in any similar subsequent meetings shall constitute a basis for affirming, supporting,
or denying the position of the United Kingdom or the Argentine
Republic regarding the sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South
Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas.
In accordance with the 1989 Joint Statement and a subsequent Joint Statement of
15 February 1990 (1990 Joint Statement on Diplomatic Relations),65 both
States agreed to establish a number of cooperative measures, including: working
groups to consider fisheries conservation and military-related incident avoidance;66
the replacement of the FIPZ with an ‘Interim reciprocal information and consul64

Joint Statement of 19 October 1989 Re-establishing Consular Relations Between Britain and Argentina, and Agreeing a Framework on Sovereignty Which Would Allow Further Talks, available
at <http://www.falklands.info/history/1989agreement.html>.
65
Joint Statement of 15 February 1990 Re-establishing Diplomatic Relations Between Britain and
Argentina, available at <www.falklands.info/history/1990agreement.html>.
66
1989 Joint Statement, Paragraphs 6 and 10.
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tation system’;67 notice periods applicable to the movement of military vessels;68
rules concerning the conduct of naval and air force units operating in proximity to
each other,69 adherence to international conventions concerning civil aviation and
collisions at sea;70 co-ordination of search and rescue operations;71 and the exchange
of information relevant to the enhancement of flight safety.72
Negotiations in the working group concerning fisheries conservation produced an
agreement to exchange information on a wide range of relevant issues and culminated in the conclusion of another Joint Statement in November 1990.73 (1990
Joint Statement on Fisheries) Paragraph 1 of the 1990 Fisheries Joint Statement provides that both ‘this Statement and its results’ are subject to the Madrid
formula on sovereignty.74 Paragraph 2 establishes two key cooperative measures and
notes that their purpose is ‘to contribute to the conservation of fish stocks’ and to
‘open the way for cooperation in this field on an ad-hoc basis’.75
The first measure is the establishment of the ‘South Atlantic Fisheries Commission’
composed of delegations from both States.76 The Commission is entrusted with several functions relating to the ‘conservation of the most significant offshore species’
in ‘waters between latitude 45°S and latitude 60°S’.77 Key functions include: collection and analysis of information received from both States concerning the operation
of fishing fleets, catch and effort statistics, and the status of stocks; submission to
67

1990 Joint Statement on Diplomatic Relations, Paragraph 5 and Annex I. This system established
direct communication links and information sharing between the armed forces of both States:
Evans, above n 56 on page 95.
68
Ibid.
69
1990 Joint Statement on Diplomatic Relations, Annex II.
70
1990 Joint Statement on Diplomatic Relations, Annex IV.
71
1990 Joint Statement on Diplomatic Relations, Annex III.
72
1990 Joint Statement on Diplomatic Relations, Annex IV. For a more comprehensive discussion
of cooperative measures established by the 1989 and 1990 Joint Statements see Evans, above
n 56 on page 95.
73
Joint Statement of 28 November 1990 establishing the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission,
available at <http://www.falklands.info/history/90fishjoint.html>.
74
The Madrid formula on sovereignty is also reiterated in full.
75
1990 Fisheries Joint Statement, Paragraph 2.
76
1990 Fisheries Joint Statement, Paragraph 2(a). Paragraph 3 stipulates, inter alia, that the
SAFC ‘will meet at least twice a year, alternatively in Buenos Aires and London. Recommendations shall be reached by mutual agreement.’
77
1990 Joint Statement on Fisheries, Paragraphs 3 and 4. As noted by Churchill, above n 56 on
page 95, this is a broadly defined area that extends North to the Golfo San Jorge and South
below the tip of South America.
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both States of recommendations for the conservation of the most significant offshore
species; and submission to both States of proposals concerning joint scientific work.
Operation of the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission resulted in the implementation several cooperative conservation measures including joint research cruises,
reductions in the number of fishing licences and the shortening of permitted fishing
seasons.78
The second measure is the temporary total prohibition of commercial fishing within
a defined area for conservation purposes.79 This measure was intended to combat
unregulated fishing taking place beyond the 150 nautical mile limit of the FICZ
but within 200 nautical miles of the Falkland Islands. The ‘half-doughnut’ shaped
defined area extends from the 150 nautical mile limit of the FICZ to a distance of
200 nautical miles from Falkland Islands, excluding areas within the 200 nautical
mile zone of territorial sea claimed by Argentina (see Figures 3.5 and 3.4).80 The
prohibition was not renewed in 1993.81
In December 1990 the United Kingdom designated an Outer Fishing Conservation
Zone (OFCZ) corresponding to the area defined in the 1990 Joint Statement on
Fisheries and extended its territorial sea claim around the Falkland Islands from 3
to 12 nautical miles.82 Responding to concerns regarding the overexploitation of fish
stocks near the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, the United Kingdom
also declared a 200 nautical mile ‘maritime zone’ around those Islands (see Figure
3.5).83 Within the maritime zone, jurisdiction was claimed:
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See Churchill, above n 56 on page 95
1990 Joint Statement on Fisheries, Paragraphs 2(b).
80
1990 Joint Statement on Fisheries, Annex. See also Churchill above n 56 on page 95.
81
Churchill, above n 56 on page 95. See also GA Bisbal, ‘The Southeast South American Shelf
Large Marine Ecosystem’ (1995) 19 Marine Policy 21.
82
See Proclamation No. 2 of 1990 (of the Falkland Islands Government), reproduced in (1991)
62 British Yearbook of International Law 647. See also Churchill, above n 56 on page 95, who
notes that ‘At the time of the Joint Statement, the area to which the prohibition applied was
high seas and it obviously would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to justify enforcing
the prohibition against foreign vessels.’
83
Proclamation No.1 of 1993 (of the Falkland Islands Government), reproduced in (1993) 64 British
Yearbook of International law 678 and (1993) 24 Law of the Sea Bulletin 47. See also Churchill,
above n 56 on page 95.
79
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... in accordance with the rules of international law over the exploration and exploitation and the conservation and management of the
natural resources (whether living or non-living) and over the protection
and preservation of the marine environment subject to such provisions
as may hereafter be made by law for such matters.84
The maritime zone claim around the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
prompted a protest from Argentina and a subsequent response note from the United
Kingdom.85 A joint statement was also issued in which both States expressed a
commitment to improve management of fish stocks surrounding the South Georgia
and the South Sandwich Islands through the framework set in the Convention for
the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CAMLR Convention).86
In 1991 both States issued a Joint Statement establishing a cooperative framework
for search and rescue operations in the South West Atlantic.87 Another Joint Statement concerning search and rescue operations was issued in 1993.88 In 1994, the
OFCZ was extended into an area located within 200 nautical miles of the Falkland
Islands but beyond the EEZ claimed by Argentina in 1991.89 Argentina issued a
strongly worded protest in response, noting that ‘British action implies a departure
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Ibid. Churchill, above n 56 on page 95, notes that the maritime zone is ‘in not a full EEZ because
jurisdiction is not claimed in respect of economic exploitation other than for natural resources,
the construction and regulation of artificial islands, installations and structures, or marine
scientific research. The 200-mile maritime zone of South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands thus lies between a traditional fishing zone and an EEZ.’
85
See Letter dated 12 May 1993 from the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary General, reproduced in (1993) 24 Law of the Sea Bulletin 52;
and Letter dated 7 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General,
reproduced in (1993) 24 Law of the Sea Bulletin 54. See also Churchill above n 56 on page 95.
86
Churchill, above n 56 on page 95. The spatial jurisdiction of the CAMLR Convention applies to
waters surrounding the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. For further discussion
of the CAMLR Convention see Chapter 4.7.3.2 below.
87
Joint Statement of 25 September 1991, cited in Churchill, above n 56 on page 95.
88
Ibid.
89
Proclamation No. 1 of 1994 (of the Falkland Islands Government), reproduced in (1995) 27 Law
of the Sea Bulletin 79. This proclamation also expands the claimed scope of subject matter
jurisdiction within the OFCZ to cover ‘protection and preservation of the marine environment’
in accordance with international law. Argentina’s EEZ claim replaced its previous claim to a
200 nautical mile territorial sea. In 1990 Argentina had not declared coastal baselines – the
UK’s intitial OFCZ claim was constructed conservatively because the limits of Argentinian
claims were not clear. See Churchill, above n 56 on page 95.
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from the Joint Statement and the bilateral understandings reached from 1990 until
now regarding the South-West Atlantic’.90
Despite this setback in diplomatic relations, both States issued a Joint Declaration
in 1995 concerning the management of both States’ overlapping continental shelf
claims.91 (1995 Joint Declaration) Paragraph 1 of the 1995 Joint Declaration
sets out a ‘formula on sovereignty’ that ‘applies to this Joint Declaration and to its
results’. The formula is identical to the Madrid formula on sovereignty but includes
two additional sentences. The first additional sentence provides that the ‘areas
subject to the controversy on sovereignty and jurisdiction will not be extended in
any way as a consequence on this Joint Declaration or its implementation.’ The
second stipulates that the Joint Declaration ‘does not apply to the maritime areas
surrounding South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.’
The remainder of the Declaration sets out a detailed cooperative framework concerning the development of hydrocarbon resources within up to six defined ‘tranches’, the
first of which were to be located in a defined area of ‘sedimentary structure’ located
South West of the Falkland Islands (see Figure 3.5).92 The focal point of cooperation is a Joint Commission composed of delegations from both States.93 Functions
entrusted to the Joint Commission include: submission to both States of recommendations concerning protection of the marine environment of the South West
Atlantic; coordination through subcommittees of several commercial and regulatory
aspects of hydrocarbon development (including potential unitisation of deposits,
and health and safety requirements); collection and promotion of relevant scientific
90

Note dated 22 August 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship
of Argentina, addressed to the Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, reproduced in (1995) 27 Law of the Sea Bulletin 81. Note also that Argentina had
previously issued a diplomatic protest responding to a Proclamation of 22 November 1991 (by
the Governor of the Falkland Islands) clarifying the United Kingdom’s continental shelf claims
surrounding the Falkland Islands: See Churchill above n 56 on page 95.
91
Joint Declaration on Co-operation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic of 27
September 1995, reproduced in (1996) 30 Law of the Sea Bulletin 62 and (1996) 11 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 113.
92
1995 Joint Declaration, Paragraph 2(b) and Annex. If a maritime boundary equidistant from
the Falkland Islands and the Argentinian mainland were designated, the defined area would
straddle this boundary.
93
1995 Joint Declaration, Paragraphs 2(a) and 3. Recommendations of the Joint Commission are
to be reached by mutual agreement.
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research; and recommendation to both States of additional tranches for hydrocarbon development.94 Paragraph 5 of the 1995 Joint Declaration provides that the
arrangements developed in 1991 and 1993 concerning search and rescue operations,
or any future arrangements on the same subject, will apply to ‘offshore activities’.
Paragraph 6 requires each State to take appropriate administrative measures concerning hydrocarbon development and to ‘abstain from taking action or imposing
conditions designed or tending to inhibit or frustrate the possibility of carrying out
hydrocarbon development’ in the relevant areas.
In 1999 both States issued a Joint Statement establishing several additional confidencebuilding measures, including further commitments concerning the cooperative management of fish stocks in the South Atlantic.95 The 1999 Joint Statement has been
described as a ‘highpoint’ in relations between both States concerning their overlapping territorial and jurisdictional claims.96 With the exception of limited hydrocarbon licensing and exploration, the 1995 Joint Declaration was not implemented in
subsequent years97 and the Kirchner administration in Argentina (elected in 2003)
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1995 Joint Declaration, Paragraph 4. Concerning protection of the marine environment of the
South West Atlantic, the Commission is required to take into account ‘relevant international
conventions and recommendations of competent international organisations.’: See Paragraph
4(a).
95
Joint Statement of 14 July 1999, reproduced at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/200
2/02/uk-argentina-exchange-o-new02647>.
96
Klaus Dodds and Matthew Benwell, ‘More unfinished business: the Falklands/Malvinas, maritime claims, and the spectre of oil in the South Atlantic’ (2010) 28 Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space 571.
97
In 1997 Churchill commented that the 1995 Joint Declaration ‘appears not to have got off to the
most promising starts. At the same time as the Joint Declaration was issued, Argentina made
a statement in which it said that it would introduce non-discriminatory legislation to impose
charges on national and foreign companies operating in the area subject to the dispute over
sovereignty, and that the Joint Declaration should not be interpreted as an “acceptance of a
claimed right to call for a licensing round for the development of hydrocarbons in the maritime
areas surrounding the Malvinas Islands”. This evoked from the British government a statement
that it did “not accept any Argentinian claim to impose such charges on companies by reason
only of their activities on the continental shelf around the Falkland Islands under Falklands
licence. HMG will be working with the Falkland Islands Government in the development
of the forthcoming licensing round.”’: Churchill, above n 56 on page 95. The diplomatic
statements Churchill refers to are: Statement by the Argentine Government with regard to the
Joint Declaration signed by the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and the United Kingdom on
Explorations and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons; and Declaration of the British Government
with regard to the Joint Declaration signed by the British and Argentine Foreign Ministers
on Co-operation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic. Both documents are
reproduced in (1996) 11 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 118.
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adopted a harder diplomatic stance than its predecessor.98 In March 2007 Argentina
withdrew from several cooperative arrangements, including the 1995 Joint Declaration and cooperative measures concerning fisheries.99 Both States have also issued
competing submissions to the CLCS regarding the outer limits of the continental in
the South West Atlantic100 (see Figure 3.5) and the United Kingdom government
has unilaterally authorised hydrocarbon development in waters to the North, East
and South East of the Falkland Islands.101
The provisional joint management frameworks established by Argentina and the
United Kingdom each focus on the cooperative management of specific resources
or the cooperative exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in functionally-specific contexts, including hydrocarbon development, fisheries cooperation, and arrangements
concerning navigational safety. Had they been implemented by the respective governments, and not fallen victim to a deteriorating bilateral relationship, they would
have operated in tandem with one another to establish functionally-broad allocation
of coastal State jurisdiction within the relevant OCA.
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See Dodds and Benwell, above n 96 on the preceding page.
Rodriguez-Rivera, above n 56 on page 95. See also United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Statement on cooperation over offshore activities in the South West
Atlantic’ available at <http://ukinargentina.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/other-locations/overseasterritories/falkland-islands1/offshore-activities-sw-atlantic>; and The Guardian, Thursday 29
March 2007, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/mar/29/argentina.falklands>,
which quotes the Argentinian foreign minister, Jorge Taiana, describing the 1995 Joint Declaration as ‘an instrument the United Kingdom sought to use to justify its illegitimate and
unilateral action to explore for resources that belong to the Argentinian citizens.’
100
International Boundaries Research Unit, ‘Claims and potential claims to maritime jurisdiction in the South Atlantic and Southern Oceans by Argentina and the UK’ available at
<http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/south_atlantic_maritime_claims.pdf>.
101
See Dodds and Benwell, above n 96 on the preceding page. Note that the relevant
concessions and licences avoid the six tranches defined in the 1995 Joint Declaration.
Nonetheless, they have attracted controversy: See BBC Online, 22 February 2010, ‘Drilling
for oil begins off the Falklands’, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8527307.stm>;
The Guardian, 22 February 2010, ‘Falkland Islands oil drilling begins’, available at
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/22/falkland-islands-oil-drilling-begins>.
Hydrocarbon development activities in the authorised areas have met with little success
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3.3.2 Argentina – Uruguay
Background:
In 1973 Argentina and Uruguay concluded an agreement102 (1973 Agreement)
concerning overlapping claims to the Río de la Plata and maritime zones seaward
of a closing line at the mouth of the river.103 Seaward of the closing line, the
1973 Agreement establishes a ‘lateral maritime boundary’104 and boundary of the
continental shelf, which are both defined by a single equidistance line.105 The closing
line and lateral maritime boundary are depicted in Figure 3.6. The lateral maritime
boundary delimits several jurisdictional competencies recognised in the Agreement,
which relate to: the exploration, conservation, and exploitation of resources; control
and supervision of fishing activities; protection and preservation of the environment;
scientific research; and construction and emplacement of installations.106 Viewing
this delimitation of competencies in light of LOSC Part V, it is reasonable to regard
the lateral maritime boundary as a delimitation of the EEZ and associated coastal
state jurisdiction.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 1973 Agreement also establishes a ‘common zone’ straddling the lateral maritime boundary, with a framework of cooperation regarding fishing activities, scientific research and environmental protection.107 Provisions concerning management
of the maritime area landward of the closing line (the river area) are subject to
102

Agreement between the Government of Argentina and the Government of Uruguay Relating
to the Delimitation of the River Plate and the Maritime Boundary between Argentina and
Uruguay, signed 19 November 1973, UNTS No. 21424, 13 ILM 251 (1974). For relevant
commentary see Charney and Alexander (1993), above n 57 on page 16, 757 and Lilian Laborde,
‘Legal Regime of the Rio de la Plata’ (1996) 36 Natural Resources Journal 252. Unless otherwise
indicated, quotations of this agreement are drawn from the English translation set out in the
UNTS.
103
The closing line is defined by Argentina and Uruguay per the Joint Declaration on the External
Limit of the Río de la Plata of 1961, which provides that the river extends to an imaginary
straight line joining Punta del Este (Uruguay) and Punta Rasa del Cabo San Antonio (Argentina).
104
Translation from Charney and Alexander (1993), above n 57 on page 16, 771. The UNTS
translation uses the term ‘maritime lateral limit’.
105
See 1973 Agreement, Article 70.
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See 1973 Agreement, Articles 72, 76 and 79.
107
See 1973 Agreement, Articles 73–82.
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Figure 3.6: Argentina – Uruguay: 1973 Agreement concerning boundary delimitation and the Río de la Plata. Source: Charney and Alexander (1993),
note 57 on page 16.
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overlapping claims to internal waters. The jurisdictional status of the river area
is not, however, clear given that (1) several States dispute the river area’s characterisation as internal waters108 and (2) in response to these protests, Argentina
and Uruguay have confirmed their respect for the freedom of navigation in the river
area.109
Article 2 of the 1973 Agreement establishes a ‘coastal belt’ of exclusive jurisdiction
of variable width adjacent to each Party’s coast within the river area. Articles 3-6
employ a complex combination of several criteria to determine the existence of national jurisdiction beyond these coastal belts (see Chapter 4.6 for further discussion).
The Articles provide as follows:
Article 3.
Outside the coastal belts, each Party’s jurisdiction shall also apply to
vessels flying its flag. The same jurisdiction shall also apply to vessels
flying the flags of third parties involved in accidents with that Party’s
vessels. Notwithstanding the provisions of the first and second paragraphs, the jurisdiction of one Party shall apply in all cases in which its
security is affected or in which unlawful acts are committed which have
effect in its territory, regardless of the flag flown by the vessel involved.
Where the security of both Parties is affected or the unlawful act has
effect in both territories, the jurisdiction of the Party whose coastal belt
is closer than that of the other Party to the place where the vessel was
apprehended shall apply.
Article 4.
In cases not covered in article 3 and without prejudice to the specific
provisions of other articles of this Treaty, the jurisdiction of either Party
shall apply according to the criterion of greater proximity of one or the
other coastal belt to the place in which the events in question occur.
Article 5.
The supervising authority which discovers an unlawful act may pursue
the offending vessel up to the limit of the coastal belt of the other Party.
108

The closing line and associated internal waters have been protested by several States. See
Charney and Alexander (1993), above n 57 on page 16, 758-759. See also Roach and Smith,
above n 52 on page 93, 35, 129, 143.
109
See Charney and Alexander, pp 758–759 (1993). Article 11 of the 1973 Agreement provides that
‘In shared waters the navigation of public and private vessels of the countries of the Rio de
la Plata Basin and public and private merchant vessels flying the flags of third countries shall
be permitted, without prejudice to the rights already granted by the Parties under existing
treaties. Furthermore, each Party shall permit the passage of warships flying the flags of third
countries and authorized by the other Party, providing that this does not adversely affect its
public policy or security.’
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If the offending vessel enters that coastal belt, the co-operation of the
other Party shall be sought and that Party shall in all cases hand over the
offender so that he can be brought before the authority which initiated
the pursuit.
Article 6.
The authorities of one Party may seize a vessel flying the flag of the
other Party when the latter is caught in flagrant violation of the provisions governing fishing, conservation and preservation of living resources,
and pollution, in force in their shared waters and shall notify that Party
immediately and place the offending vessel at the disposal of its authorities.
The 1973 Agreement also establishes cooperative frameworks concerning the joint
management of navigation and works in the river area,110 vessel pilotage,111 search
and rescue operations,112 vessel salvaging,113 pollution,114 fishing,115 and marine
scientific research.116 A joint Administrative Commission with international legal
personality is empowered to perform several functions concerning the implementation and operationalisation of these cooperative frameworks.117 The Commission is
also empowered to consider disputes arising between the Parties ‘concerning the Rio
de la Plata’ in accordance with a compulsory conciliation procedure.118
Article 41 of the 1973 Agreement designated a delimitation line for the seabed
and subsoil of the river area. Each Party is entitled to explore and exploit the
resources of the seabed and subsoil on their respective side of the delimitation line
110

1973 Agreement, Articles 7–22
1973 Agreement, Articles 23–27. A Party that maintains and administers a navigation channel under this framework is allocated enforcement competence for several navigation-related
matters: See Articles 12, 13 and 15. Article 15 provides that ‘Civil, criminal and administrative liability deriving from factors which adversely affect navigation in a channel, the use of
such channel or its installations shall fall within the competence of the authorities of the Party
which maintains and administers the channel and shall be governed by its legislation.’ Despite
reference to ‘the Party’ in Article 15, Article 12 provides that ‘the Parties may either jointly or
individually build channels or other types of works.’ The allocation of enforcement competence
over jointly built channels is unclear, although the uncertainty is resolved to some extent by
Article 4 (quoted above).
112
1973 Agreement, Articles 33–37.
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1973 Agreement, Articles 38–40.
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1973 Agreement, Articles 47–52.
115
1973 Agreement, Articles 53–56.
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1973 Agreement, Articles 57–58.
117
1973 Agreement, Articles 59–67.
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1973 Agreement, Articles 68–69. See also Article 87 of the Agreement, which enables either Party
to submit disputes referred to in Articles 68 and 69 to the ICJ, provided that no settlement has
been reached within a period of 180 days following the notification procedure set out in Article
69.
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provided that installations or other works do not interfere with navigation in the
river area.119 Mineral deposits found to be straddling the delimitation line are to be
shared ‘proportionally’ between the two States.(1973 Agreement, Article 43.)
In 1988, the Parties concluded an agreement entrusting the Administrative Commission with the task of designating a maritime boundary between two small islands
(Martin Garcia Island and Timoteo Dominguez Island, located near Buenos Aires)
in the river area.120 The author is not aware if this designation has been effected.
The provisions of the 1973 Agreement discussed above allocate coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional
contexts. They specifies the terms on which Argentina and Uruguay are to implement within the relevant OCA all of the functional components of their coastal State
jurisdiction.

3.3.3 Barbados – Guyana
Background:
Barbados and Guyana assert overlapping EEZ claims and continental shelf entitlements in an OCA located opposite the North East coast of continental South
America (see Figure 3.7).121 As discussed in the following paragraphs, the jurisdictional entitlements of Barbados and Guyana in this area are contested by Venezuela.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
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1973 Agreement, Articles 41–42.
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay entrusting the Rio de la Plata Administrative Commission with the delimitation of the boundary between Martin Garcia and Timoteo Dominguez Islands, Jun.
18, 1988, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/A
RG-URY1988RP.PDF>.
121
For Barbados, see: Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act of 25 February 1978, reproduced at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/BRB.htm>.
For Guyana, see:
Maritime Boundaries Act of 30 June 1977 and Exclusive
Economic Zone (Designation of Area) Order No.
19 of 1991, reproduced at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/GUY.htm>.
See also Colson and Smith, Volume V, above n 57 on page 16, 3578–3597.
120
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Figure 3.7: Barbados – Guyana: overlapping claims and Co-operation Zone. Source:
Colson and Smith, Volume V, note 57 on page 16.
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In December 2003 both States concluded a treaty establishing a detailed framework
for the cooperative management of this area122 (2003 Treaty). The 2003 Treaty
is expressly characterised as an implementation of the LOSC, and LOSC provisions
concerning provisional management of overlapping EEZ claims.123 The preambular
text of the 2003 Treaty recognises ‘the relevance and applicability’ of LOSC Article
74(3) in addition to emphasising the ‘universal and unified character’ of the LOSC
‘and its fundamental importance for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the sustainable development of the oceans
and seas’.
Article 1(1) of the 2003 Treaty establishes a ‘Co-operation Zone’ for the ‘exercise of
joint jurisdiction, control, management, development, and exploration and exploitation of living and non-living natural resources, as well as all other rights and duties’
established in the LOSC. The remaining paragraphs of Article 1 contain language
designed to protect the legal positions of both States concerning delimitation of the
OCA and the extent of their respective coastal State jurisdiction. They provide as
follows:
2. This Treaty and the Co-operation Zone established thereunder are
without prejudice to the eventual delimitation of the Parties’ respective maritime zones in accordance with generally accepted principles
of international law and the Convention.
3. The Parties agree that nothing contained in the Treaty nor any
act done by either Party under the provisions of the Treaty will
represent a derogation from or diminution or renunciation of the
rights of either Party within the Co-operation Zone or throughout
the full breadth of their respective exclusive economic zones.
The Co-operation Zone consists of defined triangular area that is declared to be
co-extensive with the area of bilateral overlap between the EEZ claims of both
122

Exclusive Economic Zone Co-Operation Treaty between the Republic of Guyana and the
State of Barbados concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction in their Exclusive Economic
Zones in the Area of Bilateral Overlap within Each of their Outer Limits and beyond the
Outer Limits of the Exclusive Economic Zones of Other States, adopted 2 December 2003,
in force 5 May 2004, reproduced in (2004) 55 Law of the Sea Bulletin 36, available at <
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin55e.p
df>. For an illustrative map and an overview of the 2003 Treaty, see Colson and Smith,
Volume V, above n 57 on page 16, 3578–3597.
123
Relevant LOSC provisions are discussed in Chapter 2.3.5.
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States.124 The Zone is located (1) on the Venezuelan side of a comprehensive maritime boundary established by Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago125 and (2) beyond
200 nautical miles from the undisputed portions of the coastlines of those States (see
Figure 3.7).126 The Zone is however defined by reference to a point located within
200 nautical miles of Guyana-administered territory west of the Essequibo River,
which is also claimed by Venezuela (see ‘Point G’ in Figure 3.7).127 Venezuela has
actively protested the maritime claims of Barbados and Guyana in the vicinity of
the ‘Co-operation Zone’, and both Barbados and Guyana have expressed concern
that the Trinidad & Tobago – Venezuela delimitation agreement infringes upon their
claims to an EEZ and extended continental shelf.128 Accordingly, the 2003 Treaty
may be viewed as a diplomatic response by both Parties to maritime claims promulgated by their regional neighbours.129 Nonetheless, the Treaty does make some
effort to accommodate the positions of other States, both through the preambular
acknowledgment LOSC delimitation provisions and through Article 4 which provides
that:
The Parties shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States
in the Co-operation Zone in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law and the [Law of the Sea] Convention, and in
particular the provisions of Article 58 of the Convention [concerning
rights and duties of other States in the EEZ].

124

See 2003 Treaty, Article 2. Coordinates of the triangular area are defined in Annex 1 of the
Treaty.
125
See Treaty between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Republic of Venezuela on
the delimitation of marine and submarine areas, adopted 18 April 1990, entered into force 23
July 1991, reproduced at <http://www.un.org/ Depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
STATEFILES/ TTO.htm>.
126
See Colson and Smith, Volume V, above n 57 on page 16, 3578–3597.
127
Carl Dundas notes that ‘The coast of no other state is within 200 n.m. of the area of the
Cooperation Zone (unless Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo Region is taken into account).
While the treaty took account of the outer limits of the exclusive economic zones of other
states to a distance of 200 n.m. measured from the baselines from which their territorial
sea is measured, it may be noted that the Cooperation Zone may overlap with the extended
continental shelf claims of third states [Venezuela] ... and that Guyana’s 200 n.m. limit to form
the Cooperation Zone is measured from coastline contested by Venezuela.’: ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Anderson notes that: ‘The treaty between Barbados and Guyana appears to represent a diplomatic response by the two parties to the claims of third states. This may be the first example
of the use of the concept of the joint area as a means of cooperation directed against the claims
of third states.’: David Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays (2008), 413–414.

113

The 2003 Treaty contains detailed provisions concerning management of the Cooperation Zone and the exercise of national jurisdiction within it. Article 5 addresses
jurisdiction over living natural resources, providing for the exercise by both States
of ‘joint jurisdiction’ in accordance with a ‘Joint Fisheries Licensing Agreement’,
coordinated national measures and relevant international law.130 Negotiations to
establish the Joint Fisheries Licensing Agreement are required to commence within
three months of the Treaty’s entry into force.131 In the event of a failure to reach
agreement concerning ‘the exercise of their joint jurisdiction over living resources’ in
the Co-operation Zone, neither State is entitled exercise jurisdiction on a unilateral
basis.132
Article 6 of the 2003 Treaty addresses jurisdiction over non-living natural resources,
providing for the exercise by both States of ‘joint jurisdiction’ in accordance with
relevant international law.133 The exercise of jurisdiction over non-living natural
resources is to be managed by a ‘Joint Non-Living Resources Commission’ established ‘at such time as agreed’ by both States.134 In the absence of an agreement
concerning ‘the exercise of their joint jurisdiction over non-living resources’ in the
Co-operation Zone, neither State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction on a unilateral
basis.135
Article 6 of the 2003 Treaty also contains provisions concerning the cooperative
conduct of marine scientific research; information exchange; unitisation of non-living
natural resources that straddle the boundary of the Co-operation Zone; and the
sharing of non-living natural resources located within the zone.136
130

2003 Treaty, Article 5(1) provides, inter alia, that ‘the Parties shall act at all times in accordance
with generally accepted principles of international law and the [Law of the Sea] Convention,
including the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating
to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.’
Concerning enforcement of the Joint Fisheries Licensing Agreement, Article 5(4) provides that
‘Either Party shall be entitled to enforce the provisions of the Joint Fisheries Licensing Agreement against any persons through the application of its relevant national law. Each Party
undertakes to inform the others in writing of such enforcement.’
131
2003 Treaty, Article 5(3).
132
2003 Treaty, Article 5(5).
133
2003 Treaty, Article 6(1).
134
2003 Treaty, Article 6(2)-(3).
135
2003 Treaty, Article 6(4).
136
2003 Treaty, Article 6(5)-(9).

114

Article 7 of the 2003 Treaty obliges both States to reach agreement concerning
the cooperative exercise within the Co-operation Zone of jurisdiction over ‘Security
Matters’. Negotiations to establish a security agreement are required to commence
within three months of the Treaty’s entry into force.137 The following entitlement
applies prior to the entry into force of the security agreement:
... unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, each Party shall unilaterally exercise defence and criminal jurisdiction within and in relation to
the Co-operation Zone to the same extent that it may do so within and
in relation to that part of its exclusive economic zone that lies outside
the Co-operation Zone.138
The 2003 Treaty also establishes cooperative frameworks concerning protection of
the marine environment in the Co-operation Zone139 and ongoing consultation between both States.140 Article 10 provides for recourse to the dispute settlement
framework (including compulsory and binding procedures) set out in the LOSC in
the event that direct diplomatic negotiations have failed to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 2003 Treaty.141
The provisions of the 2003 Treaty surveyed above establish a clear basis for allocating
coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete
set of functional contexts – they specifies the terms on which Barbados and Guyana
are to implement within the relevant OCA all of the functional components of their
coastal State jurisdiction. However, 2003 Treaty does not provide for the exercise of
jurisdiction by other States (namely Venezuela) asserting claims to the Co-operation
Zone. Because Venezuela is not party to the 2003 Treaty and is not bound by the
137

See 2003 Treaty, Article 7(2), which also sets out a list of matters that may be addressed in
the security agreement, namely: Enforcement of regulations over natural resources; terrorism;
prevention of illicit narcotics trafficking; trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and
other related materials; smuggling; piracy; trafficking in persons; and maritime policing and
search and rescue.
138
2003 Treaty, Article 7(3).
139
See 2003 Treaty, Article 8. Article 8(1) provides for the coordination of national measures
in order to ‘adopt all measures necessary for the preservation and protection of the marine
environment in the Co-operation Zone.’ Article 8(2) requires each State to inform the other as
soon as possible ‘with information about actual or potential threats to the marine environment
in the Co-operation Zone.’
140
See 2003 Treaty, Article 9. Article 9(1) provides that ‘Either Party may request consultations
with the other Party in relation to any matter arising out of this Treaty or otherwise concerning
the Co-operation Zone.’
141
For further discussion of relevant LOSC provisions, see Chapter 2.5 above.
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Treaty’s obligations, ambiguities of the international legal framework concerning the
exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs continue to impact upon relations
between all claimant coastal States and management of the relevant OCA.

3.3.4 Canada – United States
Background:
In 1979 the Canada and the United States agreed to empower a Chamber of the ICJ
to designate a single seabed and water-column boundary in the Gulf of Maine.142
The Chamber’s 1984 Judgment143 establishes a segmented boundary that commences at an offshore point mutually agreed by both States (Point A) and terminates at the point of intersection with the United States’ 200 nautical mile limit (see
Figure 3.9).144 McDorman notes that, prior to the conclusion of the 1979 agreement,
Canadian and US negotiators had proposed several options concerning provisional
joint management of overlapping claims in the Gulf of Maine.145 These proposals
did not gain traction because delimitation issues proved difficult to set aside.146
In particular, the location of competing boundary claims influenced political views
concerning the fair division of fisheries and potential hydrocarbon resources.147
The 1984 Judgment did not delimit two areas that have remained subject to overlapping jurisdictional claims.148 The first OCA (see Figure 3.8) consists of waters
located landward of Point A surrounding Machias Seal Island and North Rock (between Maine and Nova Scotia). These features are claimed by both States and Point
142

Agreement to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine, signed 29 March 1979, reproduced in Myron Nordquist and KR Simmonds
(eds), New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Volume IX (1980) 167. For discussion of the
negotiations preceding the agreement, see McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on
page 82, 131.
143
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States)
[1984] ICJ Reports 246.
144
For illustrative maps see McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82 and Gray,
above n 3 on page 82.
145
McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82.
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
For illustrative maps and further information concerning the specific jurisdictional claims, see
McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82 and Gray, 3 on page 82.
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A was chosen in order to separate territorial sovereignty-related issues from the maritime delimitation undertaken by the ICJ.149 The second OCA is located seaward
of the terminal point of the boundary designated in the 1984 Judgment (see Figure
3.9). This area is subject to overlapping continental shelf claims promulgated by
both States.150 A sub-component of the OCA (commonly referred to as ‘the gray
area’) is also subject to an EEZ claim promulgated by Canada.151
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Activity in the OCAs described above is managed in accordance with several functionally specific formal and informal cooperative arrangements. As discussed in
Chapter 3.2.1, several government agencies from each State cooperate closely within
their field of operational responsibility and have developed detailed cooperative
management arrangements that apply to both OCAs and contiguous areas of nonoverlapping jurisdiction.152
Enforcement jurisdiction in the OCAs is allocated by reference to the flag State of
the vessel. As discussed in 3.2.1, Canada and the United States only exercise jurisdiction within OCAs over vessels flying their respective flags and law enforcement
agencies of each State engage in regular consultations. There have been several
attempts to harmonise the domestic regulations of both States concerning fisheries
activities in the OCAs. Both States have adopted informal processes of technical
and inter-agency communication in order to manage and allocate fish stocks in the
Gulf of Maine and surrounding waters.153 A key measure in this context is the
149

McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82, 145.
See McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82, 175–181.
151
For further discussion see McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82, 175. For
discussion of the legal issues arising when a continental shelf claim of one State overlaps spatially
with the EEZ claim of another State, see: D McRae, ‘Delimitation Problems of Canada (First
Part)’ in D Pharand and U Leanza (eds) The Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic
Zone: Delimitation and Legal Regime (1993) 165; D Colson, ‘The Delimitation of the Outer
Continental Shelf between Neighboring States’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International
Law 91, 102–104; Irini Papanicolopulu, ‘A Note on Maritime Delimitation in a Multizonal
Context: The Case of the Mediterranean’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development and International Law
381.
152
See in particular the commentary concerning the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan and
the Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
153
For further discussion see EJ Pudden and DL VanderZwaag, ‘Canada–USA Bilateral Fisheries
Management in the Gulf of Maine: Under the Radar Screen’ (2007) 16 Review of European
150
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Figure 3.8: Canada – United States: overlapping claims surrounding Machias Seal
Island and North Rock. Source: Gray, note 3 on page 82.
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Figure 3.9: Canada – United States: boundary delimitation and overlapping claims
in the North Atlantic. Source: Gray, note 3 on page 82.
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Transboundary Management and Guidance Committee, which recommends a total
allowable catch for several species.154 Domestic regulations concerning lobster fishing in the OCA surrounding Machias Seal Island and North rock remain somewhat
divergent.155 Hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation within the OCAs and surrounding waters is currently subject to moratoria established in accordance with
domestic legal procedures in each State.156
The United States and Canada engage in cooperative management of their Atlantic
OCAs in accordance with a complementary collection of international legal instruments, cooperative management arrangements developed by equivalent government
agencies in each State, and coordinated national policy-making. When viewed in
isolation, each of these frameworks exhibits functional gaps, focusing on a particular
functional context or management challenge. However, the coherent and overlaid
application of the various frameworks establishes a functionally-broad allocation of
coastal State jurisdiction within the relevant OCAs.

3.3.5 Colombia – Jamaica
Background:
In 1993 Colombia and Jamaica concluded a treaty157 (1993 Treaty) concerning
their overlapping claims to a continental shelf and EEZ in the Caribbean Sea.158 ArCommunity and International Environmental Law 36. For discussion of the development of
fisheries cooperation in the Gulf of Maine and surrounding waters, see McDorman, Salt Water
Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82152–155.
154
Ibid.
155
See Beverly Cook, ‘Lobster boat diplomacy: the Canada–US grey zone’ (2005) 29 Marine Policy
385, who refers to divergent regulation of mesh size, catch size, nursery area protection, entry
limitations and closed seasons.
156
See McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82, 151–152.
157
Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Jamaica and the Republic of Colombia, signed 12 November 1993, entered into force 14 March 1994, reproduced in (1994) 25 Law of the Sea Bulletin
50.
158
When the 1993 Treaty was concluded, Colombian claims to a continental shelf and
EEZ overlapped with Jamaican claims to an EEZ: See Charney and Alexander, Volume III, above n 57 on page 16, 2179–2204. Jamaica has subsequently established an
express claim to a continental shelf: See Maritime Areas Act of 1996, reproduced at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/JAM_1996_A
ct.pdf>.
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ticle 1 of the 1993 Treaty establishes a maritime boundary between the two States.159
Immediately to the west of the boundary, the 1993 Treaty also establishes a ‘Joint
Regime Area’ in which, ‘pending the determination of the jurisdictional limits
of each Party ..., the Parties agree to establish ... a zone of joint management,
control, exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources’.160 Article
3(1), sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the 1993 Treaty exclude two circular areas of 12
nautical miles radius from the Joint Regime Area. One circular area surrounds the
cays of the Seranilla Bank and the other surrounds the cays of Bajo Nuevo. Both of
these groups of features are claimed by Colombia - a claim that has been disputed
on various occasions by Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and the United States.161
Sensitivity on the part of Jamaica to these overlapping sovereignty claims is evident in the text of the 1993 Treaty, which does not contain an explicit recognition
of Colombian sovereignty over the features.162 However, the chart attached to the
Treaty does refer to the two circular areas as ‘Colombia’s territorial sea in Serranilla
and Bajo Nuevo’. Relevant spatial characteristics of the 1993 Treaty are illustrated
in Figure 3.10.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Articles 3(2)–(6) of the 1993 Treaty establish a framework for the cooperative exercise of national jurisdiction within the Joint Regime Area. Article 3(2) sets out a list
of activities that each State is entitled to carry out. These correspond to the functional components of jurisdiction attributed by the LOSC to both coastal States
in their respective EEZ and continental shelf (for further discussion see Chapter
4.6.3).163 Activities within the Joint Regime Area concerning development of non159

1993 Treaty, Article 1.
1993 Treaty, Article 3(1). For further discussion see Charney and Alexander, Volume III, above
n 57 on page 16, 2179–2204; United States Department of State, ‘Jamaica’s Maritime Claims
and Boundaries’ (2004) Limits in the Seas No. 125 ; Martin Pratt, ‘The maritime boundary
dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea’ (2001) IBRU Boundary and
Security Bulletin, Summer.
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
163
Article 3(2) of the 1993 Treaty also entitles both States to carry out ‘Such measures as are
authorized by this Treaty, or as the Parties may otherwise agree for ensuring compliance with
and enforcement of the regime established by this Treaty.’
160
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Figure 3.10: Colombia – Jamaica: maritime boundary and the Joint Regime Area.
Source: Charney and Alexander, Volume III, note 57 on page 16.

122

living resources, marine scientific research, and protection and preservation of the
marine environment are required to by undertaken on ‘on a joint basis agreed by
the Parties.’164
National jurisdiction within the Joint Regime Area is allocated by reference to nationality and the flag State of a vessel – Article 3(5) stipulates that ‘each Party has
jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels flying its flag or over which it exercises
management and control in accordance with international law’.165 Each Party is
required to take certain steps when its nationals or vessels have been alleged by
the other Party to have breached either the provisions of the 1993 Treaty or any
measures adopted for their implementation.166 Article 3(6) sets out an agreement
to ‘adopt measures for ensuring that nationals and vessels of third States comply
with any regulations and measures adopted by the Parties’ that concern activities
within the Joint Regime Area.
Article 4 of the 1993 Treaty provides for the establishment of a ‘Joint Commission’,
consisting of one representative of each Party, that is required to develop ‘conclusions’ concerning (1) ‘modalities’ of the Treaty’s implementation, (2) the carrying
out of activities in the Joint Regime Area, (3) the adoption of measures concerning
vessels and national of third States, and (4) any other relevant functions assigned
164

1993 Treaty, Article 3(3). Both States are also prohibited from authorising third States, international organisations, or the vessels of such entities to carry out these activities; although leases,
licenses, joint ventures and technical assistance programmes are, subject to procedures set out
in Article 4, permitted.
165
The meaning of this provision is uncertain in several respects: Is the intention to draw a distinction between nationals and vessels? If so, how is jurisdiction allocated when persons holding the
nationality of one Party are aboard a vessel flagged to the other Party? Perhaps the reference
to ‘nationals’ attempts to ensure that both Parties can exercise jurisdiction within the Joint
Regime Area over their own nationals when they are not aboard a flagged vessel? Further,
what is the effect of allocating jurisdiction to a Party in respect of national and vessels ‘over
which it exercises management and control in accordance with international law’? Perhaps
this is intended to enable either Party to exercise coastal State jurisdiction over vessels flagged
to third States? That interpretation would complement the specific provision in Article 3(6)
concerning the adoption of regulations and measures relating to nationals and vessels of third
States.
166
1993 Treaty, Article 3(5). The relevant passage provides that ‘the Party alleging the breach shall
forthwith commence consultations with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement within 14
days. On receipt of the allegation, the Party to whose attention the allegation has been brought
shall, without prejudice to the consultations referred to in the above paragraph: (a) In relation
to an allegation that a breach has been committed, ensure that the activities, the subjectmatter of the allegation, do not recur; (b) In relation to an allegation that a breach is being
committed, ensure that the activities are discontinued.’
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to it by the Parties.167 The Commission not entrusted with ongoing functions.
Rather, it is required to complete the tasks assigned to it ‘within six months from
the commencement of its work.’168
The 1993 Treaty does not contain a specialised mechanism for settling disputes
concerning its interpretation and application. Rather, Article 7 of the Treaty provides for dispute settlement ‘by agreement between the two countries in accordance
with the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes provided for by international
law.’169
Provisions of the 1993 Treaty discussed above, in particular Article 3, allocate coastal
State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete set of
functional contexts. It specifies the terms on which Colombia and Jamaica are to
implement within the relevant OCA all of the functional components of their coastal
State jurisdiction. However, the continued sovereignty disputes concerning Seranilla
Bank and the cays of Bajo Nuevo are serious impediments to jurisdictional clarity
concerning management of the Joint Regime Area. The claims of Honduras and the
United States to these features are no longer actively asserted. In December 2001
Nicaragua submitted an application to the International Court of Justice which
requested, inter alia, a judgment recognising Nicaraguan sovereignty over both features.170 The Court is currently deliberating on the merits of this issue, which form
part of a broader territorial and maritime dispute. The outcome of proceedings will
be keenly observed.

167

Article 4(3) of the 1993 Treaty provides that that conclusions of the Joint Commission are to
be reached by consensus. It also provides that conclusions are non-binding unless they are
‘adopted’ by the Parties.
168
1993 Treaty, Article 4(4).
169
Note that as of 30 August 2011 Colombia has yet to ratify the LOSC (Jamaica has signed and
ratified the Convention): see above n 21 on page 9. Consequently, the compulsory and binding
procedures set out in LOSC Part XV would be inapplicable to a dispute concerning the 1993
Treaty.
170
Application Instituting Proceedings, 6 December 2001, Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia) available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/7079.pdf>.
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3.3.6 Denmark (Faroe Islands) – United Kingdom
Background:
In May 1999 Denmark and the United Kingdom concluded an agreement171 (1999
Agreement) concerning their overlapping claims to fisheries zones and continental
shelf in North Atlantic waters located between the Faroe Islands and Scotland.172
The 1999 Agreement designates continental shelf and fisheries zone boundaries173 in
addition to a ‘Special Area’ of water column that remains subject to the overlapping jurisdictional claims both States (see Figure 3.11).174
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Within the Special Area each State ‘is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction and rights
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 5, 6 and 7’ of the Agreement. Article 5
of the 1999 Agreement establishes a framework for the cooperative exercise of fisheries jurisdiction within the Special Area. Both States are required to apply within
the Special Area their respective rules and regulations concerning the management
and conduct of fisheries.175 They are also required to refrain within the Special Area
from (1) inspection and control of vessels operating under a licence issued by the
other State;176 and (2) taking ‘any action that would disregard or infringe upon the
exercise of fisheries jurisdiction by the other Party or the conduct of fisheries under
license issued by the other Party.’177

171

Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the
Home Government of the Faroe Islands on the one hand and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the other hand relating to the Maritime Delimitation in the area between the Faroe Islands and the
United Kingdom, signed 18 May 1999, entered into force 21 July 1999, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/GBR.htm>.
172
For further discussion see Charney and Smith, Volume IV, above n 57 on page 16, 2955–2977.
173
1999 Agreement, Articles 1 and 3.
174
Schofield notes that ‘[t]he Special Zone straddles the continental shelf boundary but does so in
an unequal manner, the majority of it being located on the UK side of the seabed boundary
line. This reflected the overwhelming dependence of the Faroe Islands economy on fisheries.’:
Schofield, above n 58 on page 16, 9. See also Charney and Smith, Volume IV, above n 57 on
page 16, 2956.
175
1999 Agreement, Article 5(a).
176
1999 Agreement, Article 5(b).
177
1999 Agreement, Article 5(c).
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Figure 3.11: Denmark (Faroe Islands) – United Kingdom: maritime boundary and
Special Area. Source: UK Government, Command Paper No. CM 4373
reproduced in Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4.
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Article 6 of the 1999 Agreement contains several obligations designed to prevent the
exercise of continental shelf jurisdiction by both States from impacting upon fishing
activities within the Special Area. Both States are obliged, inter alia, to (1) ‘take all
possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution’ from the their ‘offshore activities,
in accordance with the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North-East Atlantic ...’;178 and (2) provide timely notification to the other State
of any activity that may have an adverse impact on the marine environment.179
Article 7 of the 1999 Agreement contains a provision designed to restrain the unilateral exercise of several aspects of coastal State jurisdiction within the Special Area.
It provides as follows:
With regard to the exercise in the Special Area of jurisdiction and rights
which are conferred on coastal States by international law, other than
such jurisdiction or rights that follow directly from continental shelf or
fisheries jurisdiction, each Party shall refrain from exercising such jurisdiction or rights without the agreement of the other Party and shall
cooperate with the other Party, notably on measures to protect the marine environment.
The 1999 Agreement does not contain a provision protecting the legal positions of
both States concerning their overlapping claims in the Special Area. Rather, the
1999 Agreement is expressed to ‘be without prejudice to any claim of either Party’
outside of ‘the area between the Faroe Irelands and the United Kingdom within
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea of each Party
is measured’.180 The clear omission of a clause protecting claims within the Special
Area is suggestive of an intention to cooperatively manage this OCA on a permanent
basis.
The 1999 Agreement is functionally focused on fisheries cooperation in the Special
Area and contains only general provisions concerning the other important aspect of
coastal State jurisdiction beyond 24 nautical miles, namely protection of the marine
environment. Environmental management in the Special Area is, however, managed
178

1999 Agreement, Article 6(a).
1999 Agreement, Article 6(d).
180
See 1999 Agreement, Article 11 and the associated definition in the Agreement’s Preambular
text.
179
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in accordance with detailed provisions set out in the Convention for the Protection
of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, to which both Denmark and
the United Kingdom are party.

3.3.7 Equatorial Guinea – Gabon
Background:
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon assert overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction
in and adjacent to the Corisco Bay (located in the Gulf of Guinea: see Figure
3.12).181 In May 2003 Gabon submitted a document to the UN Secretariat, purporting to be an agreement with Equatorial Guinea delimiting land and maritime
boundaries between the two States.182 Equatorial Guinea has subsequently submitted several letters to the UN Secretariat disputing the existence of this agreement
and the authenticity of the document submitted by Gabon.183 The two States also
assert rival territorial claims to several Corisco Bay islands.184 In 2003 both States
agreed to engage in talks mediated by the UN Secretary General in order to resolve
long-standing diplomatic and military tensions associated with their competing jurisdictional claims.185
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
In July 2004 both States concluded a Memorandum of Understanding that reportedly contains a framework for future negotiations and an agreement-in-principle to
engage in joint development of hydrocarbon resources in waters claimed by both
181

For further details and an illustrative map see Daniel Dzurek, ‘Gulf of Guinea Boundary Disputes’ [Spring 1999] IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 98, available online at
<http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb7-1_dzurek.pdf>.
182
See Convention demarcating the land and maritime frontiers of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon,
signed and entered into force 12 September 1974, reproduced at (2005) 2248 UNTS 93.
183
See Equatorial Guinea: Objection to the authenticity of the Convention, 18 March 2004, reproduced at (2005) 2251 UNTS 387; Second objection, 7 April 2004 and Third Objection, 26 April
2004, reproduced in (2005) 2261 UNTS 308.
184
Dzurek, above n 181.
185
Diplomatic and military tensions concerning the Corisco Bay and its islands have existed since
the 1970s. For further discussion see International Boundaries Resarch Unit, ‘UN, Equatorial
Guinea and Gabon discuss next phase of mediation over Corisco Bay dispute’ (11 June 2008)
Boundary News available at <http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/>.
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Figure 3.12: Equatorial Guinea – Gabon: Corisco Bay and surrounds. Source: NationMaster Maps Online.
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States.186 Mediated talks between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are ongoing.187
As far as the author is aware, these talks have not resulted in the further development of the formative framework concerning the provisional joint management of
waters claimed by both States.
The 2004 Memorandum of Understanding apparently contains only general commitments to engage in, and discuss the establishment of, cooperative management of
the relevant OCA. It does not appear to allocate functional components of coastal
State jurisdiction within the area concerned.

3.3.8 Guinea-Bissau – Senegal
Background:
An exchange of letters on 26 April 1960 between France and Portugal (1960 Boundary Agreement) established a maritime boundary between Senegal and the Portugese Province of Guinea for overlapping claims to territorial sea, contiguous zone
and continental shelf (see Figure 3.13).188 The independent Republic of GuineaBissau subsequently disputed the legal status of the Agreement.189 The independent Republic of Senegal maintained that the Agreement was legally binding on both
186

Reportedly, the Memorandum of Understanding provides that ‘The parties will abstain from
all behaviour and all acts that could compromise, impede, or endanger the negotiation and
execution of the accord’. It also reportedly contains an agreement hold formal negotiations
concerning joint development of the relevant OCA, providing that ‘[t]he maritime area in question as well as the terms and conditions of its joint development will be determined’. See
‘Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to jointly explore offshore waters’ (8 July 2004) Energy-pedia
news, available at <http://www.energy-pedia.com/article.aspx?articleid=106011>. Other relevant news reports include: ‘Gabon, Equatorial Guinea resolving border crisis’ (27 February
2006) Afrol News, available at <http://www.afrol.com/articles/18259>; ‘Gabon–Equatorial
Guinea: Annan repoens talks on territorial dispute’ (28 February 2006) Irin News, available at
<http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=58282>.
187
See,
eg,
‘Ban
reports
progress
in
efforts
to
end
Equatorial
GuineaGabon border dispute’ (25 Feburary 2011) UN News Centre, available at
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=dispute&Cr1=&NewsID=37629>.
188
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (France), Decree No. 60-504 of May 23, 1960, Publishing the
Exchange of Notes between France and Portugal Regarding the Maritime Boundary between
Senegal and Portugese Guinea, Signed April 26, 1960 in Charney and Alexander, Volume I,
above n 57, 872–874.
189
See Award of Arbitral Tribunal of 31 July 1989, published as an Annex to the Application of Guinea-Bissau to the ICJ of 23 August 1989, available at <http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/82/11289.pdf>. See also Charney and Alexander, Volume I, above n 57,
867–868.
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Parties and the resulting boundary dispute was submitted to arbitration in March
1985.190 In an award published 31 July 1989 (1989 Arbitral Award), the tribunal
held by a majority of two to one that the 1960 Boundary Agreement was legally
binding on both Parties, albeit solely in relation to the territorial sea, contiguous
zone and the continental shelf.191 Accordingly, the 1960 Boundary Agreement did
not bind the parties in relation to delimitation of the EEZ. In a Separate Declaration, one member of the Tribunal noted that his preferred approach would have
been to answer the first question put to the Tribunal ‘partially’ in the negative – i.e.
by finding that the 1960 Boundary Agreement lacked force of law in relation to the
EEZ.192 He went on to note that such an approach would have enabled the Tribunal
to designate an EEZ boundary line, thus settling ‘the whole of the dispute’.193
Guinea-Bissau promptly instituted proceedings against Senegal in the ICJ, requesting a declaration that the Arbitral Award was null and void. Guinea-Bissau’s argument focused on the Separate Declaration of Julio A. Barberis194 – the ICJ was
requested, inter alia, to adjudge and declare that the 1989 Arbitral Award was
‘inexistent in view of the fact that one of the two arbitrators making up the appearance of a majority in favour of the text of the ‘award’, has, by a declaration
appended to it, expressed a view in contradiction with the one apparently adopted
by the vote.’195 Guinea-Bissau submitted a subsequent application to the court on
12 March 1991, asking the court to determine a line delimiting all maritime zones of
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.196 In a judgment issued 12 November 1991, the Court
rejected Guinea-Bissau’s submissions concerning the non-validity of the 1989 Arbi-
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tral Award.197 Further proceedings were discontinued198 after negotiations between
the parties produced a Management and Cooperation Agreement in October
1993199 and a supplementary Protocol in June 1995.200
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The Management and Cooperation Agreement establishes a wedge-shaped ‘Area of
joint exploitation’ (Joint Area)201 that straddles the delimitation line defined in the
1960 Boundary Agreement202 and also consists of an OCA produced by overlapping
EEZ claims that are not delimited in that Agreement (see Figure 3.13).203 The
apex of the wedge is the point of intersection of the low water mark and the GuineaBissau–Senegal land boundary.204 Areas of territorial sea bounded by the wedge are
excluded from the Joint Area.205 The outer limit of the Joint Area is not defined
– assumedly, it would extend to the outer limit of the States’ respective maritime
claims.206
Article 2 of the Management of Cooperation Agreement allocates to each Party a
proportion of resources from the Joint Area, providing as follows:207
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Figure 3.13: Guinea-Bissau – Senegal: maritime delimitation and Joint Area.
Source: Charney and Alexander, Volume I, note 57 on page 16.
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Resources from the exploitation of the Area shall be shared in the following proportions:
Fishery resources
Fifty per cent to Senegal, Fifty per cent to Guinea-Bissau;
Resources from the continental shelf
Eighty-five per cent to Senegal, Fifteen per cent to Guinea-Bissau.
In the event of new discoveries, these proportions shall be revised, and
such revisions shall depend on the quantity of resources discovered.
The allocation of sedentary species of living marine resources is unclear - such species
arguably fall under both resource categories set out in Article 2.208
The Agreement mandates the establishment by subsequent agreement of an ‘International
Agency’ to exploit the Joint Area.209 The International Agency is conferred with
very broad powers. Article 5 of the Management and Cooperation Agreement provides that the Agency ‘shall succeed Guinea-Bissau and Senegal in the rights and
obligations deriving from the Agreements concluded by each State and relating to
the exploitation of the resources in the Area.’ The use of the term ‘succeed’ in this
provision suggests that both States intended to delegate the entire scope of their
respective national jurisdiction in the Joint Area to the International Agency. This
intention is reinforced by Article 6, which provides as follows:
Under this Agreement, the Parties shall pool the exercise of their respective rights, without prejudice to the rights in law previously acquired by
each Party and confirmed by judicial decisions, or to any claims previously formulated by them in respect of areas that have not been delimited.
Through use of a ‘without prejudice’ qualifier, Article 6 also prevents the Management and Cooperation Agreement from impacting upon the legal positions of
both States concerning delimitation of the OCA and the extent of their respective
underlying coastal State jurisdiction.
The Management and Cooperation Agreement remains in force for 20 years, and
is ‘automatically renewable’ thereafter, although the term of the Agreement upon
208
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renewal is not specified.210 The Parties are required to resolve disputes concerning
the Agreement or the subsequent agreement establishing the International Agency
– initially by direct negotiations or, if no resolution is reached within six-months,
by an arbitral tribunal or recourse to the ICJ.211 Upon suspension or expiration of
the Agreement, both Parties have recourse to arbitration or the ICJ ‘for such parts
of the delimitations as have not been settled.’212
The Protocol sets out detailed provisions concerning the form, organisation and operation of the International Agency envisioned in the Management and Cooperation
Agreement. The Agency is established as an international organisation, entrusted
in broad terms with responsibility for promoting cooperation between States and
for managing the resources of the joint Area.213 Article 5 of the Protocol establishes
several functions of the International Agency, which are enumerated under three
categories. The first category relates to mineral and petroleum resource development, including associated scientific studies and marketing. The second category
relates to the field of marine fisheries, including the evaluation and management of
fisheries resources, monitoring of the marine ecosystem, and regulation and control
of fishing activities in the Joint Area. The third general category contains functions
relating to: (1) the control of rational exploitation of the Joint Area’s resources and
(2) cooperation with the Parties and relevant international organisations concerning
security, regulatory control and surveillance, protection of the marine environment,
and pollution prevention and control. Article 5 also expressly entitles the Agency to
‘act alone or in association with other companies or with international organisations
in any activity’ in the Joint Area.
Articles 6–15 of the Protocol relate to the organisational and administrative characteristics of the International Agency. The Agency is vested with exclusive rights in
210
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relation to mineral and petroleum titles and fishing activities in the Joint Area.214
It consists of several sub-bodies, including a High Authority (composed of senior
political representatives of each State and entrusted with several decision-making,
regulatory and enforcement responsibilities),215 a Secretariat (led by a SecretaryGeneral vested with various executive and management functions, including implementation of tasks determined by the High Authority),216 and the Enterprise (a
corporate structure open to private investment but subject to the majority ownership of both States, designed to facilitate development of hydrocarbon and fisheries
resources in the Joint Area).217
Articles 16–23 of the Protocol relate to cooperation between the International Agency
and both States in several functional contexts. These contexts correspond generally
to the functional components of jurisdiction attributed by the LOSC to both coastal
States in their respective EEZ and continental shelf. Article 16 obligates both States
and the International Agency to cooperate in respect of ‘scientific research, security, surveillance, rescue, protection of the marine environment, and transport’ in
the Joint Area. It also requires both States and the Agency to ‘regularly exchange
information they obtain in the course of any activities they may carry out’ in these
functional contexts. Articles 17–23 contain more detailed articulations of the general obligations set out in Article 16. Article 17 also delegates security-related rights
back from the Agency to both States, providing that ‘[a]s part of their security operations, the State Parties have policing and control rights in the Area on behalf of
the Agency.’
Articles 24 and 25 of the Protocol allocate prescriptive jurisdiction in the Joint
Area and establish a mechanism for dispute settlement. Senegalese law in force
upon signature of the Protocol applies to ‘mineral and petroleum resource prospecting, exploration and exploitation activities and to surveillance and scientific research
214
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in the mining and petroleum sphere’.218 The law of Guinea-Bissau in force upon signature of the Protocol applies to ‘fisheries resource prospecting, exploration and
exploitation activities and to surveillance and scientific research in the sphere of
fisheries’.219 The International Agency is entrusted with competence to amend certain laws concerning the development of hydrocarbon resources.220 It is also entitled
generally to recommend modifications or amendments to the laws applicable in the
Joint Area.221 The Parties are required to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the Protocol – initially by direct negotiations or, if no
resolution is reached within three-months, by arbitration.222 All conventions, fisheries agreements and contracts concluded by the Enterprise are required to contain
specific provisions concerning dispute settlement.223
The 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement, as supplemented by the 1995
Protocol, contain provisions allocating coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction
within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional contexts. These instruments
set out the terms on which Guinea-Bissau and Senegal are to implement within the
relevant OCA all of the functional components of their coastal State jurisdiction.
Although both instruments establish a comprehensive management framework on
paper, it appears that very little progress has been made towards their implementation in practice.224
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3.3.9 Nigeria – São Tomé and Príncipe
Background:
Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe assert overlapping EEZ and continental shelf
claims in the Gulf of Guinea.225 In 2001 the two States entered into a treaty (2001
Treaty) designed primarily to facilitate the joint development of ‘Petroleum and
other Resources’ within the area subject to these overlapping claims.226 The Treaty
was negotiated in the context of concerted efforts by Nigeria to conclude maritime
boundaries with several of its neighbours.227 In Colson and Smith228 it is noted
that negotiations between Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe ‘took place over a
remarkably short period of time’ and were motivated ‘in part by the uncertainties
regarding the extent of Nigeria’s oil licensing blocks in an area that was becoming
increasingly prospective.’229
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Subject to termination procedures and unless otherwise agreed, the 2001 Treaty
remains in force for a period of 45 years.230
The preambular text of the 2001 Treaty expressly acknowledges the relevance and
applicability of the LOSC. It refers in particular to LOSC Article 74(3), concerning
the provisional management of overlapping EEZ claims.231
225
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Figure 3.14: Nigeria – São Tomé and Príncipe: joint development zone. Source:
Colson and Smith, Volume V, note 57 on page 16.
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Article 2 of the 2001 Treaty establishes a ‘joint development zone’ (the Zone)
that consists of ‘the seabed, subsoil and the superjacent waters’ in a defined area,
which is depicted in Figure 3.14. The Zone is currently the largest of its kind
worldwide, enclosing an area of approximately 34,540 square kilometres (10,070
square nautical miles).232 The Zone is subject to several general principles, including
the following:233 Both States are to exercise ‘joint control’ of resource development
within the Zone for the purpose of ‘achieving optimum commercial utilization’ of the
Zone’s resources.234 All ‘benefits and obligations’ arising from development activities
undertaken in the Zone are shared 60 percent by Nigeria and 40 percent by São Tomé
and Príncipe.235 Resources within the Zone are required to be ‘exploited efficiently
... having due regard to the protection of the marine environment, and in a manner
consistent with generally accepted good oilfield and fisheries practice.’236
Article 4 of the 2001 Treaty contains two provisions designed to protect the jurisdictional claims of both States within the Zone. The first provision relates to the
Treaty’s interpretation, providing as follows
Nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted as a renunciation
of any right or claim relating to the whole or any part of the Zone by
either State Party or as recognition of the other State Party’s position
with regard to any right or claim to the Zone or any part thereof.237
The second provision relates to the legal effect of subsequent practice by both States.
It provides as follows:
232
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No act or activities taking place as a consequence of this Treaty or its
operation, and no law operating in the Zone by virtue of this Treaty, may
be relied on as a basis for asserting, supporting or denying the position
of either State Party with regard to rights or claims over the Zone or
any part thereof.238
Articles 9–35 of the 2001 Treaty establish a detailed framework for the cooperative
management of resources located in the Zone. A ‘Joint Ministerial Council’
lacking separate legal personality is entrusted with several decision-making functions
in addition to ‘overall responsibility for all matters relating to the exploration for
and exploitation of the resources in the Zone, and such other functions as the States
Parties may entrust to it.’239 The Council is composed of high-level representatives
(ministers or persons of equivalent rank) appointed by each State.240 It is required
to meet at least twice per year and its decisions are adopted by consensus.241
A ‘Joint Authority’ possessing ‘juridical personality under international law and
under the law of each of the States Parties’ is empowered, subject to the direction
of the Joint Ministerial Council, to undertake various administrative and regulatory
functions.242 These include: preparation of development plans concerning living and
non-living resources, management of the commercial aspects of hydrocarbon development; preparation of regulatory and taxation regimes concerning hydrocarbon
development, control of movements into, within and out of the Zone; data collection
and exchange; and regulation of environmental matters, health and safety, and marine scientific research.243 Decision making within the Joint Authority is undertaken
by a Board composed of representatives appointed by both States.244
Articles 36–46 of the 2001 Treaty contain detailed ‘miscellaneous’ provisions that
address the following matters within the Zone: employment and training; health and
safety; prevention of pollution and protection of the marine environment; applicable
238
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private law; criminal law and jurisdiction; compliance and enforcement; civil and
administrative jurisdiction; security and policing in the Zone; review of applicable
law and enforcement arrangements; rights of third States; and dealings with third
persons prior to the adoption of the Treaty. Both Parties are entitled within the Zone
to exercise jurisdiction in relation to vessels and national of third States.245 This
entitlement is subject to several obligations (e.g. mandating continued cooperation
and consultation) that are designed to coordinate the exercise by both States of
national jurisdiction within the Zone.246 Criminal law and jurisdiction within the
Zone over nationals of either State is allocated on the basis of their nationality.247
The framework used to allocate prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction within the
Zone is discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.6 below.
Articles 47–49 of the 2001 Treaty set out detailed procedures for the resolution
of disputes (1) between the Joint Authority and private interests; (2) arising in
the work of the Joint Authority or the Joint Ministerial Council; and (3) between
the States Parties. Subject to several temporal and procedural conditions, disputes
between the States Parties are subject to final and binding arbitration.248 Article 52
provides for unilateral termination of the Treaty in the event of certain categories of
continued dispute.249 The dispute settlement framework set out in the 2001 Treaty
is discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.9.
Provisions of the 2001 Treaty discussed above allocate coastal State competence
and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional contexts. They specifies the terms on which Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe are
to implement within the relevant OCA all of the functional components of their
245
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coastal State jurisdiction. The Treaty is at present being actively implemented by
both States, and the Joint Authority has completed several hydrocarbon licensing
rounds (although production does not appear to have commenced).250 Given the
size the Zone, and acute lack of offshore administrative capacity on the part of São
Tomé and Príncipe (a least developed country with a population of 166,000),251 the
task of managing the Zone on a functionally comprehensive basis falls, at present,
almost entirely to Nigeria.

3.3.10 Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela
Background:
In 1990 Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela concluded a Treaty252 (1990 Delimitation Treaty) that finalised the delimitation of their respective claims to a territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Caribbean Sea and North
Atlantic Ocean.253 For more than a decade prior to the conclusion of the 1990 Delimitation Treaty both States engaged in provisional and cooperative management
of living marine resources within defined ‘Areas’ subject to overlapping claims (see
Figure 3.15).254 Provisional and cooperative management was undertaken in accordance with two agreements: The first255 (1977 Fisheries Agreement) was
concluded in 1977 and was subsequently renewed on two occasions.256 The sec-
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ond257 (1985 Fisheries Agreement) was concluded in 1985 and appears to have
been allowed to expire.258 Nweihed notes that:
Both fishery agreements ... were not meant to construct maritime boundaries within the purpose of defining and separating fishery jurisdictions.
Rather, they were conducted to regulate artisanal fishing, practiced by
both sides but chiefly by Trinidad coastal fisherman in jurisdictional
waters that include some ‘pocket areas’ within Venezuela’s interior waters.259
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 1977 Fisheries Agreement designated two Areas in which vessels flying the flags
of both States were granted access for the exclusive purpose of fishing.260 Access
was subject to detailed conditions, including those concerning the: location of fishing activities; number and construction of fishing vessels; and percentage of catch
to be sold in each State.261 A Fisheries Commission composed of three representatives from each State was entrusted, inter alia, with the task of developing further
conditions concerning the cooperative management of fisheries resources in the two
Areas.262
The 1977 Fisheries Agreement also contained provisions concerning the coordination of oceanographic research (particularly in the fields of conservation, mariculture
and marine biology)263 , in addition to several obligations to undertake a range of
measures concerning the protection of species and preservation of the marine environment.264
257
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Figure 3.15: Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela: fisheries cooperation prior to 1990
boundary delimitation. Source: Nweihed, note 254 on page 143.
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The 1985 Fisheries Agreement revised and expanded upon several aspects of the
management framework set out in the 1977 Fisheries Agreement and established
two additional Areas – including a ‘Special Fishing Area’ located in Venezuelan
internal waters – in which vessels flagged to both States were granted access for
the purpose of ‘exploiting fisheries resources’.265 Fishing activities in the existing
and additional Areas were subject to detailed ‘operating conditions’, including catch
limitations for vessels flagged to both States.266
Article XI of the 1985 Fisheries Agreement, which reiterates in part Article XIV of
the 1977 Fisheries Agreement, was designed to protect the competing jurisdictional
claims of both States. It provides as follows:
Nothing in this agreement is to be considered as a diminution or limitation of the rights of either Contracting Party in relation to the limits of
its internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, continental shelf
or exclusive economic zone nor shall anything contained in this agreement in respect of fishing in the marine areas of either Contracting Party
be invoked or claimed as a precedent.
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of both Fisheries Agreements
were to be resolved through direct negotiations.267 Neither of the Agreements contained express provisions concerning (1) the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction
within the Areas or (2) the exercise of jurisdiction within the Areas in relation to
vessels flagged to third States.268
The 1977 and 1985 Fisheries Agreements are functionally limited to the context of
marine living resources management. Implementation within the relevant OCA of
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other functional components of coastal State jurisdiction was not explicitly enabled
or contemplated.

3.4 Red Sea and Persian Gulf269
3.4.1 Iran – United Arab Emirates (Sharjah)
Background:
Iran and the United Arab Emirates assert overlapping jurisdictional claims in Persian Gulf waters surrounding the islands of Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb (Jazireh-ye
Nabi Tunb) and Greater Tunb (Jazireh-ye Tomb-e Bozorg).270 Both States also
claim sovereignty over these three islands, the location of which is illustrated in
Figure 3.16).271 In November 1971, Iran and the Emirate of Sharjah concluded a
short Memorandum of Understanding272 (1971 MoU) that addresses the competing sovereignty claims and provides for the provisional joint development of marine
resources.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The preamble of the 1971 MoU preserves the legal positions of both Parties by noting
that ‘[n]either Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim to Abu Masa nor recognise
the other’s claim.’ Articles 1 and 2 of the MoU provide for the joint occupation of
Abu Musa by both Parties and refer to land areas in which each Party ‘will have
269
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Figure 3.16: Iran – United Arab Emirates: key insular features in the Persian Gulf.
Source: Ahmadi, note 275 on the following page.
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full jurisdiction’. Article 3 of the 1971 MoU provides that both Parties recognise the
existence of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea around Abu Musa. Within this zone, the
MoU provides for the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources by a private contractor
under an existing concession agreement, the terms of which must be acceptable
to Iran.273 The private contractor is required to pay half of the ‘governmental oil
resources hereafter attributable to said exploitation’ to each Party.274 Article 5 of
the 1971 MoU addresses the management of fisheries resources, providing that the
national of both Parties ‘shall have equal rights to fish in the territorial sea of Abu
Musa.’
The 1971 MoU is functionally limited to the context of marine resources management. Implementation within the relevant OCA of other functional components of
coastal State jurisdiction is not explicitly enabled or contemplated. Note also that
the extent to which the 1971 MoU is currently being implemented is unclear, given
Iran currently exercises full control over the three islands.275

3.4.2 Saudi Arabia – Sudan
Background:
Saudi Arabia and Sudan assert overlapping continental shelf claims in the Red
Sea.276 In 1974 both States concluded an agreement277 (1974 Agreement) relating
to the joint exploitation of natural resources in the resulting OCA.278
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
273

1971 MoU, Article 4.
Ibid.
275
For further discussion (and detailed coverage of the relevant political and historical context) see
Kourosh Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf: The Abu Musa and
Tunbs in Strategic Context (2008).
276
According to United Nations records, both States have not formally claimed an EEZ and/or
fisheries jurisdiction: See Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, above n 52 on page 93.
However, Saudi Arabia appears to have issued some form of general claim to a fisheries zone
and/or EEZ in 1974: See Maritime Claims Reference Manual, above n 52 on page 93. For
further discussion see Daniel Dzurek, ‘Parting the Red Sea: Boundaries, Offshore Resources
and Transit (2001) 3(2) IBRU Maritime Briefing..
277
Agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relating to the joint exploitation of the natural resources
274
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Figure 3.17: Saudi Arabia – Sudan: overlapping claims and the Common Zone.
Source: International Boundaries Research Unit
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Article II of the 1974 Agreement sets out a general cooperative obligation, providing
that ‘[t]he two Governments covenant to co-operate through all ways and means
to explore and exploit the natural resources of the sea-bed of the Red Sea.’ The
term ‘natural resources’ is defined narrowly, referring only to ‘non-living substances
including hydrocarbon and ... mineral resources.’279
Articles III – V of the 1974 Agreement address the overlapping jurisdictional claims
of both States. Articles III and IV establish mutual recognition of both States’
claims to adjacent sea-bed located landward of the 1000 metre isobath.280 Article V
establishes a ‘Common Zone’ consisting of the area of sea-bed lying between the
two States respective coasts and seaward of the 1000 metre isobath.281 The 1974
Agreement does not establish northern or southern limits of the Common Zone,
which creates confusion concerning the Zone’s limits given the 1000 metre isobath
extends northward beyond Egypt–Sudan land boundary, and southward beyond the
land boundary between Ethiopia–Sudan (see Figure 3.17).282 Within the Common
Zone both States enjoy exclusive and equal sovereign rights over (non-living) natural
resources.283
Articles VII of the 1974 Agreement establishes a Joint Commission that is constituted as a ‘body corporate’ in both States and is composed of an equal number of
representatives from each State.284 The Joint Commission is entrusted with a variety
of administrative and regulatory competencies concerning the resource development
of the sea-bed and subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, signed 16 May 1974, reproduced
at (1974) 952 UNTS 197.
278
Schofield notes that the agreement’s ‘primary objective was to allow for the joint exploration for
and exploitation of the seabed mineral resources, notably metalliferous sediments rich in heavy
metal such as copper, manganese, zinc, iron and silver, known to exist in the Red Sea deeps,
especially off Sudan.’: Schofield, above n 58 on page 16, 16. See also Prescott and Schofield,
above n 57 on page 16, 488.
279
1974 Agreement, Article I(2).
280
Article III recognises the claims of Saudi Arabia and Article IV recognises the claims of Sudan. The phrase used in both Articles is that the exclusive sovereign rights of each State
extends eastward (for Sudan) or westwards (for Saudi Arabia) ‘to a line where the depth of the
superjacent waters is uninterruptedly one thousand metres.’
281
Note that Article V also provides that ‘No part of the territorial sea of either Government shall
be included in the Common Zone.’
282
The corresponding maritime boundaries have not been delimited.
283
1974 Agreement, Article V and VI.
284
See also 1974 Agreement, Articles VIII and IX.
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in the Common Zone, including: surveying, delimitation and demarcation of the
Common Zone; conduct of scientific studies concerning resource development; resource development licensing; unitisation of deposits straddling the Common Zone,
and supervision and regulation of resource development and production.285
Article XVI of the 1974 Agreement contains a dispute settlement mechanism. Disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the 1974 Agreement are to
be settled in the first instance ‘by amicable means’. Disputes that cannot be settled
by such means are subject to compulsory and binding settlement by the ICJ. Either
State may also ask the ICJ to indicate interim measures.
The provisions discussed above are functionally limited to the context of non-living
marine resource development. Implementation within the relevant OCA of other
functional components of coastal State jurisdiction is not explicitly enabled or contemplated. As far as the author is aware, there has also been little progress achieved
concerning practical implementation of the 1974 Agreement.286

3.5 North East Asia287
3.5.1 Japan – People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Background:
Japan and PRC assert overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims in the East
China Sea (see Figure 3.18).288 The two States also assert competing sovereignty
claims to seven uninhabited islands located in the southern East China Sea (the
285

1974 Agreement, Article VII, XIII, XIV.
Schofield notes that ‘Although a Saudi-Sudanese Red Sea Commission was established in 1975,
it is understood that little exploration activity has in fact taken place and no commercial
discoveries or developments have eventuated.’: Schofield, above n 58 on page 16, 14. See also
Colson and Smith, Volume V, above n 57 on page 16, 3470, which notes that the Common Zone
has not been exploited to date and that the current status of the 1974 agreement is unclear.
287
Material in this sub-Chapter is drawn from a previous work by the author: Milligan and Schofield,
above n 1 on page 35.
288
For further discussion and illustrative maps see Schofield and Townsend-Gault, above n 3 on
page 5.
286
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Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu/Tiao Yu T’ai).289 The resulting OCAs are managed in accordance with a 1997 agreement concerning fisheries management290 (1997 Agreement) and a ‘Cooperation Consensus’ issued on 18 June 2008.291 (2008 Cooperation Consensus)
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Design features and functional coverage of the 1997 Agreement are appraised in
Chapter 4.4.5 below.
The 2008 Cooperation Consensus consists of three short paragraphs and represents
a realisation of public political pledges made by both States concerning joint development in the East China Sea.292 In the first paragraph the two States express
an agreement to ‘conduct cooperation in the transitional period prior to delimitation without prejudicing their respective legal positions’ with a view to making the
East China Sea a ‘sea of peace, cooperation and friendship’. The second paragraph
outlines a general commitment to establish and engage in joint development of a
defined area of seabed that straddles the median line between the two States’ coasts
(see Figure 3.18).293 The third paragraph outlines a general agreement to allow a
‘Japanese legal person’ to invest in the Chinese entity undertaking development of
the Chunxiao gas field (referred to in Japan as the Shirakiaba gas field). This field
is located close to the median line on the Chinese side294
The 2008 Cooperation Consensus is an agreement-in-principle. It contains only
general commitments to engage in, and discuss the establishment of, cooperative
289

Ibid. These features are currently administered by Japan.
Signed on 11 November 1997, entered into force 1 June 2000. The text of the agreement is
reproduced in Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4.
291
For further discussion and the text of this document, see Gao Jianjun, ‘A Note on the 2008
Cooperation Consensus Between China and Japan in the East China Sea’ (2009) 40 Ocean
Development and International Law 291.
292
See Manicom J, ‘Hu-Fukuda Summit: The East China Sea Dispute’ in China Elections and Governance, available at <http://chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=17841>; and ‘Fukuda,
Hu Put Focus on Future’, Japan Times (8 May 2008) <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20080508a1.html>. For further discussion see Schofield and Townsend-Gault, above n 3
on page 5.
293
The vast majority of the proposed zone is located on the Japanese side of the median line with
only the north-western corner of the joint area on the Chinese side of the line.
294
Schofield and Townsend-Gault, above n 3 on page 5.
290
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Figure 3.18: Overlapping claims in the East China Sea. Source: Schofield and
Townsend-Gault, note 3 on page 5.
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management of the relevant OCA. It does not specifically allocate functional components of coastal State jurisdiction within the area concerned, and does not add
clarity to the general and ambiguous provisions of international law concerning the
exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs. At the time of writing, there
is little sign that the general commitments set out in the 2008 Cooperation Consensus have translated into concrete steps toward OCA management.295 Indeed
significantly varying interpretations of the instrument appear to have arisen – with
‘Japan claiming that the two countries were carrying out joint development of the
Chunxiao gas field, and China claiming that the consensus only covered capital
participation and that Japan had acknowledged China’s sovereign rights’ over the
field.296

3.5.2 Japan – Republic of Korea
Background:
Japan and the Republic of Korea assert overlapping claims to EEZ and continental
shelf in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan/East Sea (see Figure 3.18 in relation to the East China Sea).297 The two States also assert competing sovereignty
claims to insular features (the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo/Takeshima) located in the
Sea of Japan/East Sea.298 The resulting OCAs are managed in accordance with
a 1974 agreement concerning joint development of hydrocarbon resources299 (1974

295

See Xinjun Zhang, ‘Why the 2008 Sino-Japanese Consensus on the East China Sea has stalled:
Good faith and reciprocity considerations in interim measures pending a maritime boundary
delimitation’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development and International Law 53.
296
Davenport, n 313 on page 158.
297
For further discussion see Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, and Schofield and Townsend-Gault,
above n 3 on page 5.
298
Ibid.
299
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning joint development
of the southern part of the continental shelf adjacent to the two countries, signed
30 January 1974, entered into force 22 June 1978, UNTS No.
19778, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/ja
p-kor1974south.pdf>. See also Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, 282–285 and Charney and
Alexander, Volume I, above n 57 on page 16, 1057–1089.
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Agreement) and a 1998 agreement concerning fisheries management.300 (1998
Agreement)
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 1998 Agreement is discussed further in Chapter 4.4.5 below.
The 1974 Agreement concerns overlapping claims to continental shelf located southeast of Jeju Island (Korea) and south-west of Fukue Island (Japan).301 It establishes a ‘Joint Development Zone’ designed to facilitate the exploration for and
exploitation of seabed oil and gas resources.302 As illustrated in Figure 3.18, part of
the Joint Development Zone is also subject to a continental shelf claim promulgated
by PRC. The 1974 Agreement applies for an initial term of 50 years,303 without
prejudice to ‘the question of sovereign rights over all or any portion of the Joint Development Zone or as prejudicing the positions of the respective Parties with respect
to the delimitation of the continental shelf.’304
The Joint Development Zone was initially divided into nine Subzones.305 Each
Party is required to authorise ‘concessionaires’ for each Subzone and concessionaires
are required to enter into an operating agreement to carry out joint exploration
and/or exploitation of natural resources.306 Within each Subzone a single ‘operator’
is designated from among the concessionaires to conduct operations.307 The designation of an operator is determinative of the laws and regulations that apply within
the relevant Subzone – Japanese law applies to Japanese operators and Korean law
300

Signed 28 November 1998, entered into force on 22 January 1999. The text of the agreement is
reproduced in Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4.
301
For an illustrative map see UNTS No. 19778, 124.
302
Note that the People’s Republic of China also asserts maritime jurisdictional claims over part of
the Joint Development Zone: Charney and Alexander, Volume I, above n 57 on page 16, 1058.
For an illustrative map and further discussion see also Schofield and Townsend-Gault, above
n 3 on page 5.
303
The 1974 Agreement may be extended if no maritime boundary is delimited, and can be terminated by either side with three years’ notice: Article XXXI(2).
304
1974 Agreement, Article XVIII.
305
See 1974 Agreement, Article III and the associated Appendix. Schofield notes that ‘the number of sub-zones was reduced to six following surveys indicating that the likelihood of seabed
hydrocarbons being present was limited.’: Schofield, above n 58 on page 16.
306
1974 Agreement, Articles IV and V.
307
1974 Agreement, Article VI.
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applies to a Korean operators.308 Costs and revenues associated with hydrocarbon
development in each Subzone are shared equally by the concessionaires authorised
by each State.309
Although the agreement primarily focused on the cooperative exercise of coastal
State competencies relating to the exploitation of seabed hydrocarbon resources,310
there are several articles concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in
other functional contexts. Article XX of the 1974 Agreement requires the Parties
to ‘agree on measures to be taken to prevent collisions at sea and to prevent and
remove pollution of the sea resulting from activities relating to the exploration or
exploitation of natural resources in the Joint Development Zone.’ In an exchange of
notes accompanying the agreement, the Parties agree that ‘[e]ither Government may
take necessary measures to prevent and remove pollution of the sea when measures
are not taken ... or when that Government considers that such measures are not
sufficient to prevent or remove pollution of the sea.’311
Article XXIV establishes a Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Commission as a means
for consultation regarding implementation of the agreement and the application of
national jurisdiction within the joint development zone. The Joint Commission is
required, inter alia, to ...
study problems, including those relating to the application of laws and
regulations of the Parties, unexpected at the time of entry into force of
this Agreement, and, when necessary, recommend to the Parties appropriate measures to solve such problems.312
308

1974 Agreement, Article XXIX provides that ‘the laws and regulations of one Party shall apply
with respect to matters relating to exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the subzones with respect to which the Party has authorised concessionaires designated and acting as
operators.’
309
Schofield notes that ‘To date, exploration activities have failed to result in the discovery of
commercially viable oil and gas reserves.’: Schofield, above n 58 on page 16.
310
See, eg, 1974 Agreement, Article XIX regarding applicable law ‘with respect to matters relating
to exploration and exploitation of natural resources’ and Article XXI regarding liability for
damage resulting from exploration or exploitation of natural resources in the Joint Development Zone. The Agreement and accompanying exchange of notes set out technical regulations
regarding several aspects of oil and gas exploration and development.
311
Diplomatic note from the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Republic of Korea, paragraph IV, UNTS No. 19778, 134.
312
See 1974 Agreement, Article XXV(1)(e). Article XXV(2) provides that ‘The Parties shall respect
to the extent possible recommendation made by the Commission under paragraph 1 of this
Article.’
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Article XXVII of the 1974 Agreement addresses the potential impacts of hydrocarbon development on other functional uses of the joint development zone, providing
that ...
exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the Joint Development Zone shall be carried out in such a manner that other legitimate
activities in the Joint Development Zone and its superjacent waters such
as navigation and fisheries will not be unduly affected.
The 1974 Agreement is actively implemented by both Japan and the Republic of
Korea. However, its implementation has not yet resulted in the discovery of commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits.313
The 1974 Agreement is functionally limited to the context of non-living marine resource development and associated pollution control measures. The 1988 Agreement
is functionally limited to the context of marine living resources management. Implementation within the relevant OCA of other functional components of coastal
State jurisdiction is not explicitly enabled. However, OCA management in other
functional contexts is clearly contemplated. Article XVII of the 1974 Agreement
refers to navigation (and fisheries) in the Joint Development Zone but does not establish a basis for cooperation in those contexts. Article XX of the 1974 Agreement
provides for further agreement concerning provisional joint management of certain
aspects of navigational safety. Article XXIV of the 1974 Agreement provides a basis
for continued discussion concerning management of human activity in the JDZ, including functional management problems that may have been unexpected upon the
Agreement’s entry into force.
The 1974 Agreement does not contain provisions concerning the assertion of coastal
State jurisdiction by PRC in the parts of the Joint Development Zone claimed by
that State. Accordingly, ambiguities of the international legal framework concerning
the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs continue to impact upon
the part of the Joint Development Zone claimed by PRC. PRC has persistently
313

Tara Davenport, ‘Joint Development in Asia: Some Valuable Lessons Learned’ in Schofield (ed),
above n 32 on page 11.
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communicated its objections to the Agreement, citing its claim to a continental
shelf entitlement within part of the Joint Development Zone.314

3.5.3 Japan – Russia
Background:
Russia and Japan assert overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction in areas adjacent to their Pacific Coasts and in the Sea of Japan.315 The two States also assert
competing sovereignty claims to a small group of islands (the Northern Territories/Southern Kuril Islands) located north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido (see
Figure 3.19).316
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Fisheries management within the resulting OCAs has been undertaken in accordance
with several short term agreements, including a formal treaty concluded in 1984.317
The author has not been able to obtain the text of these agreements. A noteworthy design feature identified by other commentators is the use, for the purposes
of fisheries management, of a provisional maritime boundary between undisputed
Japanese territory and the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands.318 Notwithstanding

314

Davenport, n 313 on the previous page, notes that PRC claims have not appeared to significantly
undermine investment and resource exploration in the Zone, but observes that: ‘If significant
discoveries are eventually made in the [Zone] China is very likely to protect, and this reaction
will have consequences for the certainty that the JDA is supposed to create for investors and oil
companies.’ See also Choon-Ho Park, ‘The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea Resources Controversy
and the Hypothesis of a 200 Mile Economic Zone,’ (1975) 16 Harvard International Law Journal
44.
315
See, eg, Alex Oude Elferink, The law of maritime boundary delimitation: a case study of the
Russian Federation (1994).
316
For detailed discussion of the sovereignty dispute, see Seokwoo Lee, ‘Towards a Framework for the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute over the Kurile Islands’ (2001)
3(6) IBRU Boundary and Territory Briefing.
For general historical background
and a discussion of recent negotiations (including joint development proposals) concerning the islands, see The Carter Center, Approaches to Solving Territorial Conflicts:
Sources, Situations, Scenarios, and Suggestions (May 2010), available at
<http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/conflict_resolution/
Solving_Territorial_Conflicts.pdf>.
317
For further discussion see Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4, 129–130.
318
Ibid.
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Figure 3.19: Japan – Russia: the Northern Territories / Southern Kuril Islands.
Source: Andy Proehl Design (at http://www.flickr.com).
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the existence of the provisional boundary, Japanese fishing vessels have reportedly
been granted access to the territorial sea surrounding the disputed islands.319
The provisional joint management frameworks discussed above appear to be functionally limited to the context of living marine resources development. Implementation within the relevant OCA of other functional components of coastal State
jurisdiction does not appear to be enabled or contemplated.

3.5.4 People’s Republic of China – Republic of Korea
PRC and the Republic of Korea assert overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims
in the East China Sea.320 In 2000 the two States concluded an agreement321 (2000
Agreement) concerning the fisheries management in areas subject to the overlapping jurisdictional claims of both States. This agreement is discussed further
in Chapter 3.5.5 immediately below, alongside several other bilateral agreements
concerning fisheries management in the East China Sea.

3.5.5 East China Sea bilateral fisheries agreements
The agreements in question are the Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement,322 Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement,323 and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement.324 These agreements were concluded following the ratification of the LOSC
and subsequent declaration of overlapping EEZs by the three States.325
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:

319

Ibid.
For further discussion and illustrative maps see Schofield and Townsend Gault, above n 3 on
page 5.
321
Signed 3 August 2000, entered into force 30 June 2001. The text of the agreement is reproduced
in Sun Pyo Kim, above n 2 on page 4.
322
Above n 290 on page 153
323
Above n 300 on page 156.
324
321
325
For further discussion see Sun Pyo Kim, ‘The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and New
Fisheries Agreements in North East Asia’ (2003) 27 Marine Policy 97.
320
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Figure 3.20: Provisional fisheries zones in the East China Sea. Source: Schofield et
al, note 7 on page 5.
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The design features of the agreements are similar – they are all expressed to apply
without prejudice to the international legal positions (e.g. maritime claims) of the
relevant Parties326 and establish provisional zones in which fishing activities are
managed on a cooperative basis in accordance with mutually agreed measures (see
Figure 3.20).327
None of the agreements provide a clear basis for the exercise within these zones of
the coastal State jurisdiction, including against vessels flagged to third States.328
Prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is instead applied on the basis of the flag
of the vessel.329 Notification procedures apply in the event that one Party identifies
a vessel flagged to the other Party acting contrary to agreed management measures.330 However, the PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement does provide that
the Parties may undertake ‘joint surveillance measures’ within defined ‘transitional
zones’, including ‘joint boarding, stopping and inspection.’331
The Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement, Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement,
and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement are functionally limited to the context of living marine resources development. Implementation within the relevant
OCA of other functional components of coastal State jurisdiction is not explicitly
enabled or contemplated. Note also that these frameworks allocate certain functional competencies to the relevant parties on a bilateral basis, but do not involve
the Republic of China / Taiwan (ROC), which also asserts maritime claims and
operates a large fishing fleet in the East China Sea. Further, the bilateral fishing
agreements concerning the East China Sea allocate jurisdiction on an inter-se basis
only and do not provide a clear basis for the assertion of coastal State jurisdiction
against vessels flagged to third States (or the ROC).
326

See Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement, Article 12; Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement,
Article 15; and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement, Article 14.
327
For further discussion see Sun Pyo Kim, above n 325 on page 161.
328
The lack of such provisions is problematic given that many vessels registered and/or licensed by
the Republic of China/Taiwan are active in the provisional zones established by the agreements.
329
See Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement, Articles 6–7; Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement,
Articles 5–6 and Annex I, Articles 2a and 3a; and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement,
Article 7.
330
See, eg, Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement, Annex I Articles 2e, 3e.
331
See PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement, Article 8.
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3.6 South East Asia and Australia332
3.6.1 Australia – Indonesia
Background:
Prior to the separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 2002, Australia and Indonesia asserted overlapping continental shelf claims in the ‘Timor Gap’ – an
area located between previously established discontinuous seabed boundaries in the
Timor Sea.333 The resulting OCA was managed in accordance with a 1989 Treaty
that defined a ‘Zone of Cooperation’ in the Timor Gap (see Figure 3.21) and established a highly detailed framework for the cooperative management of the Zone
by both States.334 The initial term of the 1989 Treaty was set at 40 years, followed
by successive terms of 20 years unless agreed otherwise.335 The Treaty is no longer
in force, having been replaced by agreements between Australia and East Timor336
that is discussed in Section 3.6.2 below.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 1989 Treaty is expressly characterised as an implementation of the LOSC and
the provisions of the Convention concerning provisional management of overlapping
continental shelf claims.337 Article 2 of the Treaty contains provisions designed to
protect the legal positions of both States, providing as follows:
332

Material in this sub-Chapter is drawn from the author’s contribution to a previous work: Milligan
and Schofield, above n 1 on page 35.
333
These boundaries were established prior to the annexation in 1975/1976 of East Timor by Indonesia. The EEZ boundary between Australia and Indonesia in the Timor Sea was delimited in
1997. For further discussion see Clive Schofield, ‘Minding the Gap: The Australia–East Timor
Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS)’ (2007) 22 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 189.; and Max Herriman and Martin Tsamenyi,
‘The 1997 Australia–Indonesia maritime boundary treaty: a secure legal regime for offshore
resource development?’ (1998) 29 Ocean Development and International Law 361.
334
Schofield notes that the management framework established by the 1989 Treaty ‘was widely
regarded as the most sophisticated and comprehensive maritime joint development zone in the
world.’: Schofield, above n on page 16, 15.
335
1989 Treaty, Article 33.
336
The newly independent East Timor indicated that it would not consider itself bound by agreements entered into by the Indonesian government: Schofield, above n on the current page..
337
1989 Treaty, Preamble. Relevant LOSC provisions are discussed in Chapter 2.3.6 above.
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Figure 3.21: Australia – Indonesia: maritime boundaries and Timor Gap Zone of
Cooperation. Source: Australian Government (GeoSciences Australia).
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3. Nothing contained in this Treaty and no acts or activities taking
place while this Treaty is in force shall be interpreted as prejudicing
the position of either Contracting State on a permanent shelf delimitation in the Zone of Cooperation nor shall anything contained in
it be considered as affecting the respective sovereign rights claimed
by each Contracting State in the Zone of Cooperation.
4. Notwithstanding the conclusion of this Treaty, the Contracting States
shall continue their efforts to reach agreement on a permanent continental shelf delimitation in the Zone of Cooperation.
The Zone of Cooperation is divided into three sub-areas (see Figure 3.21):338 Area
A is subject to ‘joint control by the Contracting States of the exploration for and
exploitation of petroleum resources, aimed at achieving optimum commercial utilization thereof and equal sharing between the two Contracting States of the benefits of
the exploitation of petroleum resources’.339 Areas B and C are subject to the national
jurisdiction of Australia and Indonesia respectively.340 Each State is required to pay
the other State a specified percentage (10 percent) of taxation revenues collected
from corporations producing petroleum in the relevant Area (Area B for Australia
and Area C for Indonesia).341
The 1989 Treaty is primarily focused on the cooperative exercise of coastal State
competencies relating to the exploitation of seabed hydrocarbon resources. However,
there are detailed provisions concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in
other functional contexts. The Joint Authority established in Part IV of the 1989
Treaty is attributed management functions that include environmental assessment,
pollution control and vessel traffic management. The Joint Authority is responsible
to a Ministerial Council composed of an equal number of representatives from each
State.342 The Ministerial Council is entrusted with ‘overall responsibility for all
matters relating to the exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum resources

338

1989 Treaty, Article 2.
1989 Treaty, Article 2(2)(a).
340
This is implicit in 1989 Treaty, Article 2(2)(b) and (c).
341
1989 Treaty, Article 4.
342
1989 Treaty, Article 7(3).
339
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in Area A of the Zone of Cooperation’ and other relevant functions that may be
entrusted to it.343
Part V of the 1989 Treaty requires the Parties, inter alia, to engage in cooperative
management of Area A relating to surveillance, security measures, search and rescue,
air traffic services, hydrographic and seismic surveys, marine scientific research and
protection of the marine environment. Article 27 of the 1989 Treaty contains detailed
provisions defining the criminal jurisdiction that applies within Area A to nationals
of the Parties and nationals of third States.
Per Article 30 of the 1989 Treaty, disputes concerning its interpretation or application are to be ‘resolved by consultation or negotiation between the Contracting
States.’
The provisions discussed above allocate coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction
within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional contexts. They specify the
terms on which Australia and Indonesia were to implement within the relevant OCA
all of the functional components of their coastal State jurisdiction.

3.6.2 Australia – East Timor
Background:
Australia and East Timor assert overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims in the
vicinity of the Timor Gap.344 The resulting OCA has been managed in accordance
with the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty345 and the 2006 Treaty on Certain Maritime

343

See 1989 Treaty, Part III, in particular Article 6.
For further discussion and illustrative maps see Schofield, above n 333 on
page 164 and Victor Prescott, ‘The Question of East Timor’s Maritime Boundaries’ (Winter 1999-2000) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 72.
Concerning
East Timorese claims, see National Parliament Law No.
7/2002 Maritime Borders of the Territory of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TLS_2002_La
w.pdf>.
345
Timor Sea Treaty, signed 20 May 2002, entered into force 2 April 2003. For treaty text see
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/A
US-TLS2002TST.PDF>.
344
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Arrangements in the Timor Sea346 (or CMATS). The Timor Sea Treaty was
negotiated during the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Authority for East
Timor347 and was signed on the same day that East Timor became independent.348
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The Timor Sea Treaty establishes a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA)
that is coextensive with Area A of the Zone of Cooperation defined in the Australia–
Indonesia 1989 Agreement (see Figure 3.22).349 Article 4 of the Timor Sea Treaty
contains obligations relating to the sharing of petroleum production in the JPDA,
providing inter alia that:
Australia and East Timor shall have title to all petroleum produced in
the JPDA. Of the petroleum produced in the JPDA, ninety (90) percent
shall belong to East Timor and ten (10) percent shall belong to Australia.
In a similar fashion to the Australia–Indonesia 1989 Treaty, the Timor Sea Treaty
is primarily focused on the cooperative exercise of coastal State competencies relating to the exploitation of seabed hydrocarbon resources.350 However, the Treaty
also contains detailed provisions concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within the JPDA in other functional contexts, including: marine environmental protection,351 occupational health and safety,352 criminal jurisdiction,353 hydrographic and seismic surveys,354 surveillance,355 security measures,356 and air traffic
services.357
346

Treaty Between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, signed 12 January 2006, entered into force
23 February 2007, [2007] ATS 12.
The text of the agreement is available at <
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2007/12/>. Note also the several agreements concerning the unitisation of hydrocarbon deposits, cited where relevant below.
347
For further discussion concerning the UN mandate, see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm>.
348
For further discussion see Schofield, above n on page 164.
349
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 3.
350
The two Treaties also contain similar provisions regarding: the protection of both State’s existing
claims to maritime jurisdiction in the Timor Sea (see Timor Sea Treaty, Article 2) and the
settlement of disputes (see Timor Sea Treaty Article 23).
351
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 10.
352
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 11.
353
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 12.
354
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 16.
355
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 18.
356
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 19.
357
Timor Sea Treaty, Article 21.
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Figure 3.22: Australia – East Timor: Joint Petroleum Development Area and Unit
Area. Source: Schofield, note 333 on page 164.
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Implementation of the Timor Sea Treaty was complicated by disagreements concerning development of the Greater Sunrise oil and gas fields, which straddle the
boundary between the JPDA and seabed then claimed solely by Australia (see Figure 3.22).358 In 2003 both State concluded an agreement concerning unitisation of
these fields,359 (2003 Unitisation Agreement) which apportioned 20.1% of the
fields’ deposits to the JPDA and the remaining 79.9% to Australia.360 Deeming its
share of the Greater Sunrise fields to be unacceptable, East Timor elected to delay
ratification of the 2003 Unitisation Agreement and asserted its right to claim areas
adjacent to the JPDA.361
After ‘complex and contentious’362 negotiations, Australia and East Timor concluded the CMATS in 2006. The Treaty is expressly characterised as an implementation of the LOSC and the provisions of the Convention concerning provisional
management of overlapping continental shelf and EEZ claims.363 It applies without
prejudice to the legal positions of both States concerning delimitation of the Timor
Sea and imposes a stringent moratorium on activity relating to those claims while
the Treaty is in force.364
CMATS Article 5 responds to East Timor’s concerns regarding its share of the
Greater Sunrise fields. It provides that revenue derived from the upstream pro358

Clive Schofield, ‘Dividing the Resources of the Timor Sea: A Matter of Life and Death for East
Timor’ (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 255.
359
See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor and the Government of Australia concerning an International Unitization Agreement for the Greater Sunrise field, signed 20 May 2002; Agreement between
the Government of Australia and the Government of the Democratic Republic of TimorLeste relating to the Unitization of the Sunrise and Troubadour fields, signed 6 March
2003, entered into force 23 February 2007. The text of both agreements is reproduced at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TLS.htm>.
360
2003 Unitisation Agreement, Article 7. Accordingly, given the share of resources set out in
Article 4 of the Timor Sea Treaty, East Timor would receive only an 18.1% (90% of 20.1%)
share of the Greater Sunrise deposits. For further discussion see Schofield, above n on page 164.
361
East Timor argued, inter alia, that it was not bound by the dimensions of the Timor Gap, which,
as noted above, was defined by previous Australia–Indonesia boundary agreements. For further
discussion, see Schofield, above n on page 164, who notes that ‘In effect East Timor opted to use
non-ratification of the Sunrise IUA [Unitisation Agreement] as a means to pressure Australia
to be more flexible in its negotiating stance and deliver what it regarded as a more equitable
share in the seabed resources of the Timor Sea.’
362
Schofield, above n on page 16.
363
CMATS, Preamble. Relevant LOSC provisions are discussed in Chapter 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 above.
364
CMATS, Articles 2 and 4. These provisions will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.4
below.
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duction of petroleum in the Unit Area defined in the 2003 Agreement is to be
shared equally by both States.365 CMATS Article 7 addresses the relationship of
the Treaty with previous agreements, providing inter alia that the Timor Sea Treaty
and 2003 Unitisation Agreement continue to apply (except as otherwise provided in
the CMATS). Subject to termination provisions, the CMATS will remain in force
for a period of 50 years, or ‘until the date five years after the exploitation of the
Unit Area ceases, whichever occurs earlier.’366
Supplementing the detailed allocation of functional competence contained in the
Timor Sea Treaty, the CMATS divides the ‘water column jurisdiction’ of both Parties
on a provisional basis by reference to a line defined in Annex II of the agreement.
This line is coincident with the southern limit of the JPDA established in the Timor
Sea Treaty. Article 8 of the CMATS contains the following provisions concerning
cooperative management of living marine resources:
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species straddle the
line described in Annex II, Timor-Leste and Australia shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries
management organisations, to agree upon the measures necessary
to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such
stocks.
3. Timor-Leste and Australia shall make every effort to pursue cooperation in relation to highly migratory fish stocks, as defined in
Annex 1 to the 1982 Convention, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organisations,
to ensure effective conservation and management of such stocks.
East Timor is required to exercise its jurisdiction over the water column above
the JPDA ‘in a manner that does not unduly inhibit petroleum activities within the
JPDA.’367 Article 9 of the CMATS establishes a bilateral joint ‘Maritime Commis365

As a consequence, East Timor receives a 50% share in the Greater Sunrise fields, as opposed to
the 18.1% share it received pursuant to the 2003 Unitisation Agreement and the TST.
366
CMATS, Article 12. Concerning termination, Article 12(2) provides as follows: ‘If: (a) a development plan for the Unit Area has not been approved in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Article 12 of the Sunrise IUA [Unitisation Agreement] within six years after the date of entry
into force of this Treaty; or (b) production of petroleum from the Unit Area has not commenced
within ten years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty; either Party may notify the
other Party in writing that it wishes to terminate this Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall
cease to be in force three calendar months after such notice is given.’
367
CMATS, Article 8.
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sion’ to ‘constitute a focal point for bilateral consultations with regard to maritime
matters of interest to the Parties’. Per CMATS Article 9(3), the Maritime Commission is required to consult on matters relating, inter alia, to maritime security,
marine environmental protection, and the sustainable management of renewable and
non-renewable resources.
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the CMATS are to be settled by consultation or negotiation.368 Disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the Timor Sea Treaty or 2003 Unitisation Agreement may be referred
to a specially constituted arbitral tribunal empowered to make final and binding
awards.369
The provisions of the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty and 2006 CMATS discussed above
allocate coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in
a complete set of functional contexts. They specifies the terms on which Australia
and East Timor are to implement within the relevant OCA all of the functional
components of their coastal State jurisdiction.

3.6.3 Cambodia – Thailand
Cambodia and Thailand assert overlapping claims to zones of national jurisdiction
in the Gulf of Thailand (see Figure 3.23).370 On 18 June 2001 the two States signed
a memorandum of understanding371 (2001 MoU) concerning their large continental
shelf OCA.372 In late 2009 the Thai Government announced its revocation of the
368

CMATS, Article 11.
2003 Unitisation Agreement, Article 26 and Annex IV; Timor Sea Treaty, Article 23 and Annex
B. Per Article 23, certain disputes in the 2003 Unitisation Agreement are also subject to final
and binding settlement by a nominated expert.
370
For further discussion and illustrative maps see Nguyen Hong Thao, Joint Development in the
Gulf of Thailand (Autumn 1999) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 79.
371
Memorandum of Understanding between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the Royal
Thai Government regarding the Area of their Overlapping Maritime Claims to the Continental
Shelf, signed 18 June 2001, published in Colson and Smith, Volume V, above n on page 16,
3743–3744.
372
Schofield, above n 58 on page 16, notes that ‘[i]t can be inferred that the area of overlap between
the parties has been reduced following the resolution of Cambodia and Vietnam’s sovereignty
dispute over islands. Uncertainty does, however, persist in relation to the southern limit of the
area covered by the MoU.’ See also Ted McDorman, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the
369
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agreement.373 The announcement followed the appointment of former Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an economic adviser to the Cambodian Government.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 2001 MoU was expressed to apply ‘without prejudice to the maritime claims
of either party.’374 It did not establish a management framework and is in effect an
agreement-to-agree on two matters: (1) joint development of hydrocarbon resources
located within a defined ‘Overlapping Claims Area’;375 and (2) delimitation of the
territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone in a defined ‘Area to be
delimited’.376 The 2001 MoU notes that the intent of the two States was to conduct
‘accelerated negotiation’ of these matters.377 With this goal in mind it provides
for the establishment of a ‘Joint Technical Committee’ that is responsible, inter
alia, for drawing up terms of the contemplated joint development and delimitation
agreements.378
As noted above, the 2001 MoU is essentially an agreement to agree concerning
provisional joint OCA management. It contains only general commitments to engage
in, and discuss the establishment of, cooperative management of the relevant OCA.
It did not specifically allocate functional components of coastal State jurisdiction
within the area concerned, and does not add clarity to the general and ambiguous
provisions of international law concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction
within OCAs.

Gulf of Thailand’ Hogaku Shimpo [The Chuo Law Review], CIX, no. 5-6 (March 2003) 253; See
also Clive Schofield, ‘Unlocking the Seabed Resources of the Gulf of Thailand’ (August 2007)
29(2) Contemporary Southeast Asia 286; Clive Schofield and M Tan-Mullins, ‘Claims, Conflicts
and Cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand’ (2008) Ocean Yearbook 22.
373
A press-release issued by the Cambodian government following Thailand’s decision is available
at <http://www.un.int/cambodia/Bulletin_Files/Nov09/Thailand_cannot_cancel.pdf>.
374
2001 MoU, Article 5. Per the first sentence of Article 5, the without prejudice clause is (naturally)
‘[s]ubject to entry into force of the delimitation of the Parties’ respective maritime claims ...’
375
2001 MoU, Article 2(a).
376
2001 MoU, Article 2(b). Notwithstanding its designation, the latter area remained an OCA in
substance. For further discussion and an illustrative map of the two Areas, see Colson and
Smith, Volume V, above n on page 16, 3735–3744.
377
2001 MoU, Article 2, which goes on to note that the two matters are to be treated as ‘an
indivisble package’.
378
2001 MoU, Articles 3 and 4.

173

Figure 3.23: Overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand. Source: Schofield et al,
note 7 on page 5.
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3.6.4 Cambodia – Vietnam
Background:
Cambodia and Vietnam assert overlapping claims to zones of national jurisdiction
projected from their adjacent coasts in the Gulf of Thailand.379 In 1982 both States
concluded an agreement380 (1982 Agreement) that is primarily focused on the
integration of the two States’ straight baseline systems and resolution of territorial
sovereignty disputes concerning several islands.381
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 1982 Agreement also establishes an area of ‘historical waters of the two countries placed under the juridical regime of their internal waters.’382 (Joint Historic
Waters Area or JHWA). As shown in Figure 3.23, the JHWA extends seaward
from points located on the mainland coastlines of the two States out to the vicinity
of the Poulo Wei group of islands (to the north-west) and the Tho Chu islands (to
the south-east).383 Several States have issued diplomatic protests in response to the
establishment of the JHWA and the associated baseline designations by Cambodia
and Vietnam.384
The 1982 Agreement specifies that negotiations concerning the establishment of a
maritime boundary in the JHWA are to take place ‘at a suitable time’.385 Article
3 of the Agreement sets out general obligations concerning the management within
the JHWA of patrolling and surveillance, fishing practices and resource exploitation
more broadly. It provides as follows:
379

For further discussion and illustrative maps see Nguyen Hong Thao, above n on page 172.
Agreement on Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea, signed and entered into force 7 July
1982, reproduced at Charney and Alexander, Volume III, above n on page 16, 2364–2365.
381
For further discussion see Charney and Alexander, Volume III, above n on page 16, 2357–2365.
382
1982 Agreement, Article 1. See also ibid for an illustrative map.
383
Charney and Alexander, Volume III, above n on page 16, 2359.
384
One controversial feature of the 1982 Agreement is its provision for the designation of a midocean point connecting the baselines of both States: see Article 3. For further information
concerning diplomatic protests, in particular those issued by Thailand and the United States,
see: Roach and Smith, above n 52 on page 93, 39–40 and Schofield and Tan-Mullins (2008),
above n 372 on page 173, 91–92.
385
1982 Agreement, Article 2.
380
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Patrolling and surveillance in these territorial waters will be jointly conducted by the two sides. The local populations will continue to conduct
their fishing operations and the catch of other sea products in this zone
according to the habits that have existed so far. The exploitation of
natural resources in this zone will be decided by common agreement.
The extent to which the above provisions have been implemented is unclear. McDorman noted in 1998 that ‘government upheaval within Cambodia has led to nonimplementation of many of the cooperative aspects of the agreement and uncertainty
over the status of the agreement.’386
The 1982 Agreement contains only general commitments to engage in and discuss
the establishment of cooperative OCA management. It does not specifically allocate
functional components of coastal State jurisdiction within the JHWA. However, it is
perhaps arguable that the JHWA falls for the purposes of the 1982 Agreement under
the concurrent (and functionally comprehensive) internal waters jurisdiction of the
Parties. The existence of concurrent internal waters jurisdiction within the JHWA
arguably represents an commitment by each State to assert jurisdiction there, subject to contrary provisions of the 1982 Agreement, on a unilateral and functionally
comprehensive basis.

386

Ted McDorman in Charney and Alexander, Volume III, above n on page 16, 2361.
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3.6.5 Cooperative frameworks in the South China Sea387
Background:
The term ‘South China Sea’ (Nan-Hai / ‘South Sea’ in Chinese) is generally used to
refer to the large marginal sea partially enclosed by the coasts of Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.
The precise geographic limits of the South China Sea are ill-defined and contested.388
This thesis employs the 1953 definition adopted by the International Hydrographic
Organisation (IHO) which includes the Gulf of Tonkin and excludes the Gulf of
Thailand.389
The South China Sea is subject to a complex patchwork of overlapping claims to
maritime zones of national jurisdiction asserted by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, PRC, the Republic of China/Taiwan (Taiwan) and Vietnam.390
387

See generally, Tara Davenport et al, Conference Report: Joint Development and the South China
Sea (2011), available at <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/publications/cil-reports/>. Note also that, in
addition to practice in the South China Sea proper, PRC and Vietnam have concluded an
agreement (signed on 25 December 2000) and supplementary protocol (signed 29 April 2004)
concerning fisheries management in the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf. The initial fisheries agreement was negotiated in parallel with the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf boundary delimitation
agreement, (also signed on 25 December 2000). Given the existence of the boundary delimitation, these cooperative arrangements will not be discussed further. Interested readers may refer
to Yunjun Yu and Yongtong Mu, ‘The new institutional arrangements for fisheries management
in Beibu Gulf’ (2005) Marine Policy 1 and Nguyen Hong Thao, ‘Maritime Delimitation and
Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf’ (2005) 34 Ocean Development and International Law
41.
388
Rahman and Tsamenyi, above n 78 on page 21.
389
See IHO, Limits of Oceans and Seas (3rd edition, 1953) 30-31. The 1953 IHO definition corresponds roughly with authoritative definitions in Chinese publications: Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu,
‘Semi-enclosed Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS
Article 123 to the South China Sea’ (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International Law 281.
390
Several maritime jurisdictional claims justified by reference to historic title, and several continental shelf claims that include insular features, have attracted diplomatic protest given their
apparent lack of basis in the LOSC. Concerning maritime jurisdictional claims: there has
been considerable debate concerning the claims of PRC and the Republic of China and the
so-called ‘U-shaped line’ associated with those claims. Further, a number of straight baseline
designations by the claimants have attracted diplomatic protest. Concerning continental shelf
claims: Brunei’s continental shelf claim incorporates Louisa Reef – a feature which remains
above water at high tide. Similarly, Malaysian claims to sovereignty over the southern part
of the Spratly archipelago appear to rely on the fact that the features in question are located
within the claimed area of continental shelf. For further discussion see Davenport et al, above
n 387. See also Robert Smith, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea: Potentiality and
Challenges’ (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International Law 214; Nguyen Hong Thao and
Ramses Amer, ‘Managing Vietnam’s Boundary Disputes’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development and
International Law 305; Clive Schofield, ‘A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?’ (October
2000) Janes Intelligence Review, available at < http://www.southchinasea.org/>. Note also
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Further, all of these claimants bar Indonesia assert competing claims to territorial
sovereignty over some or all of the insular features located in the South China Sea.391
Figure 3.24 depicts the spatial locations of various insular features, maritime claims,
and maritime limits (actual and notional) in the South Sea. The ‘dashed lines’
are promulgated by PRC / Taiwan and the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) box is
promulgated by the Philippines.392
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Establishing provisional management frameworks in the South China Sea has proved
difficult given the highly complex physical geography of the region, heightened diplomatic tensions, the presence of multiple territorial and jurisdictional claims, and the
inter-linkage between these claims and the fundamental strategic interests of the
multiple claimant States.393 There have been many negotiations and political discussions concerning joint and provisional management of the South China Sea394
that, following the 2008 judgment of the ICJ confirming Singaporean sovereignty over Pedra
Branca (a small insular feature located to the far south west of the South China Sea), Singapore
is also entitled to assert jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea. For further discussion see
Robert Beckman and Clive Schofield, ‘Moving Beyond Disputes Over Island Sovereignty: ICJ
Decision Sets Stage for Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Singapore Strait’, 40 Ocean
Development and International Law 1 (2009) 11–17.
391
Ibid. The South China Sea contains more than 200 insular features, including small islands, sand
cays and drying reefs: John McManus, Kwang-Tsao Shao, and Szu-Yin Lin, ‘Toward Establishing a Spratly Islands International Marine Peace Park: Ecological Importance and Supportive
Collaborative Activities with an Emphasis on the Role of Taiwan’ (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International Law 270. Most features are situated within four major archipelagos: the
Pratas Islands (Dongsha in Chinese), Paracel Islands (Xisha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha),
and the Spratly Islands (Nansha). Many of these features do not remain above water at high
tide – for example only around 36 of the 170-plus features in the Spratly Islands archipelago are
known to rise above high tide elevation: Daniel Dzurek, ‘The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s
on First?’ (1996) 2(1) Maritime Briefing 1. Many features have not been accurately surveyed.
392
The dashed lines and KIG box are, at the time of writing, generally understood to indicate not
the limits of maritime claims, but rather features over which the respective claimants assert
territorial sovereignty.
393
For further discussion see Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea’ (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International
Law 315.
394
A notable example is the series of informal workshops – conducted between 1989 and 2001/2
– entitled ‘Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea’. Several officials from the
relevant claimant States and policy experts participated in their personal capacity. The workshops were supported financially by the Canadian and Indonesian Governments. The central
aim of the workshops was to foster constructive dialogue and identify and develop opportunities for maritime co-operation between the claimants. Areas of discussion included: marine
scientific research, marine environmental protection, safety of navigation and communication,
resource assessment and means of development, and legal matters. For the further details see:
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Figure 3.24: Overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Source: Andi Arsana and
Clive Schofield, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and
Security
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and various models for cooperative management of the region have been proposed
by academics and policy experts.395
The South China Sea claimants have signed several non-binding documents that
represent initial steps toward the provisional joint management of South China
Sea OCAs. In 1995, PRC and the Philippines issued a ‘Joint Statement on the
South China Sea and Other Areas of Cooperation.’396 Also in 1995, the Philippines
Zou Keyuan, ‘Joint Development in the South China Sea: A New Approach’ (2006) 21 The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 83.
395
For an overview see Peter Kien-Hong Yu, ‘Setting Up International (Adversary) Regimes in
the South China Sea: Analyzing the Obstacles from a Chinese Perspective’ (2007) 38 Ocean
Development and International Law 147. Some noteworthy proposals and associated criticisms
include the following:
• BA Hamzah (a Malaysian scholar) has advocated the development of a joint development
model analogous to the Antarctic Treaty System, involving a ‘freezing’ of claims and the
development of models focused primarily on resource management: BA Hamzah, ‘The
Spratlys: What Can be Done to Enhance Confidence in Fishing in Troubled Waters’, eds
RD Hill, Norman G Owen, and EV Roberts (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991) 320–347. Detractors have highlighted the reluctance of claimant
countries to abandon their claims, even temporarily: See, eg, Kien-Hong Yu, cited above in
this footnote.
• Ambassador Hasjim Djalal (Indonesia) has informally proposed a so-called ‘doughnut hole’
method – in which each claimant country projects and an EEZ from coastal baselines and
delimits overlaps by negotiation of median lines. The result would be a ‘doughnut hole’
in the centre of the South China Sea that would be reserved for common use. Naturally,
the proposal has been criticized as being disadvantageous for the PRC and Taiwan and
for encouraging the competitive maximization of coastal claims: See David Denoon and
Steven Brams, ‘Fair Division: A new Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy’ (1997)
2 International Negotiation 320.
• David Denoon and Steven Brams have proposed a novel procedure in which claimants are
provided with a number of ‘points’ which are used to ‘buy’ groups of insular features and/or
maritime spaces in the South China Sea. The authors acknowledge that their proposed
mechanism may be undermined if claimants manipulate the system by making ‘purchasing’
decisions in a strategic manner after discovering the point allocations of other claimants:
Denoon and Brams, cited above in this footnote, 326.
• Mark Valencia has proposed the establishment of a ‘Spratlys Development Authority’ and
the allocation to the PRC/Taiwan of a 51 percent share of resource development proceeds.
PRC/Taiwan would waive their historic claims in exchange: Mark Valencia, ‘China and the
South China Sea Disputes’ (1995) Adelphi Paper no. 298. See also Valencia et al, above
n 88 on page 28.
• Other scholars have advocated the designation of a marine park encompassing the Spratly
archipelago: See, eg, John McManus, Kwang-Tsao and Shao Szu-Yin Lin, ‘Toward establishing a Spratly Islands International Marine Peace Park: Ecological Importance and Supportive Collaborative Activities with an Emphasis on the Role of Taiwan (2010) 41 Ocean
Development and International Law 270.
396

For further discussion and a reproduction of the text, see Nguyen Hong Thao, ‘Vietnam and
the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development and International
Law 125.
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and Vietnam concluded a joint agreement containing ‘basic principles for a code
of conduct in the contested areas’ in which both States committed to ‘search for a
fundamental and long-term solution to the disputes relating to sovereignty over the
Spratly ... [Islands].’397
Between 1999 and 2002, a series of diplomatic incidents and small-scale military
confrontations in the South China Sea motivated efforts to improve diplomatic relations between the claimant States and develop a regional framework for dispute
management. China was initially resistant to efforts initiated within the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to develop a regional consensus concerning
inter-State relations in the South China Sea.398
However, on 4 November 2002 China and the ASEAN member States reached an
agreement, signing a ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’
(2002 Declaration) at the eighth ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh.399 The 2002
Declaration contains four preambular statements and ten articles reflecting a nonbinding agreement to reduce diplomatic tensions and improve cooperation between
the claimants. It reiterates support for the principles set out in the LOSC and other
norms of international law concerning peaceful relations and dispute settlement.
Article 5 of the 2002 Declaration provides in part:
The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and
stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on
the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features
and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.

397

For further discussion see ibid and Peter Kien-Hong Yu, above n 395 on the preceding page.
Schofield notes the following: ‘A key problem from the Chinese perspective was that the Code was
intended to effectively freeze the status quo. As far as Beijing was concerned this would, to some
extent, legitimise what it regards as the other claimants’ illegal occupation of Chinese territory.
China’s position remains that it alone has ’indisputable sovereignty’ over the Spratly Islands
and that the South China Sea has been "China’s territory since ancient times" . . . Moreover,
China has steadfastly refused to discuss the dispute in a multilateral forum, instead offering
negotiations on a strictly bilateral basis, on the basis that ‘internationalising’ the dispute would
only complicate it.’: Schofield, above n 390 on page 177.
399
The declaration is available online at <http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>. For further discussion, see Nguyen Hong Thao, ‘The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea: A Note’ (2003) 34 Ocean Development and International Law 282.
398
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Article 6 of the 2002 Declaration reflects in-principle support for cooperative management of the South China Sea and contemplates the establishment of provisional
cooperative frameworks that correspond in general terms with the functional components of jurisdiction attributed to coastal States in the LOSC. It provides as
follows:
Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the
Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These
may include the following:
a. marine environment protection
b. marine scientific research
c. safety of navigation and communication at sea
d. search and rescue operation; and
e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking
in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal trafficking
in arms.
The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior
to their actual implementation.
The 2002 Declaration has been supplemented by several functionally specific cooperative arrangements, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.
• Exploration for hydrocarbon resources: On 11 November 2003, State oil companies from PRC and the Phillipines established through letters of intent an
agreement to conduct joint exploration for oil and gas in the South China Sea
and joint assessment of the area’s oil and gas potential.400 There is also a
subsequent agreement concerning joint seismic work.401 A 2004 Joint Communique issued by the two States ‘emphasises the importance of maintaining
peace and stability in the South China Sea and continuing the discussion of
‘joint development.’402 On 14 March 2005, the Philippines, PRC and Vietnam
400

See Zou Keyuan, above n 394 on page 180.
Ibid.
402
Ibid. See also ‘The Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines’, People’s Daily (in Chinese) (4 September
2004) 3.
401
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Figure 3.25: Philippines – PRC – Vietnam: Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking
Agreement Area. Source: Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield, Australian
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security
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signed a ‘Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the
Agreement Area in the South China Sea’.403 This agreement was never meaningfully implemented and lapsed in 2008.404 Key barriers to implementation
of the Agreement were the large (around 140,000 square kilometers) area of
cooperation it established (see Figure 3.25) and the overlap of this area with
jurisdictional claims advanced by other claimant States.405 In April 1998, the
Chinese Petroleum Corporation (from Taiwan) and China Offshore Oil Corporation (from PRC) approved an agreement concerning the exploration of
areas claimed by PRC/Taiwan (i.e. the Tainan Basin and Zhaoshan sunken
area).406 A subsequent joint venture agreement was concluded in 2003.407
• Marine living resources management and environmental protection: There is
no overarching cooperative framework with clear competence concerning living
marine resources in the South China Sea.408
• Joint marine scientific expeditions: These have been undertaken by the Philippines and Vietnam.409 PRC has responded by expressing concern and reiterating the commitments set out in the 2002 Code of Conduct.410
• Joint patrolling and military exercises: PRC and the Philippines have conducted joint search and rescue exercises in the South China Sea.411 The PRC
and Vietnamese navies have conducted joint patrol exercises in the Gulf of

403

See Nguyen Hong Thao and Ramses Amer, ‘A New Legal Arrangement for the South China
Sea,’ (2009) 40 Ocean Development and International Law 339.
404
See Schofield et al, above n 7 on page 5.
405
See Smith, above n 390 on page 177 and Nguyen Hong Thao and Ramses Amer, above n 403.
406
Zou Keyuan, above n 394 on page 180 and US Energy Information Administration, ‘Taiwan’,
Country Analysis Briefs, available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/taiwan.html>.
407
Ibid.
408
However, the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, which was established in 1948 and operates
under the auspices of the FAO, provides a framework for consultation and performs advisory
functions: See relevant section of the FAO Website at <www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/apfic/en>.
Note also the cooperative frameworks established by PRC and Vietnam concerning fisheries
management in the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf, discussed above n 387 on page 177.
409
See Nguyen Hong Thao and Amer, above n 390 on page 177.
410
Ibid.
411
Peter Kien-Hong Yu, above n 395 on page 180.
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Tonkin/Beibu Gulf, implementing provisions of a 2000 delimitation agreement
concerning the Gulf of Tonkin.412
Provisional joint management frameworks concerning the South China Sea display
various functional gaps. The 2002 Code of Conduct contains only general commitments to engage in, and discuss the establishment of, cooperative management of
the relevant OCA. It does not specifically allocate functional components of coastal
State jurisdiction within the area concerned and does not add clarity to the general
and ambiguous provisions of international law concerning the exercise of coastal
State jurisdiction within OCAs. The surveyed bilateral and trilateral cooperative
arrangements concerning the South China Sea are focused on specific functional
contexts. Cooperation in other functional contexts is not explicitly enabled or contemplated. Further, the surveyed bilateral and trilateral cooperative arrangements
have included all South China Sea claimants. Consequently they do not provide for
the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction by all parties asserting claims to all or part
of their area of application. In such circumstances, ambiguities of the international
legal framework concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs
continue to impact upon relations between all relevant claimant coastal States and
management of the relevant OCA.

3.6.6 Indonesia – Malaysia
Background:
Indonesia and Malaysia assert overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction in the
Celebes Sea (see Figure 3.26).413 The two States also formerly asserted competing
sovereignty claims to two small islands (Ligitan and Sipadan) located in the Celebes

412
413

Ibid. For discussion of the delimitation agreement see above n 387 on page 177.
See Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, ‘Undelimited maritime boundaries of the Asian Rim in
the Pacific Ocean’ (2001) 3(1) IBRU Maritime Briefing, 38–40. See also Prescott and Schofield,
above n 57 on page 16.
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Figure 3.26: Indonesia – Malaysia: Celebes Sea and notional equidistance line.
Source: Adapted from Prescott and Schofield, note 57 on page 16.
sea.414 The competing sovereignty claims were resolved by a 2002 Judgment of the
ICJ, which awarded sovereignty over both islands to Malaysia.415
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Following the Court’s decision both States have agreed, as a provisional management
measure, to conduct coordinated patrols in the waters surrounding the islands.416
This agreement is functionally limited to the context of maritime security and enforcement. Implementation within the relevant OCA of other functional components
of coastal State jurisdiction is not explicitly enabled or contemplated.

414

See David Colson, ‘Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia)’
(2003) 97 The American Journal of International Law 398.
415
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment of 17 December 2002 [2002] ICJ Rep 625.
416
See Anderson, above n 129 on page 113, 414; and Report of the UN Secretary General on Oceans
and the Law of the Sea (2004) UN Doc. A/59/62, [27].
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3.6.7 Malaysia – Thailand
Background:
Malaysia and Thailand assert overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims projected from their adjacent coasts in the Gulf of Thailand.417 In 1979 both States
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding418 (1979 MoU) concerning the exploitation of sea-bed resources in a defined ‘Joint Development Area’ characterised as coextensive with the continental shelf OCA claimed by both States (see
Figure 3.23 on page 174).419
The most seaward part of the Joint Development Area is also subject to a continental
shelf claim asserted by Vietnam.420 The resulting trilateral OCA is addressed briefly
in a 1997 delimitation agreement concluded by Thailand and Vietnam, which provides that its Parties ‘shall enter into negotiation with the Government of Malaysia
... in order to settle the tripartite overlapping continental shelf claim area.’421 As
417

Both States reached agreement concerning their territorial sea boundaries in the Gulf
of Thailand and Straits of Malacca in 1979: Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia Relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two
Countries, signed 24 October 1979, entered into force 15 July 1982, available at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/T
HA-MYS1979TS.PDF>. Note also that the continental shelf boundary between the two States
in the Gulf of Thailand has been partially defined: Memorandum of Understanding between
the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary
between the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, signed 24 October 1979, entered into force
15 July 1982, text published in Charney and Alexander, Volume I, above n 57 on page 16,
1105–1107. For further discussion and illustrative maps see Charney and Alexander, Volume
I, above n 57 on page 16 1091–1098, 1099–1123.
418
Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia
on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploration of the Resources
of the Sea-Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, signed 21 February 1979.
Text available at <
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/TH
A-MYS1979CS.PDF>.
419
1979 MoU, Preamble and Article 1. Curiously, the area in question is defined twice – first in the
preamble and Article 1 as the ‘overlapping area’, and subsequently in Article III as the ‘joint
development area’.
420
For an illustrative map see Nguyen Hong Thao, above n 370 on page 172.
421
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries between the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 9 August 1997 (entered into force 28 February 1998), Article 2.
Text available at <
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/TH
A-VNM1997MB.PDF>. For further discussion of the Agreement see Charney and Smith,
Volume IV, above n 57 on page 16 2692–2694.
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far as the author is aware, no trilateral agreement concerning overlapping claims in
the Joint Development Area has been concluded to date.422
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The 1979 MoU provides for the establishment of a ‘Joint Authority’ that is empowered to ‘assume all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both Parties for the
exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and
subsoil’ in the Joint Development Area.423 It also provides for the equal sharing
of ‘all costs incurred and benefits derived from activities carried out’ in the Joint
Development Area.424 The Joint Authority is permitted to exercise its rights and
responsibilities for a period of fifty years, or indefinitely in the event that no delimitation agreement is reached within that period.425 Both States are obliged to
continue their efforts to effect delimitation of the Joint Development Area.426 Disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the 1979 MoU are to be
settled ‘peacefully by consultation or negotiation’ between the two States.427
Although the 1979 MoU is primarily focused on the cooperative exercise of coastal
State competencies relating to the exploitation of seabed hydrocarbon resources,
there are several articles concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in
other functional contexts. Article IV(1) of the 1979 MoU recognises several concurrent functional competencies of both States within the Joint Development Area,
providing as follows:
The rights conferred or exercised by the national authority of either
Party in matters of fishing, navigation, hydrographic and oceanographic
surveys, the prevention and control of marine pollution and other similar
matters (including all powers of enforcement in relation thereto) shall
extend to the joint development area and such rights shall be recognised
and respected by the Joint Authority.
422

See also Schofield and Tan-Mullins, above n 372 on page 173, 112–113.
1979 MoU, Article III. The Joint Authority is comprised of an equal number of representatives
from each State and is conferred ‘all the powers necessary for, incidental to or connected with
the discharge of its functions ...’.
424
1979 MoU, Article III(5).
425
1979 MoU, Articles III(1), VI.
426
1979 MoU, Article II.
427
1979 MoU, Article VII.
423
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Article IV(2) of the 1979 addresses maritime security issues in general terms, requiring both parties to ‘have a combined and coordinated security arrangement’ in the
Joint Development Area. Article V of the 1979 MoU defines two separate sub-areas
of criminal jurisdiction (one for Malaysia and one for Thailand) that apply without
prejudice to the sovereign rights or negotiating positions of both States.
In order to implement the 1979 agreement, a supplemental agreement was required
to address complex operational, administrative and regulatory issues associated with
hydrocarbon development and the establishment of the Joint Authority. Following
several years of negotiations, taking place in the context of various domestic political obstacles, the supplemental agreement428 was concluded in May 1990. The
supplemental agreement is now operational, with offshore hydrocarbon resources
being discovered and exploited.429
The 1979 MoU and 1990 supplemental agreement contain provisions allocating
coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional contexts. They specify the terms on which Malaysia and
Thailand are to implement within the relevant OCA all of the functional components of their coastal State jurisdiction. However, they do not contain provisions
concerning the assertion of coastal State jurisdiction by Vietnam in the parts of
the Joint Development Area claimed by that State. Accordingly, ambiguities of
the international legal framework concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs continue to impact upon the part of the Joint Development Area
claimed by Vietnam, in which no petroleum development has been undertaken. In
428

Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom
of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters Relating to the Establishment
of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, signed 30 May 1990, reproduced in Charney and Alexander, Volume I, above n 57 on page 16, 1111–1123 and available at
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/il/pdf/1990%20Agreement%20between%20Malaysia%20and%20Th
ailand%20on%20the%20MTJA-pdf.pdf>. Milligan and Schofield, above n 1 on page 35, note
that ‘[t]he long pause between the two agreements has been ascribed to a number of factors,
including changes in the governments of both countries that undermined the political will for
joint development. Additionally, bilateral disputes arose in relation to fisheries, the parties’
differing approaches to managing offshore rights, and commercial issues concerning previouslygranted Thai concessions. Ultimately these difficulties were overcome and commercially viable
oil and gas field have been discovered within the JDA’ See also Schofield, above n 372 on
page 173 and Schofield and Tan-Mullins, above n 372 on page 173.
429
See Schofield, 372 on page 173.
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1999 Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia reached an in-principle agreement concerning
management of the relevant sub-area of the OCA. However this agreement does not
appear to have evolved into a more concrete OCA management framework.430

3.6.8 Malaysia – Vietnam
Background:
Malaysia and Vietnam assert overlapping claims to zones of national jurisdiction
in the Gulf of Thailand.431 In 1992 both States concluded a memorandum of understanding432 (1992 MoU) concerning development of hydrocarbon resources in a
long, narrow ‘Defined Area’ subject to their overlapping continental shelf claims (see
Figure 3.23 on page 174). A key factor motivating negotiations was the discovery
of potentially viable hydrocarbon deposits by Malaysian contractors.433
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
The Defined Area is located in the south-eastern part of the Gulf of Thailand and,
per Article 1 of the 1992 MoU, is acknowledged to be coextensive with the continental
shelf OCA claimed by both States.
The 1992 MoU applies, without prejudice to maritime claims of the Parties,434 for a
period of 40 years (subject to review and extensions).435 It establishes a minimalist
framework for the joint development of seabed petroleum deposits: Two nominated
State-owned corporations (Petronas from Malaysia and PetroVietnam from Vietnam) are to enter into a commercial arrangement to explore and exploit petroleum
430

See Davenport, above n 313 on page 158, who notes that further progress may have been limited
by Vietnam’s insistence on a three-way split of revenue from the entire Joint Development Area,
as opposed to the small tripartite OCA.
431
For further discussion and illustrative maps see Nguyen Hong Thao, above n 370 on page 172.
432
Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for
the Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf
Involving the Two Countries, signed on 5 June 1992, entered into force 4 June 1993. For
further discussion and the text of the Memorandum see Charney and Alexander, Volume III,
above n 57 on page 16, 2335–2344.
433
Schofield, above n 372 on page 173.
434
1992 MoU, Article 4.
435
Schofield, above n 58 on page 16. See also 1992 MoU, Article 5.
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resources in the Defined Area.436 The 1992 MoU also requires the Parties to arrive
at mutually acceptable terms for development of petroleum fields that are identified
to be partly located in the Defined area.437 The MoU is at present being actively
implemented, with discovered deposits in the Defined Area being developed on a
cooperative basis.438
The 1992 MoU is functionally limited to the context of non-living marine resource
development. Implementation within the relevant OCA of other functional components of coastal State jurisdiction is not explicitly enabled or contemplated.

3.7 Polar Regions
3.7.1 Norway – Russia
Background:
In September 2010, after four decades of negotiations, Norway and Russia concluded
a Treaty439 (2010 Delimitation Treaty) finalising the delimitation of their respective claims to maritime jurisdiction in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean.440 Prior to
the conclusion of the 2010 Delimitation Treaty, both States engaged in cooperative
management of marine living resources within a defined ‘Grey Zone’ that incorporated parts of the Norwegian EEZ, Russian EEZ and an OCA subject to competing
436

1992 MoU, Article 3. Per Article 3(b), commercial arrangements between the two nominated
organisations are subject to the approval of both States. Schofield notes that ‘[i]n practical
terms, as Petronas had already issued production-sharing contracts for the overlapping area,
PetroVietnam agreed to a commercial arrangement whereby these existing contracts would
remain valid and petroleum operations would be directly managed by Petronas.’: Schofield,
above n 58 on page 16, 17.
437
1992 MoU, Article 2.
438
See Schofield and Tan-Mullins, 372 on page 173.
439
Treaty Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic
Ocean, signed 10 September 2010, entered into force 7 July 2011, available at
<www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/delelinje/avtalen.html?id=614006>.
English
translation available at <www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/campaign/delimitation/treaty.html?
id=614006>.
440
For further discussion see Tore Henriksen and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the
Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development and International Law 1. For
background see also Elferink, above n 315 on page 159.
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Figure 3.27: Norway – Russia: overlapping continental shelf claims before September
2010. Source: Stabrun, note 441.
EEZ claims and continental shelf entitlements asserted by both States (see Figures
3.27, 3.28, and 3.29).441
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Marine living resources management in the Grey Zone was conducted in accordance
with a short-term Agreement442 (1978 Fisheries Agreement) first concluded in
441

For further discussion see Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Maritime Management in Disputed
Areas: The Case of the Barents Sea (1992); and Kristoffer Stabrun, The Grey Zone Agreement of 1978: Fishery Concerns, Security Challenges and Territorial Interests, Fridtjof Nansen
Institute Report 13/2009.
442
Agreement Between Norway and the Soviet Union on a Temporary and Practical Arrangement
for the Fishery in an Adjacent Area of the Barents Sea, signed 11 January 1978, entered in
force 27 April 1978, Overenskomster med fremmede stater (1978), 436. For further discussion
see Churchill and Ulfstein, above n 441.
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Figure 3.28: Norway – Russia: overlapping EEZ claims before September 2010.
Source: Stabrun, note 441 on the preceding page.
1978 and renewed on an annual basis thereafter.443 The 1978 Fisheries Agreement
permitted each Party to exercise jurisdiction within the Grey Zone over (1) fishing
vessels flying its flag and (2) vessels flying the flag of third States granted access
to fish in the Zone under license.444 The 1978 Fisheries Agreement was designed to
complement Agreements concluded by Norway and the Soviet Union in 1975 and
1976,445 which establish a detailed bilateral framework of fisheries cooperation that
also applies to contiguous areas of non-overlapping jurisdiction.446

443

Henriksen and Ulfstein, above n 440 on page 191.
Ibid.
445
Agreement on Co-operation in the Fishing Industry Between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Norway, signed 11 April 1975, 983 UNTS 8; Agreement Concerning Mutual Relations in the
Field of Fisheries Between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Norway, signed 15 October
1976, 1157 UNTS 147.
446
See Churchill and Ulfstein, above n 441 on the previous page. For a brief overview of cooperation
undertaken pursuant to the Agreements, see Geir Honneland, ‘Norway and Russia in the Barents
Sea – Cooperation and Conflict in Fisheries Management’ (2007) 20 Russian Analytical Digest
9, available online at <http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=30693>.
444
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Figure 3.29: Norway – Russia: Grey Zone before September 2010. Source: Stabrun,
note 441 on page 192.
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In 1998 the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of a joint zone in order to
facilitate hydrocarbon development in continental shelf areas claimed by both States
(see Figure 3.27 on page 192).447 This proposal was rejected by Norway.448
Provisional joint management undertaken by Norway – Russia was functionally focused on marine living resources management. Implementation within the relevant
OCA of other functional components of coastal State jurisdiction was not explicitly
enabled or contemplated.

3.7.2 Canada – United States
Background:
In addition to the competing claims discussed in Chapters 3.2.1 on page 82 and 3.3.4
on page 116, Canada and the United States assert overlapping claims to a territorial
sea, continental shelf and EEZ in the Beaufort Sea (north of Alaska and the Yukon
Territory).449 The dimensions of the resulting OCA are depicted in Figure 3.30.
Design features of provisional joint management frameworks:
During the 1970s both States engaged in negotiations concerning the potential joint
development of hydrocarbon resources in this OCA.450 Both States have also undertaken joint hydrographic surveys in the area.451 McDorman notes that, at present,
‘Both Canada and the United States have adopted a policy of preventing drilling
or other hydrocarbon-related activity from taking place in the disputed area within
the Beaufort Sea.’452 As noted in Section 3.2.1, several government agencies from
each State cooperate closely within their field of operational responsibility and have
developed detailed cooperative management arrangements in this context.
447

Henriksen and Ulfstein, above n 440 on page 191; Churchill and Ulfstein, above n 441 on page 192,
68; Elferink, above n 315 on page 159, 185.
448
Ibid.
449
For further information and illustrative maps see Gray, above n 3 on page 82. See also McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 181–187..
450
McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 187–190.
451
Ibid, 182.
452
McDorman, Salt Water Neighbours, above n 2, 187.
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Figure 3.30: Canada – United States: overlapping claims in the Beaufort Sea.
Source: Gray, note 3 on page 82.
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Provisional joint management frameworks relating specifically to the Beaufort Sea
OCA are functionally focused on hydrocarbon development and associated scientific
research. They operate in tandem with various inter-agency cooperation frameworks
(see Chapters 3.2.1 and 3.3.4) to provide a functionally broad allocation of coastal
State jurisdiction within the Area.

3.7.3 Cooperative frameworks in Antarctic waters453
Background:
Maritime spaces surrounding the Antarctic continent are not commonly discussed
in the context of OCA management. They are, however, relevant to discuss given
the presence in Antarctic waters of both OCAs and frameworks that facilitate, inter
alia, the long-term provisional joint management of such areas.
At present seven States – Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway,
and the United Kingdom – have asserted territorial claims to parts of the Antarctic
continent or islands located south of 60 degrees south latitude.454 Claims asserted
by Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom overlap with one another.455 Further,
Antarctic territorial claims have not been recognised widely by non-claimant States
and have been actively protested by several States with an active presence in the
region (some of whom reserve the right to assert claims in the future).456 Territorial

453

Material in this sub-Chapter has been adapted from the author’s contribution to a previous
work: Gregory Rose and Ben Milligan, ‘Law for the management of Antarctic marine living
resources: from normative conflicts towards integrated governance?’ (2009) 20 Yearbook of
International Environmental Law 41.
454
For detailed information concerning these territorial claims, see William Bush, Antarctica and
International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National Documents, Volumes I–III (1982).
See also Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law (1996)
54–58; and Christopher Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Current
Legal Dilemmas (1980-1) 18 San Diego Law Review 415. A large portion of the Antarctic
continent – between longitudes 90 degrees west and 150 degrees west – remains unclaimed.
455
Ibid. For an illustrative map see Rose and Milligan, above n 453.
456
For example, the United States has refused to recognise any claims at all to the Antarctic
continent: Digest of United States Practice in International Law (1975) 107–111. Some states
advocate that the Antarctic continent and surrounding waters should be regarded as common
heritage of mankind: Moritaka Hayashi, ‘The Antarctic Question in the United Nations’ (1986)
19 Cornell International Law Journal 275.
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claims to the Antarctic continent and surrounding islands are depicted in Figure
3.31.
The seven States named above have also declared maritime zones of national jurisdiction that are projected from their Antarctic territorial claims.457 These claims,
which overlap in several locations a manner corresponding to the relevant underlying territorial claims, remain unrecognised or have been actively protested by other
States. Argentina,458 Australia,459 Chile460 and France461 have claimed both a territorial sea and an EEZ/fisheries zone adjacent to Antarctica. New Zealand,462

457

Note that despite having made such maritime claims, Antarctic baselines from which to measure
them have not yet been declared by most claimant States: Stuart Kaye and Donald Rothwell,
‘Southern Ocean Maritime Claims: Another Antarctic Challenge for the Law of the Sea?’
(2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law 359.
458
Note to the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union Asserting Argentine Jurisdiction
over Antarctica and Other Territories (14 September 1927), reprinted in Bush, Volume I, above
n 454 on the preceding page, 584–585; Law no. 17,094 (29 November 1966) and several other
enactments discussed in Bush, Volume II, above n 454 on the previous page, 72.
459
In relation to the territorial sea claim, see Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) Section 6.
It was extended from three to twelve nautical miles in 1990. See Commonwealth of Australia
Gazette (13 November 1990) no. S 297 (Australia), reprinted in (1992) 13 Australian Yearbook of International Law 278. The extension to twelve nautical miles did not attract specific
international protest. See Brian Opeskin and Donald Rothwell, ‘Australia’s Territorial Sea:
International and Federal Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles’ (1991) 22 Ocean Development and International Law 395, 402. In relation to the EEZ claim adjacent to the Australian
Antarctic territory, see Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). See also Seas and
Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) sections 10A and 11, claiming a continental shelf adjacent
to the Australian Antarctic territory; and Andrew Serdy, ‘Towards Certainty of Seabed Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Territorial Sea Baseline: Australia’s Submission
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’ (2005) 36 Ocean Development and
International Law 201 (2005).
460
Presidential Declaration over Continental Shelf and Seas Adjacent to the Coasts (23 June 1947)
discussed in Bush, Volume II, above n 454 on the preceding page, 448–449. Note also Chilean
claims to a ‘mar presencial’ (presential sea): Paul Kibel, ‘Alone at Sea: Chile’s Presencial
Ocean Policy’ (2000) 12 Journal of Environmental Law 43.
461
Law no. 66–400 Concerning Marine Fishing and the Exploitation of the Produce of the Sea
in French Southern and Antarctic Lands (18 June 1966), reprinted in Bush, Volume II, above
n 454 on the previous page, 551–555; and Order no. 5 Promulgating Legislation Concerning
the Delimitation of the French Territorial Sea (13 January 1972), reprinted in Bush, Volume
II, above n 454 on the preceding page, 579–580; Law no. 76–755 of 16 July 1976 Relating to
the Economic Zone off the Coasts of the Territories of the Republic and Decree no. 78–144 of 3
Feburary 1978, creating an EEZ off the coasts of the French Southern and Antarctic Territories,
available at <http://www.un.org/ Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/index.htm>.
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Parliamentary Statement Concerning Jurisdiction over the Territorial Sea of the Ross Dependency (23 September 1977), reprinted in Bush, Volume III, above n 454 on the previous page.
See also the discussion in Rothwell, above n 454 on the preceding page, 276–277. Section 9(3)
of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 specifically provides for the declaration of an EEZ within the Ross Dependency. No such declaration has occurred: LexisNexis,
Laws of New Zealand (2004), Antarctica, [16].
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Norway463 and the United Kingdom464 have declared a territorial sea but not an
EEZ/fisheries zone adjacent to Antarctica.465 All of the territorial claimant States
have claimed, or cited their entitlement to, coastal State rights over continental shelf
areas adjacent to the Antarctic continent.466 EEZ claims (actual and notional) to
Antarctic waters are depicted in Figure 3.32.
Design features and analysis of functional coverage:
Antarctica and its surrounding waters are currently managed on a cooperative basis
in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), which consists of the 1959
Antarctic Treaty467 ; 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals
(CAS Convention);468 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CAMLR Convention)469 , Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol)470 . The Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities was adopted in 1988 but never entered into
force.471
The following paragraphs discuss some relevant provisions of the Antarctic Treaty,
CAMLR Convention and Madrid Protocol. The CAS Convention is not discussed,
given the absence since 1964 of commercial sealing in Antarctica.472 Design fea463

Act no. 57 of June 2003 Relating to Norway’s Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone, reprinted
in United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
54 Law of the Sea Bulletin (2004) 97.
464
See, e.g., British Note to Chile Providing Information South Concerning British Claims to Certain Territory (23 May 1914), reprinted in Bush, Volume II, above n 454 on page 197, 304–305.
465
For further details see Rothwell, above n 454 on page 197, 276–282.
466
Note that the territorial claimant States have also presented submissions to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf that either (1) incorporate claims to an extended continental
shelf projected from the Antarctic continent or (2) include clear reservations relating to their
Antarctic claims. See United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (30 October 2009),
available at <http://www.un.org/ Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm>; and
Karen Scott, ‘Managing Sovereignty and Jurisdictional Disputes in the Antarctic: The Next
Fifty Years’ (2009) 20 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 1.
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Antarctic Treaty, signed 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961, 402 UNTS 71.
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Signed 11 February 1972, entered into force 11 March 1978, 1080 UNTS 175.
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Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources, signed 20 May 1980,
entered into force 7 April 1982, 1329 UNTS 47.
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Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, signed 4 October 1991, entered
into force 14 January 1998, 30 ILM 1455.
471
For further discussion see Rothwell, above n 454 on page 197.
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See United States Department of State, Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty Sytem (9th ed, 2002)
326, available at <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/ant/>.
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Figure 3.31: Territorial claims to the Antarctic continent and surrounding islands.
Source: Rose and Milligan, note 453 on page 197.
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Figure 3.32: The CAMLR Convention and EEZ claims (actual and notional) to
Antarctic waters. Source: Rose and Milligan, note 453 on page 197.
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tures of the ATS may be distinguished from other OCA management frameworks
on a three grounds that are explained in further detail below. First, the ATS is a
truly multilateral management framework with corresponding institutional frameworks that differ significantly from other surveyed frameworks that involve a much
smaller number of States Parties. Second, spatial coverage of the CAMLR Convention includes both OCAs, non-disputed zones of national jurisdiction, and maritime
spaces that are unambiguously high seas. Third, the ATS is one of four surveyed
frameworks that reflect a policy objective to undertake cooperative management
of a defined area on an indefinite basis without limitation (see Chapter (4.3.5) for
further discussion).
The Antarctic Treaty:
Sovereignty disputes and concerns regarding the strategic, economic and scientific
significance of the Antarctic region prompted a series of negotiations during the
1940s and 1950s culminating with the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.473
The Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961 after ratification by the twelve
states participants in the negotiations, including all states claiming sovereignty over
territories on the Antarctic continent.474
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty defines its area of application as follows:
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of
60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the
present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the
exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard
to the high seas within that area.
Within this area, the Antarctic Treaty establishes a cooperative management framework based on several objectives – the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes,475
freedom of scientific investigation,476 international scientific cooperation,477 pro473

See Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty Sytem, above n 472 on page 199. See also Rothwell,
above n 454 on page 197, 63–71.
474
As of 27 February 2010, forty-eight countries are party to the Antarctic Treaty. See the Secretariat website at <http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e>.
475
Antarctic Treaty, Article I.
476
Antarctic Treaty, Article II.
477
Antarctic Treaty, Article III.
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hibition of nuclear activity,478 and the setting aside of disputes over territorial
sovereignty. The focal point of cooperative activities is the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, which is empowered to develop binding and non-binding measures
concerning implementation of the Antarctic Treaty and the furtherance of its objectives.479 A large number of such measures have been adopted since the Treaty’s
entry into force.480 The Antarctic Treaty also contains robust rights of inspection,
enabling certain Parties to designate observers having freedom of access to ‘[a]ll areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those
areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel’.481 Contracting Parties are also required to provide each other with advance
notice of a broad range of specified activities undertaken in Antarctica.482
The issue of territorial sovereignty is addressed in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,
which contains language that simultaneously prohibits the expansion of territorial
claims but stipulates that its provisions are to be interpreted without prejudice to
existing territorial claims. It provides as follows:
2. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
a) renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously
asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica;
b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party
of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
478

Antarctic Treaty, Article V.
See Antarctic Treaty, Article IX. For further discussion see Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty
Sytem, above n 472 on page 199 and Rothwell, above n 454 on page 197.
480
These recommendations are published online at <http://www.ats.aq/devAS/info_measures_list
.aspx>.
481
Antarctic Treaty, Article VII.
482
Antarctic Treaty, Article VII(5). The specified activities are: ‘all expeditions to and within
Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in
or proceeding from its territory; all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and any
military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the
conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty [concerning the use of
Antarctica for peaceful purposes].’
479
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c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as
regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other
State’s rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica.
3. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty
is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the
present Treaty is in force.
The Antarctic Treaty does not contain specific provisions concerning the assertion
of national jurisdiction in Antarctic waters on the basis of territorial claims to the
Antarctic continent.483 There has been considerable academic debate concerning
whether, in light of the prohibitions set out in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,
a state claiming Antarctic territory is entitled to regard itself as a coastal State
under the LOSC and to assert maritime jurisdiction consistent with the Antarctic
Treaty.484 The LOSC does not contain specific provisions concerning the Antarctic
Treaty. However, LOSC Article 311(2) preserves the rights and obligations in other
agreements provided they are compatible with the convention and ‘do not affect the
enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations’ under the LOSC.485 To date, States claiming maritime zones within the area
of application of the Antarctic Treaty have sought to reconcile their implementation
of parallel rights and obligations under the ATS and the LOSC by refraining from
taking steps to enforce or consolidate their claims to maritime zones against third
parties.486
483

Note however, Article VIII, establishing nationality-based jurisdiction over persons located in
Antarctica.
484
See, eg, Joyner, above n 485; Bernard Oxman, ‘Antarctica and the New Law of the Sea’ (1986)
19 Cornell Journal of International Law 211; M. Peterson, ‘Antarctic Implications of the New
Law of the Sea’ (1986) 16 Ocean Development and International Law 137.
485
See Christopher Joyner, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System and the Law of the Sea: Competing
Regimes in the Southern Ocean?’ (1995) 10 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal
Law 301; Ruth Davis, ‘Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The HSI Litigation’ (2007) 8
Melbourne Journal of International Law 142.
486
For example, each of these states has requested that the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf not consider their claims to an extended continental shelf projected from the
Antarctic continent. National legislation of the territorial claimant States is generally drafted
to defer in express terms to international instruments or specifically exclude jurisdiction over
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Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty establishes a consent-based dispute settlement
mechanism, providing as follows:
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties
concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty,
those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a
view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the
International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach
agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve
parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek
to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article.
The CAMLR Convention:
The CAMLR Convention establishes a framework for the exploitation of marine
living resources that places a strong emphasis on conservation objectives.487 In
contrast to the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol, the Convention’s area of
application extends beyond 60 degrees South latitude to a line approximating the
Antarctic convergence (see Figure 3.32).488
foreign nationals in order to minimise the potential to provoke a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of international law: See, e.g., Law no. 24,922 of 12 January 1998,
Chapter II, Article 4 (Argentina); Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura 1991, Article 1 (Chile);
Antarctic Act 1994 (United Kingdom) Part III; and the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth,
Australia), section 8. In relation to Australian legislation, see also Warwick Gullett and Clive
Schofield, ‘Pushing the Limits of the Law of the Sea Convention: Australian and French Cooperative Surveillance and Enforcement in the Southern Ocean’ (2007) 22 The International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 545. A notable exception to this deference to international
instruments is found in Section 225 of the 1999 Australian Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, which prohibits, inter alia, foreign persons and vessels from killing
or injuring whales in the EEZ projected from the Australian Antarctic Territory: See Stuart
Kaye and Donald Rothwell, ‘Australia’s Antarctic Maritime Claims and Boundaries’ (1995) 26
Ocean Development and International Law 195, 210–211; Joanna Mossop, ‘When Is a Whale
Sanctuary Not a Whale Sanctuary? Japanese Whaling in Australian Antarctic Maritime Zones’
(2005) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 43.
487
See Denzil Miller, Eugene Sabourenkov and David Ramm, ‘Managing Antarctic Marine Living
Resources: The CCAMLR Approach’ (2004) 19 The International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law 317; Erik Molenaar, ‘CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries’ (2001) 16 The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 465.
488
The coordinates of this line are defined in Article I(4) of the Convention. For an illustrative
map see Rose and Milligan, above n 453 on page 197. The Antarctic convergence (also referred
to as the Antarctic polar front) is the natural boundary zone where Antarctic surface waters
moving northward sink below sub-Antarctic waters: Keith Moore, Mark Abbott, and James
Richman, ‘Location and Dynamics of the Antarctic Polar Front from Satellite Sea Surface
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CAMLR Convention Article II(1) provides that ‘the objective of this Convention is
the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources’. To this end, the Convention
establishes a Commission of the Parties that is empowered, inter alia, to establish
binding measures regarding the conservation and management of marine living resources including measures permitting the harvesting of particular species.489 In
exercising this function, the Commission is required to take full account of recommendations and advice of a Scientific Committee of Commission Members.490 The
subject matter jurisdiction of the Convention in relation to marine mammals is
specifically limited by Article VI, which provides that nothing in the Convention
derogates from the rights and obligations of Parties to the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling491 and the 1972 CAS Convention.
CAMLR Convention Article XXV contains a dispute settlement mechanism that
is for the most part identical to the equivalent mechanism in the Antarctic Treaty.
However, it also permit parties to agree to resolve a dispute by recourse to an arbitral
tribunal constituted in accordance with an Annex to the Convention. Awards of the
arbitral tribunal are final and binding on all parties to a dispute.492
The Madrid Protocol:
The Madrid Protocol establishes a stringent system of environmental protection
within the area of application of the Antarctic Treaty.493 Article 2 of the Protocol
designates Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science and refers
to the commitment of the Parties to the ‘comprehensive protection of the AntarcTemperature Data’ (1999) 104 Journal of Geophysical Research 3059. Thus, the Convention’s
area of application attempts to approximate the natural boundary of the Antarctic large marine
ecosystem.
489
See CAMLR Convention, Article VII. Decisions of the Commission on matters of substance are
taken by consensus (Article XII) and are subject to ‘opt-out’ procedures (Article IV(6)).
490
See CAMLR Convention, Article IX(4). The composition and functions of the Scientific Committee are set out in Articles XIV - XVI.
491
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, signed 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS
72.
492
CCAMLR Convention, Annex for an Arbitral Tribunal, Article 5.
493
See Catherine Redgwell, ‘Environmental Protection in Antarctica: The 1991 Protocol’ (1994) 43
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 599; and Christopher Joyner, ‘The 1991 Madrid
Environmental Protection Protocol: Contributions to marine pollution law’ (1993) 20 Marine
Policy 183.
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tic environment.’494 The Protocol and its six associated Annexes set out detailed
obligations to plan and carry out activities so as to limit environmental impacts,
to conduct prior assessment of possible environmental impacts, and to undertake
regular and effective monitoring of the Antarctic environment.495
Several of the Protocol’s provisions relate specifically to the marine environment
and the management of marine living resources:
Annex II of the Protocol (Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora) prohibits the
taking of or harmful interference with flora and fauna except in accordance with a
permit granted only in relation to scientific or educational activities.496 Potential
conflicts between the Madrid Protocol and resource exploitation frameworks established by other instruments are addressed by specific limitations of the Protocol’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Article 4 provides that the Protocol does not modify or
amend the Antarctic Treaty, and does not derogate from ‘rights and obligations of
the Parties to this Protocol under the other international instruments in force within
the Antarctic Treaty system.’497 Accordingly, the restrictions set out in the Protocol
do not apply to the harvesting of fish undertaken in accordance with the CCAMLR
Convention or in accordance with high seas freedoms referred to in Article VI of the
Antarctic Treaty. The subject matter jurisdiction of Annex II regarding interactions
with marine mammals is limited by an express requirement that ‘nothing in the Annex shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Parties under the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.’498
Annex IV of the Protocol (Prevention of Marine Pollution) establishes, inter alia,
detailed restrictions on the discharge of oil, noxious liquids, garbage, sewage, and

494

Annex II (Conservation of Fauna and Flora) prohibits the taking of or harmful interference with
flora and fauna except in accordance with a permit granted only in relation to scientific or
educational activities.
495
Broad environmental management principles are set out in Madrid Protocol, Article 3
496
Madrid Protocol, Annex II, Articles 3(1) and 3(2). See also Madrid Protocol, Annex V (Area
protection and management).
497
Madrid Protocol, Article 4
498
Madrid Protocol, Annex II, Article 7.
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other substances from ships operating in the area of application of the Antarctic
Treaty.499
Annex V of the Madrid Protocol (Area Protection and Management) provides, inter
alia, for the designation of ‘any area, including any marine area’ as an Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) or an Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA).
The specified objective of ASPA designations is ‘to protect outstanding environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness values, any combination of those
values, or ongoing or planned scientific research.’500 The specified objective of ASMA
designations is to ‘assist in the planning and co-ordination of activities, avoid possible conflicts, improve co-operation between Parties or minimise environmental impacts.’501
Madrid Protocol Article 18 establishes consent-based dispute settlement procedures
supplemented by a limited procedure for compulsory and binding dispute settlement.
The provision calls for parties to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Protocol by peaceful means, including but not limited to negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.502 Where noncompulsory means fail to resolve the dispute, the Madrid Protocol Articles 19 and
20 provides for compulsory and binding dispute settlement by an Arbitral Tribunal
or, if the Parties have indicated such a preference in advance, by the International
Court of Justice. Madrid Protocol Article 20(1) limits the availability of compulsory procedures to specific subject matter, providing that compulsory procedures
are only available in relation to
. . . disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 7
[Prohibition of Mineral Resource Activities], 8 [Environmental Impact
Assessment] or 15 [Emergency Response Action] or, except to the extent
that an Annex provides otherwise, the provisions of any Annex or, insofar
as it relates to these Articles and provisions, Article 13 [Compliance with
this Protocol] . . .
499

See Madrid Protocol, Annex IV, Article 3-6.
Madrid Protocol, Annex V, Article 3.
501
Madrid Protocol, Annex V, Article 4.
502
Madrid Protocol, Article 18.
500
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Madrid Protocol Article 20(2) limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the relevant
dispute settlement forum by providing as follows:
The Arbitral Tribunal shall not be competent to decide or rule upon
any matter within the scope of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. In
addition, nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as conferring competence or jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice or any other
tribunal established for the purpose of settling disputes between Parties
to decide or otherwise rule upon any matter within the scope of Article
IV of the Antarctic Treaty.
Comment concerning functional coverage:
OCAs located within the Antarctic Treaty Area are subject to management measures
prescribed by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, CAMLR Commission of
the Parties, and the other cooperative management mechanisms mentioned above.
These cooperative management mechanisms are not specifically tailored to the objective of OCA management. Rather, OCA management is integrated into a broader
cooperative framework defined by reference to the 60 degree parallel and, in the case
of CAMLR, by reference to the approximate location of the Antarctic convergence
(and Antarctic large marine ecosystem). Claimant coastal States in practice assert
all functional components of their coastal State jurisdiction throughout Antarctic
waters in relation to their own nationals. Management of non-nationals is undertaken on a cooperative basis on the terms set out in ATS instruments. Operating
together, the constituent instruments of the Antarctic Treaty System thus contain
provisions impacting upon all functional components of coastal State jurisdiction
claimed in Antarctic waters.
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3.8 Conclusion: functional coverage of provisional
joint management frameworks
By supplementing the provisions of international law discussed in Chapter 2, the
varied State practice discussed in this Chapter represents an important step towards establishing a sound legal basis for the management of the world’s OCAs.
Many of the surveyed provisional joint management frameworks facilitate, or contemplate, further cooperation concerning the implementation within the relevant
OCA of functional components of coastal State jurisdiction set out in the LOSC. In
keeping with the established position of customary international law and common
paragraph 3 of LOSC Articles 74/83 (concerning delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf respectively), most frameworks are designed to avoid prejudice to the
legal positions of the claimant coastal States.503
However, the functional coverage of provisional joint management frameworks varies
greatly. Several frameworks may be characterised as functionally comprehensive, including the: Argentina – Uruguay 1973 Agreement concerning the Río de la Plata
(Chapter 3.3.2); Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement and the 1995 Protocol (Chapter 3.3.8); Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001
Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9); Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement
of 1990, in the parts of the joint development area not claimed by Vietnam (Chapter
3.6.7); Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1); Australia – East Timor
2002 Timor Sea Treaty and 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2); the Antarctic Treaty
System (Chapter 3.7.3).
As discussed in illustrated in detail the preceding sections of this Chapter, these
frameworks contain provisions allocating coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in a complete set of functional contexts. The claimant
coastal States are afforded a clear basis for implementing, within the relevant OCA,
503

This is achieved either expressly, through inclusion of a ‘without prejudice’ clause, or through
the conclusion of an agreement that is not legally binding.
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the components of their jurisdiction concerning: artificial structures, environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational safety and
resource exploitation. As discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.1, the allocation
of functional competence is achieved through the use of provisions that either (1)
establish cooperative mechanisms in a variety of specific functional contexts without addressing directly the issue of coastal State jurisdiction; or (2) allocate coastal
State jurisdiction to one or more of the claimant coastal States within the relevant
OCA or within defined sub-areas.
Other provisional joint management frameworks exhibit clear functional gaps that
may undermine the ability of claimant coastal States to engage in management of
the relevant OCA. The gaps and associated State practice may be loosely categorised
as follows:
Functionally limited allocation of competence:
State practice falling under this category includes the following: several of the
surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established between Canada – United
States (Chapters 3.2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.7.2);* the surveyed cooperative arrangements
established between El-Salvador – Honduras – Nicaragua concerning environmental management in the Gulf of Fonseca (Chapter 3.2.2); Denmark (Faroe Islands)
– United Kingdom 1999 Agreement (Chapter 3.3.6);* several of the surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established between Argentina – United Kingdom
concerning the Southern Atlantic Ocean (Chapter 3.3.1);* Trinidad and Tobago
– Venezuela 1977 and 1985 Fisheries Agreements (Chapter 3.3.10); Iran – United
Arab Emirates (Sharjah) 1971 MoU (Chapter 3.4.1); Saudi Arabia – Sudan 1974
Agreement concerning development of non-living continental shelf resources (Chapter 3.4.2); Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.5.2); Japan – Russia cooperative arrangements concerning
fisheries (Chapter 3.5.3); Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement; Japan – Republic of Korea
1998 Agreement; and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning fisheries
management in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5); several of the surveyed bilateral
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and trilateral cooperative arrangements concerning the South China Sea (Chapter
3.6.5); Indonesia – Malaysia cooperation concerning maritime enforcement (Chapter
3.6.6); Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.6.8); Norway – Russia 1978 Fisheries Agreement (Chapter 3.7.1).
These frameworks focus on the cooperative management of specific resources or the
cooperative exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in functionally specific contexts.
Cooperation in other functional contexts is either contemplated in very general
terms, not referred to, or deferred to subsequent agreement. Functional contexts
not addressed in these frameworks remain subject to relevant provisions of international law, which, as argued in Chapter 2, do not establish a detailed framework for
implementation within an OCA of coastal State jurisdiction.
However, it is important to note that the frameworks marked with an asterisk (*)
operate (or have in the past operated) in tandem with other functionally specific
frameworks, for the intended purpose of establishing a functionally broad management framework within the relevant OCA. For example: the United States and
Canada engage in cooperative management of their OCAs in accordance with a
complementary collection of international legal instruments, cooperative management arrangements developed by equivalent government agencies in each State, and
coordinated national policy-making. These frameworks exhibit functional gaps only
when viewed in isolation. Together they provide a functionally broad allocation of
coastal State competencies within the relevant OCA. The Denmark (Faroe Islands)
– United Kingdom 1999 Agreement is functionally focused on fisheries cooperation
in the Special Area and contains only general provisions concerning protection of
the marine environment. However, environmental management in the Special Area
is also subject to detailed provisions set out in the Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, to which both Denmark and
the United Kingdom are party.504
504

Note also 1999 Agreement, Article 6(a), which, as noted in Chapter 4.2.6, specifically defers to
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic.
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No allocation (or clear allocation) of functional competence:
State practice falling under this category includes the following: the condominium
/ co-ownership arrangement applicable to parts of the Gulf of Fonseca (Chapter
3.2.2);† 2004 Memorandum of Understanding concluded by Equatorial Guinea –
Gabon (Chapter 3.3.7); Cambodia – Thailand 2001 MoU (Chapter 3.6.3); Cambodia
– Vietnam 1982 Agreement (Chapter 3.6.4);† 2002 Declaration concerning the South
China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); Japan – PRC 2008 Cooperation Consensus concerning
the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.1).
These frameworks contain general commitments to engage in, or discuss the establishment of, cooperative management of an OCA but do not specifically allocate
functional components of coastal state jurisdiction within the area concerned. They
do not add clarity to the general and ambiguous provisions of international law
concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs.
The frameworks marked with a dagger (†) are special cases that could be categorised
differently. It is perhaps arguable that the Joint Historic Waters Area defined in the
Cambodia – Vietnam 1982 Agreement, which is described as being ‘placed under the
juridical regime of their internal waters’,505 falls for the purposes of that agreement
under the concurrent (and functionally comprehensive) jurisdiction of the Parties.
The existence of concurrent jurisdiction within the JHWA arguably represents a
commitment by each State to assert jurisdiction there, subject to contrary provisions of the 1982 Agreement, on a unilateral and functionally comprehensive basis.
Similarly, it is perhaps arguable that the condominium / co-ownership arrangement
that applies to certain waters of the Gulf of Fonseca entitles El-Salvador, Honduras
and Nicaragua to exercise jurisdiction within those waters on a concurrent, unilateral
and functionally comprehensive basis.506
No allocation of functional competence to certain claimants:
505
506

Cambodia – Vietnam 1982 Agreement, Article 3.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the presence of an agreement between the Parties may be
a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction within the relevant waters: for further discussion
see Chapter 4.1.2.
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State practice falling under this category includes the following: Barbados – Guyana
2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3);†† Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.5);††
Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement of 1990, in the parts
of the joint development area claimed by Vietnam (Chapter 3.6.7);†† several of
the surveyed bilateral and trilateral cooperative arrangements concerning the South
China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement; Japan – Republic of
Korea 1998 Agreement; and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning
fisheries management in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5).
These frameworks allocate certain functional competencies to the relevant parties,
but do not provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by other coastal States507 asserting
claims to all of part of the relevant OCA. In such circumstances, ambiguities of the
international legal framework concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction
within OCAs continue to impact upon relations between all claimant coastal States
and management of the relevant OCA. The frameworks marked with a double dagger
(††) could be characterised as functionally comprehensive if they involved of all of
the relevant claimant States: each framework contains detailed provisions allocating
coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction to its States parties in a complete set
of functional contexts.
No allocation of functional competence concerning non-claimant States:
This is a peculiar feature of the Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement; Japan – Republic of
Korea 1998 Agreement; and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning
fisheries management in the East China Sea. As noted in Chapter 4.4.5, these
instruments allocate jurisdiction on an inter-se basis only and do not provide a
clear basis for the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction against vessels flagged to
third States (or the ROC).
Drawing on State practice identified and critiqued in this Chapter, the next Chapter
will formulate legal and policy options for provisional joint OCA management.
507

And in the case of the aforementioned East China Sea fisheries agreements, to ROC.
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4 Legal and policy options for
managing overlapping claim areas
4.1 Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 have examined provisions of international law concerning the
assertion of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs, the impact of these provisions
on OCA management, and the development by several coastal States of supplemental
legal and policy frameworks concerning the provisional joint management of such
spaces.
Drawing on the responses developed in those Chapters, this Chapter proposes detailed legal and policy options for the provisional joint management of OCAs. The
proposed options are intended to fulfill two aims: First, they are intended to inform
the future negotiation of provisional joint management frameworks. Accordingly,
each proposed option is accompanied by explanatory commentary, suggested legal
drafting, and detailed cross-references to representative examples of State practice
discussed in Chapter 3. Secondly, the proposed options are intended to facilitate the
functionally comprehensive management of OCAs by the relevant claimant coastal
States. They offer potential avenues towards ‘filling’ the functional gaps identified in
Chapter 3 by enabling the collective implementation within OCAs of all functional
components of coastal State jurisdiction.
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The author’s intention is to be helpfully suggestive rather than prescriptive – in deference to the fact that functional gaps in provisional joint management frameworks
often arise from compelling political and strategic factors that impede further cooperation concerning the management of OCAs. Indeed the survey in Chapter 3 suggests that the presence of sufficient political will, and a stable bilateral relationship,
are critical factors influencing the establishment of OCA management frameworks,
and endurance of those frameworks in the medium and long term.1 While discussing
State practice concerning the joint development of petroleum resources (including
in OCAs), Townsend-Gault and Stormont make the relevant observation that:
A joint development arrangement is not a mechanical process, but rather
a highly complex and complicated result of a series of dealings between
the countries concerned over a range of issues, some of which may have
little or nothing to do with the ostensible subject of the exercise. It
should not be suggested lightly, and cannot take the place of any true
mutuality of understanding between two States. In other words, the conclusion of any form of joint development arrangement, in the absence of
the appropriate level of consent between the parties, is merely redrafting
the problem and possible complicating it further.2
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses methods for achieving the objective of functionally comprehensive OCA management.
Sections 4.3 – 4.10 recommend different design features of a prospective provisional
joint management framework that are consistent with that objective, and analyse
key strengths and weaknesses of specific design features common to several of OCA
management frameworks identified in Chapter 3. Taking into account the significance of political factors, particular attention will be devoted to assessing the merits
of different design features in different general political contexts.

1

This observation is commonly made. See, eg: Davenport, above n 313 on page 158; and Schofield
and Tan-Mullins, above n 372 on page 173.
2
Ian Townsend-Gault and William Stormont, ‘Offshore Petroleum Joint Development Arrangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation?’ in Gerald Blake et al (eds), The
Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources (1995) 53.
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4.2 Achieving functionally comprehensive OCA
management
Within an OCA, how can the claimant coastal States collectively implement all functional components of coastal State jurisdiction attributed to them by the LOSC?
Given the ambiguities in the international legal framework discussed above in Chapter 2 on page 35, functionally comprehensive management of an OCA can only be
achieved through development of a provisional joint management framework having
the following two characteristics:
• Comprehensive participation: The framework must involve all of the relevant
claimant coastal States;
• Comprehensive allocation of functional competence: The framework must enable each of the claimant coastal States to clearly identify the circumstances
(and locations) in which they are entitled (or not entitled) to implement all
LOSC rights and obligations concerning: artificial structures, environmental
protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational safety
and resource exploitation.

4.2.1 Variety of options and selection methodology
There is enormous scope for calibrating a provisional joint management framework to
suit the specific circumstances of claimant coastal States in a manner that remains
consistent with the above characteristics. Drawing on examples of State practice
discussed in Chapter 3 (and the author’s critical assessment of best practice) the
remaining Sections of this Chapter will canvas several legal and policy options that
are consistent with the objective of functionally comprehensive management. The
following design features of a prospective provisional joint management framework
will be addressed: duration of the framework; spatial coverage of the framework; interaction of the framework with existing jurisdictional claims; choice of constituent
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instrument(s); mechanism for allocating jurisdiction; mechanism for allocating resources and revenues; institutional aspects of cooperation; and dispute settlement
procedures. Each of these features have been selected on the basis that they are a
recurrent element of multiple provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in
Chapter 3. They also represent domains in which negotiators have developed varying solutions to a common issue or similar cluster of issues associated with OCA
management.

4.3 Duration of the framework
Claimant coastal States should determine the operative time-period of a provisional
joint management framework or its component parts. There are a wide variety of
factors that may influence the choice to engage in provisional joint management of
an OCA for a particular length of time, including: the nature of planned resource
exploitation, progress (if any) of delimitation negotiations, and national politics in
the claimant coastal States. The provisional joint management frameworks surveyed
in Chapter 3 employ a variety of methods to define their duration. The following
paragraphs discuss a selection of these methods and provide representative drafting
where relevant.

4.3.1 Termination upon boundary delimitation
Several frameworks link their operative time-period with the progress of maritime
delimitation negotiations; i.e. the framework or certain subcomponents continue
to apply until a maritime boundary has been established by the claimant coastal
States. A basis for provisional joint management is therefore maintained for the
remaining duration of the OCA. Representative drafting can be found in Article
12(2) of the Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3), which provides as
follows:

218

This Treaty shall remain in force until an international maritime boundary delimitation agreement is concluded between the Parties.
See also the Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.5) and Cambodia –
Vietnam 1982 Agreement (Chapter 3.6.4), which both contain specific obligations
that apply pending delimitation of a maritime boundary in the relevant OCA. The
various cooperative measures referred to in Article 3 of the Cambodia – Vietnam
1982 Agreement are expressed to apply ‘pending the settlement of the maritime
border between the two States in the historical waters mentioned in Article 1 ...’
Article 3(1) of the Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty provides as follows:
Pending the determination of the jurisdictional limits of each Party in
the area designated below, the Parties agree to establish therein a zone
of joint management, control, exploration and exploitation of the living
and non-living resources, hereafter called ‘The Joint Regime Area’ ....

4.3.2 Termination connected with resource exploitation
Article 12 of the Australia – East Timor 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2), which is
quoted below, permits either State to terminate the Treaty if certain activities concerning hydrocarbon development have not taken place within a specified timeframe.
See also Article XXXI(4) of the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.5.2), which requires the Parties to consult
on whether to revise or terminate the Agreement if either Party ‘recognises that
natural resources are no longer economically exploitable in the Joint Development
Zone’.
Provisions of this nature enable claimant coastal States to terminate a framework
that has demonstrably failed to encourage certain forms of resource development
within an OCA. Such provisions are attractive because they offer a degree of flexibility to claimant coastal States, enabling them to explore alternative approaches
to resource management. The specific provisions quoted in the previous paragraph
are, however, problematic because the legal basis for all functional aspects of OCA
management (i.e. the entire Treaty or Agreement) may be terminated if resource
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exploitation activities cease or do not proceed. A preferable approach (to achieve
functionally comprehensive OCA management) is to narrow the scope of termination provisions connected with resource exploitation, allowing unrelated aspects of
the cooperative management framework to continue.

4.3.3 Longer numeric term
Several frameworks, in particular those designed to facilitate hydrocarbon development, apply for specified time period of 20 years or more. A longer numeric term
provides protection and encouragement for the high levels of new financial investment associated with such development. Most of the frameworks having a longer
numeric term also contain provisions that enable (1) the continued operation of the
framework after the numeric term has expired, or (2) termination of the framework
before the numeric term has expired. Representative drafting can be found in Article
XXXI of the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning hydrocarbon
development (Chapter 3.5.2), which provides in part as follows:
2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of fifty years and
shall continue in force thereafter until terminated in accordance
with paragraph 3 of this article.
3. Either Party may, by giving three years’ written notice to the other
Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial fifty-year
period or at any time thereafter.
See also the: Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management Cooperation Agreement
(Chapter 3.3.8), which applies for an ‘automatically renewable’ term of 20 years;3
and the Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.6.8) which applies for a term of 40 years subject to review and extensions.4
Review and extension provisions are desirable because they enable claimant coastal
States to flexibly adapt the modalities of cooperation in response to current circumstances, or periodically continue a framework that is operating successfully.

3
4

Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management Cooperation Agreement, Article 8.
Schofield, above n 58 on page 16. See also 1992 MoU, Article 5.
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4.3.4 Shorter numeric term
Several of the surveyed frameworks, in particular those focused on marine living resources management, apply for specified time period of five years or less. Exploitation of marine living resources is generally less investment-intensive than hydrocarbon development and is less likely to be discouraged or undermined by a shorter
numeric term. Frameworks falling under this category are generally intended to be
renewed by the claimant coastal States on a regular basis. Representative drafting
can be found in Article 14 of the Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement concerning fisheries management in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5), which provides in part as
follows:
1. ... This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years,
and shall continue in force thereafter subject to termination in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
2. Either Contracting Party may terminate this Agreement at any
time on or after the date of expiration of an initial period of five
years by giving six months’ written notice to the other Contracting
Party.
See also the: Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela 1977 and 1985 Fisheries Agreements (Chapter 3.3.10); Japan – Russia cooperative arrangements concerning fisheries (Chapter 3.5.3); Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement concerning fisheries
management in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5), which applies for an initial period of three years and thereafter until six months from provision of notice by either
Party;5 PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning fisheries management
in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5), which applies for an initial term of five years
and thereafter until one year from provision of notice by either Party;6 several of
the surveyed bilateral and trilateral cooperative arrangements concerning the South
China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); and the Norway – Russia 1978 Fisheries Agreement
(Chapter 3.7.1).

5
6

Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement, Article 16.
PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement, Article 16.
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A potential disadvantage of shorter numeric terms is that they leave management
frameworks vulnerable to political discretion and short-term political imperatives.
Such factors are often not conducive to effective long-term sustainable management
of maritime space (including the deployment of marine spatial planning).

4.3.5 Indefinite duration
Several frameworks do not define their operative time-period, reflecting an intention
to engage in cooperative management of an OCA on an indefinite basis. An indefinite
operative time-period can be used to further two contrasting policy objectives. The
first objective is management of an OCA on a long-term basis without limitation.
The second is to provide the claimant coastal States with complete discretion to
terminate the framework at any time.
Frameworks where the first objective is prevalent include the: Argentina – Uruguay
1973 Agreement concerning the Río de la Plata (Chapter 3.3.2); Denmark (Faroe
Islands) – United Kingdom 1999 Agreement (Chapter 3.3.6); Saudi Arabia – Sudan
1974 Agreement concerning development of non-living continental shelf resources
(Chapter 3.4.2); and Antarctic Treaty System instruments (Chapter 3.7.3), which
entitle certain Parties to withdraw if the instrument in question has been amended
without their consent.7
Frameworks where the second objective is prevalent include the: Japan – PRC
2008 Cooperation Consensus concerning the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.1); several of the surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established between Canada
– United States (Chapters 3.2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.7.2); several of the surveyed bilateral
cooperative arrangements established between Argentina – United Kingdom concerning the Southern Atlantic Ocean (Chapter 3.3.1); Iran – United Arab Emirates
(Sharjah) 1971 MoU (Chapter 3.4.1); 2002 Declaration concerning the South China

7

See Antarctic Treaty, Article XII; CAMLR Convention, Articles XXX and XXXI; Madrid Protocol, Article 24.
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Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); and Indonesia – Malaysia cooperation concerning maritime
enforcement (see 3.6.6).

4.3.6 Hybrid methods
Several frameworks use a combination of the methods discussed above. See for
example the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1), which is expressed
to apply for an initial period of 40 years, subsequent periods of 20 years unless
the Parties otherwise agree, or until a permanent continental shelf boundary is
established in the area covered by the Zone of Cooperation.8 Similar language can
be found in Article VI of the Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU (Chapter 3.6.7).
Several frameworks also use different methods to define the operative time-period
of different sub-components of the framework. A representative example is the Australia – East Timor 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2). Article 12 of the 2006 CMATS
establishes a long numeric term, an indefinite operative time-period for certain provisions, and permits either State to terminate the Treaty if certain activities concerning hydrocarbon development have not taken place within a specified timeframe.
It provides in part as follows:
Period of this Treaty
1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, this Treaty shall
remain in force until the date 50 years after its entry into force,
or until the date five years after the exploitation of the Unit Area
ceases, whichever occurs earlier.
2. If:
a) a development plan for the Unit Area has not been approved in
accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Sunrise IUA
within six years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty;
or
b) production of petroleum from the Unit Area has not commenced within ten years after the date of entry into force of
this Treaty;
either Party may notify the other Party in writing that it
wishes to terminate this Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall
8

Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty, Article 12.
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cease to be in force three calendar months after such notice is
given.
3. Should petroleum production take place in the Unit Area subsequent to the termination of this Treaty pursuant to paragraph 2 of
this Article, all the terms of this Treaty shall come back into force
and operate from the date of commencement of production.
4. The following provisions of this Treaty shall survive termination of
this Treaty, and the Parties shall continue to be bound by them
after termination: ......
5. The period of this Treaty referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article
may be extended by agreement in writing between the Parties.
Note also the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9), which
applies for a term of 45 years and can be terminated if certain categories of dispute arise between its Parties.9 Article 51(3) of the 2001 Treaty provides for the
continued operation of certain provisions in order to protect the commercial interests associated with hydrocarbon development in the Joint Development Zone. It
provides as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, the expiry or other termination of this Treaty
shall not affect development contracts with an expiry date after such
expiry or other termination and the provisions of this Treaty shall remain in force for the sole purpose of administering such contracts and
maintaining the joint development regime to the extent necessary. On
the expiry or earlier termination of the last remaining such contract the
outstanding provisions of this Treaty shall terminate forthwith.
This approach is particularly useful for claimant coastal States who lack sufficient
resources to engage in resource exploration activities and wish to provide additional
certainty to external private investors without committing themselves to a longer
term of cooperation in other functional contexts. Ultimately, the method for defining
the duration of a framework should seek to strike a balance between the demands
of the various political and resource development factors discussed above. Hybrid
approaches may prove useful when these different demands become too difficult to
reconcile. A risk associated with complex or vaguely drafted hybrid approaches is
that they may generate uncertainty and expectation gaps regarding the extent of
the Parties’ time commitment to cooperative OCA management.
9

Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty, Articles 51–52.
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4.4 Spatial coverage of the framework
Claimant coastal States should identify the maritime spaces in which a provisional
joint management framework applies. Ideally, the spatial coverage of a provisional
joint management framework should extend throughout the relevant OCA – a lack
of spatial coverage in certain locations would have adverse management implications
for those locations (see Chapter 2.6).10
It is important to note that the spatial limits of an OCA may be disputed by the
relevant claimant coastal States. This situation arises when coastal State A asserts
that coastal State B has no legal entitlement to assert a claim in a particular location
claimed by coastal State A (or vice versa). For example, coastal State A might assert
that baselines defined by coastal State B are inconsistent with the LOSC.11 Another
example is where coastal State A asserts that an insular feature claimed by coastal
State B is not capable of generating the maritime zones projected from that feature
by coastal State B.12 Alternatively, coastal State A might assert that coastal State
B does not have sovereignty over a relevant insular feature (and vice versa). Where
the spatial limits of an OCA are disputed, claimant coastal States are advised to
reach agreement concerning (1) the location of those limits, or (2) the limits of a
subset of the OCA in which all claimant coastal States are prepared to acknowledge
the legal legitimacy of each others’ claims.13 In practice, negotiations concerning the
spatial limits of an OCA are often closely connected with negotiations concerning
provisional joint management of the OCA.
10

Note also that claimant coastal States frequently do not claim the full extent of their respective
maritime zones. Instead they only claim waters located landward of what they assert to be
the correct course of the maritime boundary. In such circumstances, and assuming that all
claimant coastal States agree that their respective claims are consistent with the LOSC, the
limits of the OCA are defined by the competing asserted locations of the maritime boundary.
11
For further discussion concerning relevant provisions of the LOSC, see Churchill and Lowe, above
n 10 on page 7, 31–59.
12
For further discussion of relevant LOSC provisions, in particular LOSC Article 121, see ibid,
48–52.
13
Of course, acceptance of OCA limits by the claimant coastal States does remove the possibility
that third States will accept the basis on which those limits of the claimants’ national jurisdiction are defined. See for example, the Cambodia – Vietnam 1982 Agreement (Chapter 3.6.4),
for which several States have issued diplomatic protests in response to the establishment of the
JHWA and the associated baseline designations by Cambodia and Vietnam.
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Commentators have observed that there is a degree of correlation in current State
practice between clearly defined OCA limits and the subsequent implementation of
a stable provisional joint management framework.14 For example: The Malaysia –
Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement of 1990 (Chapter 3.6.7) were preceded by Thailand’s unilateral declaration of its continental shelf limit in the 1970s,
and by map issued by Malaysia in 1979 defining the limit of its continental shelf
and territorial sea.15 Similar observations could be made for the majority of provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3. There is also a degree
of correlation between the presence of territorial sovereignty disputes (complicating
spatial characterisation the OCA), and limited progress towards establishment and
sustained implementation of provisional joint OCA management. See for example
the progress of cooperation between: Argentina – United Kingdom concerning the
Southern Atlantic Ocean (Chapter 3.3.1); the various claimants to parts of the South
China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); Iran – United Arab Emirates (Sharjah) concerning the
Persian Gulf (Chapter 3.4.1); Equatorial Guinea – Gabon regarding the Corisco
Bay (Chapter 3.3.7); and Japan – PRC regarding continental shelf resources in the
East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.1). The significant counter example is the sustained
cooperative management of Antarctica and surrounding waters under the Antarctic
Treaty System (Chapter 3.7.3). A clearly characterised OCA may provide claimant
coastal States with a tangible basis for making the trade-offs and compromises that
are necessary ingredients of a successful OCA management framework.
The provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 employ a variety of methods to define their spatial coverage and/or the spatial limits of the
relevant OCA. The following paragraphs discuss a selection of these methods and
provide representative drafting where relevant.

14
15

See, eg, Davenport, above n 313 on page 158.
Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mogn Razil, and Kamaruzan Jusoff, ‘Malaysia’s Policy towards
its 1963–2008 Territorial Disputes,’ (2009) 1(5) Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 107.
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4.4.1 Geographic coordinates (zonal management)
Most frameworks define geographic coordinates of a zone in which the claimant
States engage in provisional joint management. Article 4 of the Denmark (Faroe
Islands) – United Kingdom 1999 Agreement (Chapter 3.3.6), contains a simple representative example of this method. It provides as follows:
1. In the area between points L and R listed in Schedule B, the Special
Area, each Party is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction and rights
in accordance with the provisions of articles 5, 6 and 7 [concerning
cooperative management of the Special Area].
2. The Special Area is described by the coordinates in Schedule C
to this Agreement and, by way of illustration, drawn on chart C
annexed to this Agreement.
Article 3 of the Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty contains more complex representative drafting that defines the limits of a zone by reference to both straight lines
and arcs. It provides in part as follows:
a. The Joint Regime Area is established by the closed figure described
by the lines joining the following points in the order in which they
occur. The lines so joining the listed points are geodesic lines unless
specifically stated otherwise.
POINT

LATITUDE (North)

...........

................................

LONGITUDE (West)
..................................

The limit of the Joint Regime Area then continues along the arc
of 12 nautical miles radius centred on a point at 15° 47’ 50"N, 79°
51’ 20"W, such that it passes to the West of Serranilla Cays to a
point at 15° 58’ 40"N, 79° 56’ 40"W. The figure is then closed by
the geodesic line to point 1.
b. The Joint Regime Area excludes the maritime area around the cays
of Serranilla Bank comprised with-in the outermost arc of the Circle
of 12 nautical miles radius centred at a point 15° 47’ 50"N, 79° 51’
20"W, such that it passes through points 15° 46’ 00"N, 80o 03’ 55"W
and 15o 58’ 40"N, 79° 56’ 40"W.
c. The Joint Regime Area will also exclude the maritime area around
the cays of Bajo Nuevo comprised within the outermost arc of the
circle of 12 nautical miles radius centred at the point 15° 51’ 00"N,
78° 38’ 00"W.
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See also: Article 1 of the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement (Chapter 3.3.8), which defines a wedge-shaped area bounded by two
azimuths;16 Article 2 of the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9); Article II of the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning
hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.5.2); relevant provisions of the Japan – PRC
1997 Agreement, Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement, and PRC – Republic
of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning fisheries management in the East China Sea
(Chapter 3.5.5); Article 1 of the Cambodia – Vietnam 1982 Agreement (Chapter
3.6.4); Article 2 of the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1); Article 3
of the Australia – East Timor 2002 Timor Sea Treaty, Article 1 of the 2006 CMATS
(Chapter 3.6.2); and Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty (Chapter 3.7.3), which defines its spatial jurisdiction by reference to a parallel of latitude. When formulating
provisions that define the spatial coverage of a provisional joint management framework, coastal States are advised to rely on geotechnical advice in order to avoid
mistakes such as a failure to specify the datum associated with specified points of
latitude and longitude.17
Note also that several frameworks expressly mention that the spatial coverage of
the provisional joint management framework is coextensive with agreed limits of
the relevant OCA. Article 2 of the Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3)
is a representative example of this approach. It provides as follows:

16

Article 1 of the 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement provides as follows: ‘The parties hereto shall jointly exploit a maritime zone situated between the 268° and 220° azimuths
drawn from Cape Roxo; The respective territorial seas of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal shall be
excluded from this joint exploitation zone ...’. This drafting does not clearly define the seaward
limit of the maritime zone, which as noted above, assumedly would be the outer limit of the
States’ respective maritime claims. The following language is preferable: In accordance with
international law, the parties hereto shall jointly exploit a maritime zone, which is situated
between the 268° and 220° azimuths drawn from Cape Roxo and extends seaward to the limit
of maritime zones claimed by either party.
17
For a useful collection of relevant technical advice, see: International Hydrographic Organisation,
Manual on Technical Aspects of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (4th ed, 2006)
available at <http://www.iho.int/>.
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The Geographical Extent of the Co-operation Zone
1. The Parties agree that the Co-operation Zone is the area of bilateral
overlap between the exclusive economic zones encompassed within
each of their outer limits measured to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured, and beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic
zones of other States at a distance of 200 nautical miles measured
from the baselines from which their territorial sea is measured. For
the purposes of this Treaty, the term “exclusive economic zone” and
its legal regime shall have the meaning ascribed to them in Part V
of the [LOS] Convention.
2. The precise geographical extent of the Co-operation Zone is defined
in Annex 1 to this Treaty.
3. The Parties contemplate that they may, by agreement at a later
date, delimit an international boundary between them.
Other provisions linking the spatial coverage of a provisional joint management
framework with agreed limits of an OCA include: Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the
Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.6.8);
Article 1 of the Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU (Chapter 3.6.7); and The Iran –
United Arab Emirates (Sharjah) 1971 MoU (Chapter 3.4.1), which contains provisions concerning cooperation within a 12 mile territorial sea projected from island
of Abu Massa (claimed by both States). As noted above, a significant advantage of
provisions of this nature is that they enable spatially comprehensive removal of the
jurisdictional uncertainties (and adverse management implications) associated with
overlapping claims. A trend evident in the State practice surveyed in Chapter 3 is
that where the claimant coastal States have established some form of provisional
framework in a subset of the OCA, remaining uncertainties and tensions associated
with the area as a whole (or political tensions not specifically related to the OCA)
have significantly undermined implementation of the framework. See for example
the: Cambodia – Thailand 2001 MoU (Chapter 3.6.3); surveyed bilateral and trilateral cooperative arrangements concerning the South China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); and
Japan – PRC 2008 Cooperation Consensus concerning the East China Sea (Chapter
3.5.1).
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4.4.2 Specific coordinates (provisional maritime boundary)
Claimant coastal States can simply specify coordinates of a line that delimits the
relevant OCA on a provisional basis. This approach is not widely used. As noted
above (Chapter 3.5.3), Japan and Russia have reportedly established a provisional
maritime boundary for the purposes of fisheries management in waters surrounding
the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands.
Provisional maritime boundaries provide a high degree of jurisdictional certainty,
which is conducive to effective OCA management. However, in practical terms
they may be difficult to negotiate – competing diplomatic and political positions
concerning the final location of a maritime boundary can be readily deployed during
negotiations of a provisional boundary. Furthermore, a provisional boundary may in
practical terms be difficult to depart from or modify at a later date, as management
practices, domestic laws, and the behaviour of nationals from both claimant coastal
States become progressively entrenched.
As a matter of international law, establishment of a provisional maritime boundary
need not, and is unlikely to, prejudice the legal positions of claimants States concerning the proper course of a final maritime boundary. Please refer to Chapter 4.5
for further discussion of this issue.

4.4.3 Geophysical characteristics
Several frameworks define their spatial coverage and/or the spatial limits of the
relevant OCA by reference to local geophysical or biogeoraphic characteristics. This
approach can be considered a subset of the approach discussed in Chapter 4.4.4
below. For a representative example of State practice see the Saudi Arabia – Sudan
1974 Agreement, discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.4.2, establishes a framework
for cooperative management of an area of sea-bed lying between the two States’
respective coasts and seaward of the 1,000 metre isobath. Article I of the CAMLR
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Convention refers to the Antarctic Convergence, which represents a biogeographic
boundary between Antarctic and sub-Antarctic ecosystems. It provides as follows:
1. This Convention applies to the Antarctic marine living resources of
the area south of 60° South latitude and to the Antarctic marine
living resources of the area between that latitude and the Antarctic
Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem.
...
4. The Antarctic Convergence shall be deemed to be a line joining the
following points along parallels of latitude and meridians longitude:
....
Note that in order to maintain precision and clarity, the location of the Antarctic Convergence is approximated by specific coordinates. See also the Argentina –
Uruguay 1971 Agreement (Chapter 3.3.2), which establishes, inter alia, cooperative
provisions concerning the maritime area located landward of a closing line drawn
across the mouth of the Río de la Plata. An advantage of using geophysical or biogeographic characteristics to define spatial coverage is that a meaningful relationship
can be established between the OCA management framework and the principle object of management – namely, the inter-related components of the regional marine
environment.

4.4.4 No relation between spatial coverage and OCA
Claimant coastal States may wish to integrate management of an OCA into cooperative frameworks concerning that apply within a broader area. See for example several
of the surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established between Canada –
United States (Chapters 3.2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.7.2). As noted above, several government
agencies from each of these States cooperate closely within their field of operational
responsibility and have developed detailed cooperative management arrangements
that apply to both OCAs and contiguous areas of non-overlapping jurisdiction.
See also the: fisheries Grey Zone established by Norway – Russia (Chapter 3.7.1),
which incorporated parts of the Norwegian EEZ, Russian EEZ and the OCA subject
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to claims asserted by both States; Argentina UK 1990 Joint Statement on Fisheries
(Chapter 3.3.1) establishing a fisheries management framework in waters between
meridians 45°S latitude and 60°S latitude; 2002 Declaration concerning the South
China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); and the Norway – Russia 1978 Fisheries Agreement
(Chapter 3.7.1) establishing a detailed framework of fisheries cooperation that applied, prior to the conclusion of the 2010 boundary delimitation, both to the OCA
and to contiguous areas of non-overlapping jurisdiction.
This option is desirable when there is not a close match between the spatial limits of
an OCA and preferred/effective spatial units of oceans management. For example:
in order to achieve effective outcomes coastal States may wish to engage in holistic
cooperative management of a certain ecosystem, or throughout the migratory range
of certain species, either of which may extend beyond the relevant OCA.
In the case of marine living resources, spatially limited unilateral management measures are unlikely to produce sustainable outcomes. Churchill makes the following
observations concerning the unilateral Interim Fisheries Conservation Zone (FICZ)
established by the United Kingdom in waters claimed by the United Kingdom and
Argentina (see Chapter 3.3.1):
[The FICZ] not a wholly successful answer to the broader needs of fisheries management in the region. This was so for two reasons. First,
many fish stocks in the FICZ migrated into the Argentine 200-mile zone;
thus management measures taken in the FICZ for such stocks could be
ineffective unless co-ordinated with Argentine measures. Second, a good
deal of foreign fishing still took place beyond the FICZ, much of it within
200 miles of the Falkland Islands.18

18

Churchill, above n 56 on page 95.
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4.5 Interaction of the framework with existing
jurisdictional claims
Claimant coastal States may elect define the relationship between their overlapping jurisdictional claims and joint management of the relevant OCA. In particular,
they may elect to (1) clearly emphasise the provisional nature of a joint management framework; (2) protect their legal positions concerning their competing claims;
and/or (3) set out mutually accepted forms of behaviour concerning those competing
claims. The provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 employ a variety of methods to address these issues. The following paragraphs discuss
a selection of these methods and provide representative drafting where relevant.

4.5.1 No definition of interaction between joint management
and overlapping claims
Frameworks falling under this category include the Argentina – Uruguay 1973 Agreement concerning the Río de la Plata (Chapter 3.3.2) and the Denmark (Faroe Islands) – United Kingdom 1999 Agreement (Chapter 3.3.6). As noted above, these
frameworks also contain no definition of their operative time-period, reflecting an
intention to engage in cooperative management of an OCA on an long-term indefinite basis. Accordingly, protection or clarification of underlying jurisdictional claims
is not an important policy concern for the claimant coastal States.
If claimant coastal States intend to protect or clarify their respective claims to an
OCA, it is not strictly necessary to insert protective language into a provisional joint
management framework. Overlapping claims are protected by three aspects of international law concerning maritime delimitation and jurisdictional disputes. First,
in accordance with LOSC Part XV Section 3, claimant coastal States are entitled
to exclude disputes concerning maritime delimitation and provisional management
of an OCA from compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures set out in
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Part XV Section 2 of the Convention.19 Essentially, this allows the Claimant States
to maintain complete control over delimitation and provisional arrangements without being concerned about how their conduct will be interpreted by an independent
dispute settlement body.
Second, even if a case was brought to compulsory dispute settlement, international
judicial and arbitral bodies are demonstrably reluctant to interpret cooperation
between the claimant coastal States in a manner that undermines their respective
jurisdictional claims.20 For example, in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case between
Iceland and the United Kingdom,21 the International Court of Justice emphatically
declined to construe a cooperative management agreement as a modification of the
rights held by the parties.22 The Court also noted the following:23
Moreover, if the Court were to come to a conclusion that the interim
agreement prevented it from rendering judgment ... the inevitable result
would be to discourage the making of interim arrangements in future disputes with the object of reducing friction and avoiding risk to peace and
security. This would run contrary to the purpose enshrined in the provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to the pacific settlement
of disputes.
Third, in the case of overlapping claims to EEZ and continental shelf, LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) require claimant States to ‘make every effort’ to establish
provisional arrangements to manage the OCA. LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) also
insulates those arrangements from the delimitation dispute by specifically providing
that provisional management arrangements ‘shall be without prejudice to the final
delimitation.’24
If claimant coastal States are dissatisfied by the protections offered under international law, they may elect to protect existing jurisdictional claims by mutual
agreement, using one or more of the following methods.
19

See Chapter 2.5.
For further discussion see Anderson, above n 129 on page 113, 495–497.
21
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 3.
22
Ibid, 19–20.
23
Ibid.
24
See Chapters 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.
20
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4.5.2 Express reference to provisional nature of framework
Several frameworks contain a simple express statement that joint management activities are to be undertaken on a provisional basis, pending delimitation of a maritime
boundary. Representative drafting can be found in Article 16 of the Canada – United
States 1979 Protocol concerning the northern Pacific and Bering Sea halibut fishery
(Chapter 3.2.1), which contains the following language:
Pending delimitation of maritime boundaries between Canada and the
United States in the Convention area, the following principles shall be
applied as interim measures in the boundary region ....
See also: Article 3 of the Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.5) establishing a Joint Regime Area in which certain cooperative measures apply ‘pending the
determination of the jurisdictional limits of each Party ...’; Article 3 of the Cambodia
– Vietnam 1982 Agreement (Chapter 3.6.4), setting out cooperative measures that
apply ‘pending the settlement of the maritime border between the two States’ in the
Joint Historic Waters Area; and the 2002 Declaration concerning the South China
Sea (Chapter 3.6.5), which contemplates the establishment of cooperative activities
‘[p]ending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes’.
Note also that several agreements, including the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty
(Chapter 3.6.1) and Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9),
contain preambular text that specifically acknowledge the relevance and applicability
of the LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3). As discussed in Chapter 3, these Articles
provide that ‘provisional arrangements of a practical nature’ concerning delimitation
of the EEZ and continental shelf ‘shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation’.
Legal considerations notwithstanding, express agreement concerning the provisional
nature of a management framework may serve the important function of building
trust amidst diplomatic and political tension. For example, Anderson observes that
during negotiations between Argentina and the UK (concerning maritime claims
in the South Atlantic), development of the Madrid Formula on Sovereignty was
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instrumental in ensuring the continued progress of diplomatic discussions concerning
OCA management.25

4.5.3 Express protection of existing jurisdictional claims
Several frameworks contain clauses that are designed to prevent interpretation or
implementation of the framework from impacting upon existing jurisdictional claims.
Representative drafting can be found in Article 2 of the Australia – East Timor 2006
CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2), which provides as follows:
Without prejudice
1. Nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted as:
a) prejudicing or affecting Timor-Leste’s or Australia’s
legal position on, or legal rights relating to, the delimitation of their respective maritime boundaries;
b) a renunciation of any right or claim relating to the
whole or any part of the Timor Sea; or
c) recognition or affirmation of any right or claim of the
other Party to the whole or any part of the Timor Sea.
2. No act or activities taking place as a result of, and no law
entering into force by virtue of, this Treaty or the operation thereof, may be relied upon as a basis for asserting, supporting, denying or furthering the legal position
of either Party with respect to maritime boundary claims,
jurisdiction or rights concerning the whole or any part of
the Timor Sea.
Article 14 of the PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning fisheries
management in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5) provides succinctly as follows:26
No provision in this Agreement shall be interpreted in such a way as to
prejudice the position of either Contracting Party on issues in the Law
of the Sea.
See also the: Argentina – United Kingdom Madrid Formula on Sovereignty, quoted
above in Chapter 3.3.1); Article 1 of the Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter
3.3.3); Article 6 of Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation
25
26

David Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays (2008), 495–497.
This language is similar to that found in the other bilateral fisheries agreements concerning the
East China Sea - see Chapter 3.5.5.
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Agreement (Chapter 3.3.8); Article 4 of the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001
Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9); Article XIV of the Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela 1977
Fisheries Agreement (Chapter 3.3.10); Article XI of the Trinidad and Tobago –
Venezuela 1985 Fisheries Agreement (Chapter 3.3.10); Japan – PRC 2008 Cooperation Consensus concerning the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.1); Article XVIII of
the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.5.2); Article 5 of the Cambodia – Thailand 2001 MoU (Chapter
3.6.3); Article V of the Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU (Chapter 3.6.7); Article 4
of the Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU (Chapter 3.6.8); Article 2 of the Australia
– Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1); Antarctic Treaty Article IV(1), quoted
above in Chapter 3.7.3, which focuses on territorial sovereignty but contains robust
drafting; and the preamble of the Iran – United Arab Emirates (Sharjah) 1971 MoU
(Chapter 3.4.1) which notes that ‘[n]either Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim
to Abu Masa nor recognise the other’s claim.’
From a political and diplomatic perspective, express protection of existing jurisdictional claims may go a long way towards building trust between claimant States, and
providing mutual reassurance of good faith intention(s) to discuss cooperative OCA
management. Such protections are unsuited to highly contentious jurisdictional disputes where express mutual acknowledgment of claims may be readily perceived,
regardless of legal considerations, as undermining those claims.

4.5.4 Moratorium concerning assertion or expansion of current
claims
Several frameworks also contain clauses designed to prevent the parties from taking steps to actively assert, pursue or expand their existing jurisdictional claims.
The key purpose of such clauses is to mandate continued commitment to cooperative management – participating States must refrain from undermining cooperative
management frameworks through actions extrinsic to that framework. Detailed rep-
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resentative drafting can be found in Article 4 of the Australia – East Timor 2006
CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2), which provides in part as follows:
Moratorium
1. Neither Australia nor Timor-Leste shall assert, pursue or further
by any means in relation to the other Party its claims to sovereign
rights and jurisdiction and maritime boundaries for the period of
this Treaty.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article does not prevent a Party from continuing
activities (including the regulation and authorisation of existing and
new activities) in areas in which its domestic legislation on 19 May
2002 authorised the granting of permission for conducting activities
in relation to petroleum or other resources of the seabed and subsoil.
3. ...
4. Notwithstanding any other bilateral or multilateral agreement binding on the Parties, or any declaration made by either Party pursuant
to any such agreement, neither Party shall commence or pursue any
proceedings against the other Party before any court, tribunal or
other dispute settlement mechanism that would raise or result in,
either directly or indirectly, issues or findings of relevance to maritime boundaries or delimitation in the Timor Sea.
5. Any court, tribunal or other dispute settlement body hearing proceedings involving the Parties shall not consider, make comment
on, nor make findings that would raise or result in, either directly
or indirectly, issues or findings of relevance to maritime boundaries
or delimitation in the Timor Sea. Any such comment or finding
shall be of no effect, and shall not be relied upon, or cited, by the
Parties at any time.
6. Neither Party shall raise or pursue in any international organisation matters that are, directly or indirectly, relevant to maritime
boundaries or delimitation in the Timor Sea.
7. The Parties shall not be under an obligation to negotiate permanent
maritime boundaries for the period of this Treaty.
The robust drafting of this provision was influenced by strident media criticism
of the Australian Government on the alleged basis its approach to negotiations was
exploitative of East Timor’s bargaining position, and that the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty
had established an unfair allocation of the Timor Sea’s natural resources.27 More
succinct language can be found in Antarctic Treaty Article IV(2), which provides

27

For further discussion see: Schofield, above n 333 on page 164.
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that ‘No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.’

4.5.5 Acknowledgment of concurrent jurisdiction or overlapping
claims
Another method is simply to acknowledge that zones claimed by the relevant coastal
States overlap with one another and/or apply on a concurrent basis. See for example
Article V of the Saudi Arabia – Sudan 1974 Agreement concerning hydrocarbon
development (Chapter 3.4.2), which provides as follows:
The two Governments recognize that the . . . [defined area] . . . is common to both Governments and shall hereafter be known as the Common
Zone. The two Governments have equal sovereign rights in all the natural resources of the Common Zone which rights are exclusive to them
...
See also the Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU (Chapter 3.6.7) which explicitly acknowledges the existence of ‘overlapping claims’28 and notes the commitment of
both States to delimiting the OCA.29 These approaches emphasise mutual commitment to OCA management and do not characterise overlapping claims in adversarial terms. Once established, express acknowledgment of concurrent jurisdiction or
overlapping claims may serve the important function of reducing ongoing tensions
between the relevant claimant States. However, such approached may be difficult
to implement where domestic political sentiment is strongly attached to the validity
of one particular claim (to the exclusion of the other).

4.5.6 Approaches for highly sensitive jurisdictional disputes:
All of the methods discussed above either explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the
existence of multiple jurisdictional claims in, or competing legal positions concerning, an OCA. Where overlapping claims are associated with a high degree of political
28
29

1979 MoU, Preamble and Article I.
1979 MoU, Article II.
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tension, there may be a strong political aversion to any compromise of a State’s own
claim, or a strong political aversion to any acknowledgment of the claims of other
States.30 In such circumstances even an implicit acknowledgment of another States’
claims may be vulnerable to mischaracterisation during domestic political debates
as an impermissible ‘sell-out’ of national interests. The two clauses set out below
(drafted by the author) attempt to avoid generating the perception of any compromise concerning existing claims, while at the same time expressly protecting those
claims.
In accordance with international law, this agreement shall in no way
prejudice the sovereignty and sovereign rights that exist within the zone
of cooperation.
In accordance with international law, the State entitled to sovereignty
and sovereign rights within the zone of cooperation agrees, in the interest
of peace, cooperation and friendship, to cooperate with the other States
Parties in the manner specified in this agreement.
The first clause provides a general protection for sovereignty and jurisdiction within
an OCA. It does not specify which State is entitled to that sovereignty and jurisdiction and it does not acknowledge that multiple States may have valid claims to
that sovereignty and jurisdiction. The second clause goes a step further towards
accommodating possible domestic political sensitivities. It acknowledges that a single State is the rightful holder of sovereignty and jurisdiction within an OCA but it
does not identify that State. Cooperation is characterised as an unspecified holder
of sovereignty and jurisdiction generously engaging in cooperation with other States.

30

Several scholars have noted that acknowledgment of sovereignty and jurisdiction operates as a
precondition for discussions concerning joint management of OCAs. See, eg, comments by Peter
Kien-Hong Yu, above n 99, in relation to the PRC diplomatic position concerning maritime
claims in the South China Sea.

240

4.6 Mechanism for allocating jurisdiction or
competence
In order to facilitate functionally comprehensive management of an OCA, a provisional joint management framework must enable each of the claimant coastal States
to clearly identify the circumstances (and locations) in which they are entitled (or not
entitled) to implement LOSC rights and obligations concerning: artificial structures,
environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational
safety and resource exploitation.
How might this be achieved? The provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 use a variety of mechanisms to allocate jurisdiction or competence within the relevant OCA. The following paragraphs discuss a selection of these
methods and provide representative drafting where relevant.

4.6.1 Flag-based allocation of coastal State jurisdiction
Several frameworks employ a ‘flag-based’ mechanism whereby the claimant States
exercise coastal State jurisdiction (i.e. enforce their respective national laws and
regulations) over vessels flying their respective flags. Such mechanisms are most
suitable for the management of the water column within an OCA and their utility
may be limited if development of seabed resources is contemplated.31 A key issue
with flag-based mechanisms is how to allocate jurisdiction over vessels flagged to
third parties. As noted above, the Japan – PRC 1997 Agreement, Japan – Republic
of Korea 1998 Agreement; and PRC – Republic of Korea 2000 Agreement concerning
fisheries management in the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.5) are silent on this issue.
A preferable approach is to recognise the existence of concurrent jurisdiction against
nationals of non-claimant States, allowing any of the claimant States to enforce
national laws and regulations against third State vessels. See for example Article
31

Development of seabed resources would require, for example, the allocation of jurisdiction in
relation to artificial structures in addition to vessels.
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16 of the Canada – United States 1979 Protocol concerning the northern Pacific
and Bering Sea halibut fishery (Chapter 3.2.1) which provides that either party
may enforce provisions of the Convention against fishing vessels flagged to third
Parties.32 In order to ensure the similar regulatory standards are applied to all
vessels, it is desirable when implementing flag-based approaches to reach agreement
regarding the harmonisation of relevant domestic laws and regulations in each of the
claimant coastal States.

4.6.2 Spatial allocation of coastal State jurisdiction (discrete
subzones)
Several frameworks employ a zonal approach that provisionally delimits jurisdictional competence of the Parties (i.e. what laws apply and which State may enforce
them) within the OCA. Representative drafting can be found in Article V of the
Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU, which provides as follows:
The criminal jurisdiction of Malaysia in the joint development area shall
extend over that area bounded by straight lines joining the following
coordinated points: - .....
The criminal jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Thailand in the joint development area shall extend over that area bounded by straight lines
joining the following coordinated points: - .....
The areas of criminal jurisdiction of both Parties defined under this Article shall not in any way be construed as indicating the boundary line of
the continental shelf between the two countries in the joint development
area, which boundary is to be determined as provided for by Article
II, nor shall such definition in any way prejudice the sovereign rights of
either Party in the joint development area.
See also the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1) and the Australia
– East Timor 2002 Treaty and 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2). As noted above
(Chapter 3.5.3), Japan and Russia have also reportedly established a provisional
maritime boundary for the purposes of fisheries management in waters surround32

1979 Protocol, Article 16. Note that the agreement applies to management of specific fisheries
resources as opposed to EEZ rights in general. However, the provision for concurrent jurisdiction
could be readily adapted more broadly.
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ing the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands. The Japan – Republic of Korea 1974
Agreement concerning hydrocarbon development combines discrete subzones with a
nationality-based allocation of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. As noted
in (Chapter 3.5.2), this Agreement requires each Party to authorise ‘concessionaires’
for each Subzone of the Joint Development Zone, who are are required to enter into
an operating agreement to carry out joint exploration and/or exploitation of natural
resources.33 Within each Subzone a single ‘operator’ is designated from among the
concessionaires to conduct operations.34 The designation of an operator is determinative of the laws and regulations that apply within the relevant Subzone – Japanese
law applies to Japanese operators and Korean law applies to a Korean operators.35
Discrete subzones provide a high degree of jurisdictional certainty, which may incentivise investment in major infrastructure development (e.g. hydrocarbon exploration
and exploitation), and is conducive to effective OCA management. In comparison
to the concurrent or informal allocation methods discussed below, discrete subzones
limit the risk of uncertainty regarding what claimant State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction (and what law applies) in specific locations and circumstances. However,
in practical terms the designation of subzones may be more difficult to negotiate
than other approaches, because competing diplomatic and political positions concerning the final location of a maritime boundary can be readily deployed during
negotiations. As explained in Chapter 4.5, establishment of defined sub-zones need
not and is unlikely to prejudice the legal positions of claimants States concerning
the course of a final maritime boundary.
It is open to the claimant coastal States to decide whether or not the allocation of
coastal State jurisdiction in discrete OCA subzones is inter-linked with the allocation
of marine resources from each subzone. For example: Under the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement (Chapter 3.5.2), costs and revenues associated with
33

Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement, Articles III–V.
Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement, Article VI.
35
Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement, Article XXIX provides that ‘the laws and regulations
of one Party shall apply with respect to matters relating to exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the sub-zones with respect to which the Party has authorised concessionaires
designated and acting as operators.’
34
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hydrocarbon development in each Subzone are shared equally by the concessionaires authorised by each State, regardless of which State exercises jurisdiction in the
Subzone pursuant to the Agreement.36 In contrast, each of the subzones defined in
the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1) features a different resource
allocation between the Parties.37 Where is there is strong political opposition to
spatially-oriented compromises (e.g. ‘we shouldn’t give up our waters’), de-coupling
of resource allocation from allocation of jurisdiction may enable the claimant coastal
States to reach an agreement that includes constructive trade-offs (e.g. ‘you exercise
jurisdiction, we get more resources’ or vice versa).

4.6.3 Spatial allocation of coastal State jurisdiction (on a
concurrent basis)
Instead of allocating coastal State jurisdiction on a spatially discrete basis, several
frameworks provide for the concurrent exercise of coastal State jurisdiction throughout the relevant OCA. A robust example of this approach is the Barbados – Guyana
2003 Treaty, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.3.3. Another example
can be found in Article 3 of the Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.5)
which provides in part as follows:
2. In the Joint Regime Area, the Parties may carry out the
following activities:
a) Exploration and exploitation of the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and the seabed and its subsoil, and
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the Joint Regime Area;
b) The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
c) Marine scientific research;
36

Schofield notes that ‘To date, exploration activities have failed to result in the discovery of
commercially viable oil and gas reserves.’: Schofield, above n 58 on page 16.
37
For further discussion see also Stuart Kaye, ‘The Timor Gap Treaty: Creative Solutions and
International Conflict’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 74.
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d) The protection and preservation of the marine environment;
e) The conservation of living resources;
f) Such measures as are authorized by this Treaty, or as
the Parties may otherwise agree for ensuring compliance with and enforcement of the regime established
by this Treaty.
3. Activities relating to exploration and exploitation of nonliving resources, as well as those referred to in paragraph
2 (c) and (d), will be carried out on a joint basis agreed
by both Parties.
4. The Parties shall not authorize third States and international organizations or vessels of such States and organizations to carry out any of the activities referred to in
paragraph 2. This does not preclude a Party from entering
into, or authorizing arrangements for leases, licences, joint
ventures and technical assistance programmes in order to
facilitate the exercise of the rights pursuant to paragraph
2, in accordance with the procedures established in article
4 [concerning the Joint Commission].
This language specifically refers to the concurrent entitlement of both States to
exercise the six key functional components of coastal State jurisdiction recognised
in the LOSC. Note also that, in addition to recognising the entitlement of both
States to engage in certain activities within the OCA, the 1993 Treaty determines
the existence of national jurisdiction in specific instances by reference to nationality
and the flag State of a vessel. As noted in Chapter 3.3.5, Article 3(5) of the 1993
Treaty stipulates that ‘each Party has jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels
flying its flag or over which it exercises management and control in accordance
with international law’.38 Each Party is also required to take certain steps when its
nationals or vessels have been alleged by the other Party to have breached either the
38

The meaning of this provision is uncertain in several respects: Is the intention to draw a distinction between nationals and vessels? If so, how is jurisdiction allocated when persons holding the
nationality of one Party are aboard a vessel flagged to the other Party? Perhaps the reference
to ‘nationals’ attempts to ensure that both Parties can exercise jurisdiction within the Joint
Regime Area over their own nationals when they are not aboard a flagged vessel? Further,
what is the effect of allocating jurisdiction to a Party in respect of national and vessels ‘over
which it exercises management and control in accordance with international law’? Perhaps
this is intended to enable either Party to exercise coastal State jurisdiction over vessels flagged
to third States? That interpretation would complement the specific provision in Article 3(6)
concerning the adoption of regulations and measures relating to nationals and vessels of third
States.
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provisions of the 1993 Treaty or any measures adopted for their implementation.39
Note also the Article 3(6) of the Treaty sets out an agreement to ‘adopt measures for
ensuring that nationals and vessels of third States comply with any regulations and
measures adopted by the Parties’ that concern activities within the Joint Regime
Area.
Allocation of concurrent jurisdiction is potentially well-suited to OCAs in which all
the claimant States have historically engaged in overlapping patterns of enforcement activity or resource exploitation (e.g. fishing in the same location), and it is
politically difficult to depart from those established patterns. There are however
significant risks associated with the allocation of jurisdiction on a concurrent basis.
For example, if the political relationship between claimant coastal States deteriorates, concurrent jurisdiction does not provide an clear agreed basis for preventing
the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction within the OCA in a confrontational or
competitive manner. Discrete subzones, in contrast, mitigate this risk by spatially
separating the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction by each of the claimant States.
Another risk associated with concurrent jurisdiction is that, without active harmonisation of domestic laws and regulations, divergent regulatory standards may be
applied throughout the OCA. These risks are addressed in the Barbados – Guyana
2003 Treaty through a combination of incentives and commitments to develop appropriate supplementary agreements. For example: As noted in Chapter 3.3.3, the
Treaty provides for the establishment of a ‘Joint Fisheries Licensing Agreement’ and
coordinated national measures under which concurrent jurisdiction concerning marine living resources will be exercised by both States.40 A strong incentive to engage
in cooperation is provided by a requirement that, in the event of a failure to reach
agreement concerning ‘the exercise of their joint jurisdiction over living resources’ in
39

1993 Treaty, Article 3(5). The relevant passage provides that ‘the Party alleging the breach shall
forthwith commence consultations with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement within 14
days. On receipt of the allegation, the Party to whose attention the allegation has been brought
shall, without prejudice to the consultations referred to in the above paragraph: (a) In relation
to an allegation that a breach has been committed, ensure that the activities, the subjectmatter of the allegation, do not recur; (b) In relation to an allegation that a breach is being
committed, ensure that the activities are discontinued.’
40
Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty, Article 6(2)-(3).
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the Co-operation Zone, neither State is entitled exercise jurisdiction on a unilateral
basis.41

4.6.4 Allocation of coastal State jurisdiction or competence to a
joint authority
Several frameworks delegate jurisdictional or administrative competence to a joint
authority composed of representatives of the claimant coastal States. One example
of this approach is Article 5 of the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and
Cooperation Agreement (Chapter 3.3.8), which provides as follows:
Upon its establishment, the Agency shall succeed Guinea-Bissau and
Senegal in the rights and obligations deriving from the Agreements concluded by each State and relating to the exploitation of the resources in
the Area
As noted in Chapter 3.3.8, the use of the term ‘succeed’ in the above provision
suggests that both States intended to delegate the entire scope of their respective
national jurisdiction in the Joint Area to the Agency.
Frameworks that delegate jurisdictional or administrative competence to a joint authority also generally contain provisions recognising the underlying concurrent or
joint jurisdiction of the claimant coastal States within the OCA. See for example
Article 6 of the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement (Chapter 3.3.8), which provides as follows:
Under this Agreement, the Parties shall pool the exercise of their respective rights, without prejudice to the rights in law previously acquired by
each Party and confirmed by judicial decisions, or to any claims previously formulated by them in respect of areas that have not been delimited.
See also: Article 36–46 of the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty (Chapter
3.3.9); and Article 17 of the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1995 Protocol (Chapter 3.3.8)
concerning the exercise of police powers. The role of joint authorities is discussed
41

Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty, Article 5(5).
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in further detail in Chapter 4.8. For the present purposes it is relevant to note the
following: A potential advantage of allocating jurisdiction or competence to a joint
authority is that it establishes a focal point for decision-making and rule-making to
inform the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the claimant States. However, establishing a new entity with competence and powers concerning OCA management
may be more effort-intensive than establishing networks between existing institutions
in the respective claimant States. If agreement is reached to allocate jurisdiction or
competence to a joint authority, claimant coastal States are also advised to clearly
define the relationship between the powers and duties of the authority and the residual powers and duties of the claimant coastal States. Any uncertainty in this context
has the potential undermine effective OCA management, deter potential investors
in major infrastructure development, and lead to misunderstandings between the
relevant national governments.

4.6.5 Operational coordination within an OCA
Several frameworks do not contain specific allocations of jurisdiction of competence
within the relevant OCA. Rather, they establish networks of coordination between
national agencies and governments that enable each of the claimant coastal States
to identify circumstances (and locations) in which they are entitled (or not entitled)
to implement LOSC rights and obligations. See for example the surveyed bilateral
cooperative arrangements established between Canada – United States (Chapters
3.2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.7.2). Reviewing these arrangements, McDorman comments as
follows:42
... following the Gulf of Maine Case, the existence of areas of overlapping claims has not caused significant difficulty between the two States.
The two States have been adept at overlooking the disputes and, in most
cases, finding ways to circumvent the “issue” and cooperate on a functional and operational level. Because of this, it appears that there have
been few or no discussions between the two governments in the last three
decades seeking resolution of any of the maritime boundary disputes.
42

McDorman, Saltwater Neighbours, above n 2 on page 82, 118.
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A potential disadvantage of operational coordination within an OCA is a lack of
transparency or public clarity concerning the allocation of national jurisdiction
within an OCA. However, as a matter of international law, the absence of a transparent and public allocation of jurisdiction within an OCA does not in and of itself
deprive the claimant coastal States of their national jurisdiction in the area. Rather,
as discussed in Chapter 2, the existence of overlapping claims entails certain unclear
limitations on the ability to exercise national jurisdiction within the OCA. These
limitations may be removed by consent or otherwise addressed on an operational
level by the claimant coastal States. A key limitation of operational coordination is
that it may provide insufficient certainty to attract investors in major infrastructure
development in the OCA.
In comparison to the other allocation models discussed in Chapter 4.6, three significant potential advantages of operational coordination are: (1) it minimises the
effort and resources required to establish a provisional joint management framework,
provided capable institutions are already present; (2) it can be adapted more flexibly than other approaches in response to changing circumstances; and (3) it does
not necessarily require strong vertical integration within national governments, and
may be achieved informally via horizontal links between relevant agencies at local
and regional levels.43

4.6.6 Other approaches
Articles 3–6 of the Argentina – Uruguay 1973 Agreement concerning the Río de la
Plata, which are discussed in Chapter 3.3.2, employ a complex combination of several criteria (including geographic proximity and impact of national security of the
claimant States) to determine the existence of national jurisdiction in the relevant

43

Cf Townsend-Gault in Schofield (ed), above n 313 on page 158, who notes that ‘...links between
local governments of different countries may be an absolute necessity in the discharge of the
international obligations of their respective states. This, in turn, requires a high degree of
vertical integration within each state.’
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OCA. See also the condominium / co-ownership arrangement applicable to parts of
the Gulf of Fonseca (Chapter 3.2.2).
These models should be approached with caution – they provide broadly worded
legal bases for claimant States to retrospectively justify their exercise of jurisdiction
within an OCA, but do not enable government agencies to clearly determine in
a prospective manner whether or not they are entitled to exercise jurisdiction in
specific locations and circumstances. See for example Article 3 of the Argentina –
Uruguay 1973 Agreement, which provides, inter alia, that the ‘jurisdiction of one
Party shall apply in all cases in which its security is affected or in which unlawful
acts are committed which have effect in its territory, regardless of the flag flown by
the vessel involved.’

4.7 Mechanism for allocating resources and revenues
Claimant coastal States should determine their respective share of resources and
revenues associated with management of the OCA. The provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 use a variety of methods to address this
issue. The following paragraphs discuss a selection of these methods and provide
representative drafting where relevant.

4.7.1 Moratorium on resource exploitation
Several frameworks simply prohibit exploitation of certain resources located within
the OCA. See for example the moratorium on hydrocarbon development established
by Canada – United States which is discussed above in Chapters 3.2.1, 3.3.4 and
3.7.2. Note also the Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3), which prohibits the exploitation of certain resources until both States have reached agreement
concerning the cooperative management of those resources in the OCA. Concerning
marine living resources, Article 5(5) of the 2003 Treaty provides as follows:
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For further clarity, the failure of the Parties to reach agreement in writing
in relation to the exercise of their joint jurisdiction over living resources
in the Co-operation Zone in any particular instance means that neither
Party can exercise its jurisdiction in that instance.
Article 6(4) of the 2003 Treaty establishes an equivalent prohibition that applies to
non-living resources. These provisions create a powerful incentive for cooperation –
each has an effective veto over resource exploitation in the OCA. This approach is
obviously not appropriate when one claimant State is significantly more reliant than
the other(s) on resources located within the OCA. A key advantage of moratoria
is that they effectively remove a source of the OCA dispute, and may have the
significant ancillary benefit of preventing damage to marine ecosystems.44 Moratoria
concerning marine living resources will of course not be effective unless they are
accompanied by an effective allocation of enforcement jurisdiction covering both
nationals of the claimant coastal States and third States.

4.7.2 Percentage shares
Most frameworks allocate resources and revenues associated with the OCA in percentage shares to each of the claimant coastal States. For simple representative
drafting see Article 3.1 of the 1989 Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty
(Chapter 3.3.9), which provides as follows:
Within the Zone, there shall be joint control by the States Parties of
the exploration for and exploitation of resources, aimed at achieving
optimum commercial utilization. The State Parties shall share, in the
proportions Nigeria 60 per cent., São Tomé e Príncipe 40 per cent., all
benefits and obligations arising from development activities carried out
in the Zone in accordance with this Treaty.
For complex representative drafting focused on hydrocarbon resources see the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1); Australia – East Timor 2002 Timor
44

For further discussion concerning the potential benefits of establishing resource exploitation
moratoria in the South China Sea, see: John McManus, Kwang-Tsao and Shao Szu-Yin Lin,
‘Toward establishing a Spratly Islands International Marine Peace Park: Ecological Importance
and Supportive Collaborative Activities with an Emphasis on the Role of Taiwan (2010) 41
Ocean Development and International Law 270.
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Sea Treaty and 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2); and other provisions of the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9) that elaborate upon the
general provision quoted above.45 Most of the provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 provide for an equal division of resources between the
parties. Note that in the Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty, a different percentage allocation is established within different sub-areas of the OCA. This approach
enables resource allocation in particular locations to reflect the proximity of that
location to each claimant coastal State.
When negotiating resource allocation percentages, it is advisable to account for economic benefits and impacts that are related to development of the OCA but may
be not be realised in that immediate area. A failure to account for economic benefits and impacts flowing from downstream development of OCA hydrocarbons has
caused considerable friction between several coastal States and compromised implementation of OCA management frameworks. For example: Implementation of
the Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement of 1990 (Chapter
3.6.7) have been complicated by significant protests regarding potential environmental, social and cultural impacts of a downstream gas separation plant and associated
offshore pipelines in southern Thailand.46 Implementation of the Australia – East
Timor 2002 Timor Sea Treaty and 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2) has been complicated by East Timor’s insistence that downstream processing associated with
the Greater Sunrise development should take place at a gas liquefaction plant near
Dili.47 In response to the petroleum developer’s reluctance to do so,48 East Timor
has threatened to end its participation in the cooperative management framework.49

45

For detailed discussion of resource allocation issues concerning joint hydrocarbon development
see Fox et al, above n 90 on page 29.
46
For further discussion see: Schofield and Tan-Mullins, above n 372 on page 173. As of 2007
the gas separation plant was operational and a re-routed pipeline was completed in 2006-7:
Davenport, above n 313 on page 158.
47
See Davenport, above n 313 on page 158.
48
Woodside Petroleum has cited in this context the technical and economic difficulties associated
with constructing a pipeline across the Timor trough, as opposed to the easier route across the
physical continental shelf of Australia.
49
See Davenport, above n 313 on page 158.
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4.7.3 Allocation determined by institutional body
Another approach is to delegate the task of resource allocation to an institutional
body comprised of representatives from each claimant coastal State. Specific resource allocation is then implemented through coordinated enactment of domestic
legislation – for example legislation setting the total allowable catch allocated to
vessels licensed by each claimant coastal State. For further discussion see Chapter
4.8.
In order to minimise the potential for future disputes, claimant coastal States are
advised to ensure that the mechanisms for allocating resources and revenues are
clearly drafted and take into account potential future activities in the OCA. A
construction to avoid can be found in Article 2 of the Guinea-Bissau - Senegal 1993
Management and Cooperation Agreement (Chapter 3.3.8), which as noted above
does not clearly categorise sedentary species. For a discussion of issues arising from
an unclear allocation of hydrocarbon resources in the Kuwait–Saudi Arabia ‘Offshore
Neutral Zone’, see Fox et al, above n 90 on page 29, 48–49.

4.8 Institutional aspects of cooperation
Claimant coastal States should consider the institutional and administrative requirements associated with managing an OCA on a provisional joint basis. The provisional joint management frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 address institutional
aspects of OCA joint management in a variety of ways. The following paragraphs
discuss different approaches evident in current State practice and provide representative drafting where relevant.

4.8.1 New consultative institutions
Several frameworks establish new institutions that are entrusted with consultative
or deliberative functions concerning management of the OCA. A common function
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is the making of recommendations concerning specific aspects of OCA management. See for example the: Argentina – Uruguay 1973 Agreement concerning the
Río de la Plata (Chapter 3.3.2); Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3);
Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela 1977 and 1985 Fisheries Agreements (Chapter
3.3.10); Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.5); several of the surveyed
bilateral cooperative arrangements established between Argentina – United Kingdom concerning the Southern Atlantic Ocean (Chapter 3.3.1); Japan – PRC 1997
Agreement; Japan – Republic of Korea 1998 Agreement; and PRC – Republic of
Korea 2000 Agreement concerning fisheries management in the East China Sea
(Chapter 3.5.5); and the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning
hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.5.2). A key advantage of these institutions is
that they provide a focal point for ongoing (and potentially complex) discussions
concerning the implementation of provisional joint management frameworks. Another advantage of consultative institutions is that they may provide a forum for
dispute settlement and maintenance of political relationships that, as noted previously, are critical components of effective OCA management. Where claimant
coastal States have well-established and ongoing communication links concerning
overlapping maritime claims, establishment of a new consultative institution may
be unnecessary/redundant.

4.8.2 New administrative institutions
Several frameworks establish new institutions that are entrusted with some organisational, administrative or regulatory functions concerning management of an OCA.
In several cases a new institution is entrusted with international legal personality,
or legal personality arising under the domestic law of the claimant coastal States.
See for example the: Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation
Agreement and the 1995 Protocol (Chapter 3.3.8); Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe
2001 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9); the Antarctic Treaty System (Chapter 3.7.3); Saudi
Arabia – Sudan 1974 Agreement concerning development of non-living continental
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shelf resources (Chapter 3.4.2); Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement of 1990 (Chapter 3.6.7); Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter
3.6.1).
While new administrative institutions may foster close and continued cooperation
concerning OCA management, a potential drawback is the large amount of effort
involved to establish such institutions and integrate them into the domestic legal
systems of the claimant States. Fox et al make the following observations about
difficulties encountered during implementation of the Malaysia – Thailand 1979
MoU and efforts to establish the supplemental agreement which was not concluded
until 1990 (Chapter 3.6.7):50
The second major difficulty in the Thai/Malaysia zone is the legal system
under which the Authority will operate. While the constitution of the
Authority stipulated its powers and functions the Authority needed to be
given legal personality in both jurisdictions. Legal authority was to be
conferred by the implementation of identical legislation in both States
which would contain provisions on petroleum production and defining
powers vested in the Authority. However, it was recognised that this
would require a common legal system, alteration of domestic legislation
and a degree of harmonisation. The natural consequence of the allocation of rights and responsibilities of such a sweeping nature to the Joint
Authority and the nature of the joint claim to the Area would appear to
envisage a unique jurisdictional approach: a new and special set of laws
applying in the Area.
Efforts to establish the Joint Authority were further complicated by significant differences between the national petroleum licensing frameworks used in Malaysia and
Thailand.51

50
51

Fox et al, above n 90 on page 29, 136.
In Malaysia, a national company (PETRONAS) with monopoly rights concerning petroleum
development adopted a production-sharing system to manage the participation of other developers. In contrast, petroleum development in Thailand was managed through licenses and
associated royalties/tax concessions. For further discussion see Davenport, above n 313 on
page 158.
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4.8.3 Cooperation between existing institutions
Several frameworks do not establish new institutions but instead focus on encouraging the development of cooperative networks between existing governments or government agencies. See for example: several of the surveyed bilateral and trilateral
cooperative arrangements concerning the South China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); Malaysia
– Vietnam 1992 MoU concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.6.8); Indonesia – Malaysia cooperation concerning maritime enforcement (Chapter 3.6.6);
and several of the surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established between
Canada – United States (Chapters 3.2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.7.2). Such approaches may
be desirable when claimant coastal States wish to avoid the effort (and potential
difficulties discussed in Chapter 4.8.2) associated with the establishment of new
cooperative institutions. Indeed OCA management frameworks featuring cooperation between existing institutions have generally required less time to negotiate in
comparison to frameworks featuring new institutions. Compare for example the negotiation period associated with the Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU (2 years) with
the equivalent period for the Japan – Republic of Korea 1974 Agreement concerning
hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.5.2, 4 years), Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1995
Protocol (Chapter 3.3.8, 4+ years), Australia – Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter
3.6.1, 5 years), and Malaysia – Thailand supplemental agreement of 1990 (Chapter
3.6.7, 11+ years).52
Cooperation between existing institutions can be encouraged (or mandated) through
a variety of methods. For example: Article 9 of the Barbados – Guyana 2003
Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3) contains the following language concerning consultation and
communications:

52

Timeframes for Japan – Korea 1974 Agreement, Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU, and Australia
– Indonesia 1989 Treaty are taken from Davenport, above n 313 on page 158. A significant
exception is the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty, which as noted in Chapter
3.3.9 was negotiated rapidly, motivated by desire to exploit petroleum resources in the OCA. A
noteworthy unusual characteristic of this framework, which may have contributed to the speed
of the negotiations, is the marked disparity of economic power and capacity of the claimant
coastal States.
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1. Either Party may request consultations with the other Party in relation to any matter arising out of this Treaty or otherwise concerning
the Co-operation Zone.
2. The Parties shall designate their respective Ministers of Foreign
Affairs to be responsible for all communications required under this
Treaty, including under this Article 9, and Articles 3, 5, 6 and 10.
Either Party can change its designation upon written notice to the
other Party.
General obligations to cooperate (such as the provision quoted above), may be
supplemented with specific obligations to exchange specified information, or engage
in cooperation in particular functional contexts. See for example Article 8 of the
Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3), which provides as follows:
1. The Parties shall, consistent with their international obligations,
endeavour to co-ordinate their activities so as to adopt all measures necessary for the preservation and protection of the marine
environment in the Co-operation Zone.
2. The Parties shall provide each other as soon as possible with information about actual or potential threats to the marine environment
in the Co-operation Zone.
See also: Article 6(9) of the same Treaty, which requires each Party ‘to provide the
other with the results of any scientific research or exploration as soon as possible
after the conclusion of any survey’; and Articles 12–18 of the Australia – Indonesia
1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1), which require cooperation (and information exchange
in certain contexts) concerning surveillance, security measures, search and rescue,
air traffic services, hydrographic and seismic surveys, marine scientific research, and
marine environmental protection.
Alternatively, claimant coastal States may wish to establish an agreement emphasising: (1) the procedures through which inter-institutional cooperation is to be
realised, or (2) the results of such cooperation. In the case of the former category, claimant coastal States, or particular institutions in those States, may commit to meeting on regular, and perhaps specified, occasions. See for example the
Canada–United States 1990 Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement (Chapter 3.2.1),
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in accordance with which law enforcement agencies of each State undertake regular
(annual) meetings and consultations. For representative drafting falling under the
second category (emphasising results of cooperation), see Article 3 of the Malaysia
– Vietnam 1992 MoU concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.6.8), which
provides as follows:
1. Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam agree to nominate
PETRONAS and PETROVIETNAM, respectively, to undertake,
on their respective behalves, the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum in the Defined Area;
2. Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shall cause PETRONAS
and PETROVIETNAM, respectively, to enter into a commercial arrangement as between them for the exploration and exploitation of
petroleum in the Defined Area provided that the terms and conditions of that arrangement shall be subject to the approval of the
Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam;
3. both parties agree, taking into account the significant expenditures
already incurred in the Defined Area, that every effort shall be made
to ensure continued early exploration of petroleum in the Defined
Area.
Inter-institutional cooperation may also be furthered through negative requirements
that prohibit conduct falling short of a specified standard. See for example Paragraph 6 of the Argentina–United Kingdom 1995 Joint Declaration concerning hydrocarbon resources (Chapter 3.3.1). This declaration requires both States to abstain,
during the course of their cooperative activities, from ‘taking action or imposing
conditions designed or tending to inhibit or frustrate the possibility of carrying out
hydrocarbon development’.

4.8.4 Delegation of functions to a particular State
Several of the surveyed provisional joint management frameworks simply delegate
particular administrative and regulatory functions to a particular State. The delegation may be spatial (within particular areas), functional (related to certain activities) and/or jurisdictional (concerning specified components of coastal State juris-
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diction). For a representative example of State practice see Article 8 of the Australia
– East Timor 2006 CMATS which, as discussed in Chapter 3.6.2, allocates to East
Timor jurisdiction and responsibility concerning fisheries management in the Joint
Petroleum Development Area. Claimant coastal States are advised to clearly define
any limits and conditions associated with a delegation of functions. Under the Australia – East Timor 2006 CMATS, East Timor is required to exercise its jurisdiction
over the water column above the JPDA ‘in a manner that does not unduly inhibit
petroleum activities within the JPDA.’53 East Timor is also required to undertake
certain activities relating to the management of highly migratory and straddling fish
stocks.54
A delegation of functions can be used to facilitate OCA management when there is a
significant disparity of administrative and technical capability between the claimant
coastal States.55 See for example the Malaysia – Vietnam 1992 MoU concerning hydrocarbon development. As noted in Chapter 3.6.8, this agreement stipulates that two nominated State-owned corporations (Petronas from Malaysia and
PetroVietnam from Vietnam) are to enter into a commercial arrangement to explore and exploit petroleum resources in the Defined Area. In practice, exploration
and exploitation activities in the Defined Area have been undertaken primarily by
PETRONAS on behalf of PETROVIETNAM.56 This course of action was taken
because PETROVIETNAM lacked the necessary technical expertise and enabling
(Vietnamese) petroleum legislation.57
Note also that where there is strong political opposition to delegating functions
to a particular claimant State, a possible approach is to de-couple formal allocation of functions from de-facto contributions to OCA management, for example by
one claimant State providing technical or economic assistance to the other. Anal53

CMATS, Article 8.
Ibid. The relevant drafting is quoted in Chapter 3.6.2.
55
See also Thomas Mensah, ‘Joint Development Zones as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Approach in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in Ranier Lagoni and Daniel Vignes (eds) Maritime
Delimitation (2006), who characterizes a delegation of functions (by one claimant coastal State
in favour of another) as as a form of technical assistance.
56
Davenport, above n 313 on page 158. See also 370 on page 172.
57
Ibid.
54
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ogous approaches are commonly used to improve the effectiveness of coastal State
maritime law enforcement outside of OCAs. Useful examples of State practice include: the provision to several South Pacific States of patrol boats and associated
training as part of the Australian Navy’s Pacific Patrol Boat Project;58 a variety of
arrangements between South-East Asian States to share aerial and maritime surveillance information;59 and bilateral ‘Shiprider Agreements’ between several Caribbean
coastal States and the United States, which permit officials of the relevant States
Parties to exercise their functions whilst embarked on vessels of the United States
Coast Guard or United States Navy.60

4.9 Dispute settlement procedures61
Claimant coastal States may elect to establish procedures for the settlement of disputes concerning provisional joint management of the OCA. Dispute settlement is
a critical component of effective OCA management – the State practice surveyed
in Chapter 3 clearly illustrates that negotiation of a provisional joint management
framework may not in and of itself significantly reduce the likelihood of further
58

See Steve Bell, ‘The Pacific Patrol Boat Project’ (2005) 16(2) Papers in Australian Maritime
Affairs <http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/maritimepapers/piama16/pacific .html>.
59
Examples of such arrangements include: The ‘Eye in the Sky’ Program, which was established
in September 2005 between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand and provides for the
sharing and collection of aerial surveillance information regarding the Straits of Malacca: see
Anders C Sjaastad, ‘Southeast Asia SLOCs and security options’ in Kwa Chong Guan and John
K Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (2007); Project SURPIC, a joint maritime
surveillance program established by Singapore and Indonesia regarding the Singapore Straits:
see See Joshua Ho, ‘The important and security of regional sea lanes’ in Kwa Chong Guan and
John K Skogan (eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (2007); and the establishment, pursuant to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) of an Information Sharing Centre in Singapore which maintains a
database of information related to piracy and facilitates communication between a variety of law
enforcement agencies prosecuting piracy cases: see ibid. The ReCAAP agreement was opened
for signature 28 February 2005 and entered into force 4 September 2006. The text of the agreement may be found at <http://www.recaap.org/about/pdf/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf>.
60
See, eg, Article 5 of the Agreement Between the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and the
Government of the United States of America concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operations,
1996, available at <http://www.caricom.org/>. See also Erik Molenaar, ‘Multilateral Hot
Pursuit and Illegal Fishing in the Southern Ocean: The Pursuits of the Viarsa 1 and the South
Tomi’ (2004) 19 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19.
61
Material in this sub-Chapter has been adapted from the author’s contribution to a previous
work: Rose and Milligan, above n 453 on page 197.
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disputes between the claimant coastal States. The provisional joint management
frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 contains a variety of dispute settlement procedures. They can be classified according to (1) their compulsory or non-compulsory
nature, and (2) their provision for binding or non-binding decisions by courts of
tribunals. The following paragraphs discuss a selection of procedures and provide
representative drafting where relevant.

4.9.1 Non-compulsory procedures
Several frameworks refer to dispute settlement procedures but do not mandate their
use in the absence of agreement between the claimant coastal States. Representative
drafting can be found in Article 7 of the Colombia – Jamaica 1993 Treaty (3.3.5),
which provides as follows:
Any dispute between the Parties on the interpretation or application
of this Treaty shall be settled by agreement between the two countries
in accordance with the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes
provided for by international law.
This approach may be appropriate when claimant coastal States have previously
established frameworks for formal and informal dispute settlement concerning their
overlapping claims,62 and/or intend to incorporate dispute resolution and consultative functions into the institutional component of a provisional joint management
(see discussion in Chapter 4.8).

4.9.2 Compulsory procedures (entailing non-binding decisions)
Several frameworks require claimant coastal States to engage in certain behaviour
in the event of a dispute but do not provide for binding decisions by courts or tribunals. This approach is more prescriptive than non-compulsory procedures, but
62

For example, claimant coastal States may have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice or appropriate regional body (e.g. Caribbean Court of Justice,
European Court of Justice), and/or elected not to take advantage of the optional exclusion
for delimitation disputes set out in LOSC Part XV Section 3 (see Chapter 2.5 for further
discussion).
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affords the claimant States more behavioural flexibility, in comparison to compulsory procedures that entail binding decisions regarding compliance with the OCA
management framework. See for example Article 30 of the Australia – Indonesia
1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1), which provides as follows:
Settlement of disputes
1. Any dispute arising between the Contracting States concerning the
interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be resolved by
consultation or negotiation between the Contracting States.
2. Each production sharing contract entered into by the Joint Authority shall contain provisions to the effect that any dispute concerning
the interpretation or application of such contract shall be submitted
to a specified form of binding commercial arbitration. The Contracting States shall facilitate the enforcement in their respective
courts of arbitral awards made pursuant to such arbitration.
Note the that paragraph 2, while not enabling decisions that are binding on Australia
and Indonesia, does provide for binding commercial arbitration of certain contractual
aspects of hydrocarbon development. Provisions of this nature are useful if claimant
States wish to retain flexibility to interpret and implement the OCA management
framework as they see fit, whilst providing a degree of commercial and financial
certainty to developers of major infrastructure in the OCA.

4.9.3 Compulsory procedures (entailing binding decisions)
Several frameworks require claimant coastal States to submit their disputes to binding determination by courts or tribunals. This approach significantly limits the
flexibility of the claimant States to interpret and implement the OCA management
framework as they see fit. It may also serve the useful function of making national
governments less vulnerable domestic political pressure to retreat from compromises embedded in the OCA management framework. Representative drafting can
be found in Article 10 of the Barbados – Guyana 2003 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.3) which
provides as follows:
Dispute resolution
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1. Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Treaty shall be resolved by direct diplomatic negotiations between the two Parties.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time,
either Party may have recourse to the dispute resolution provisions
contemplated under the [1982 Law of the Sea] Convention.
3. Any decision or interim order of any court or tribunal constituted
pursuant to Article 10(2) shall be final and binding on the Parties. The Parties shall carry out in good faith all such orders and
decisions.
As noted in Chapter 3.3.3, this language provides for recourse to the dispute settlement framework (including compulsory and binding procedures) set out in the LOSC
in the event that direct diplomatic negotiations have failed to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 2003 Treaty. See also: Article 9 of
the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement and
Article 25 of the 1995 Protocol (Chapter 3.3.8); and Article 23 of the Australia –
East Timor 2002 Timor Sea Treaty (Chapter 3.6.2), which also containing specific
procedures for taxation-related disputes.
Note especially Articles 47–49 of the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty
(Chapter 3.3.9), which provide as follows:
Article 47: Settlement of Disputes between the Authority and
Private Interests
1. Disputes between the Authority and a contractor or between joint
contractors and/or operators concerning the interpretation or application of a development contract or operating agreement, shall
unless otherwise agreed between the parties thereto be subject to
binding commercial arbitration pursuant to the terms of the relevant development contract or operating agreement.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, the arbitration shall be held in Lagos pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and administered by
the AACCL Centre for International Commercial Dispute Settlement, Lagos.
Article 48: Resolution of Disputes arising in the work of the
Authority of the Council
1. Any dispute that arises with respect to the functioning of this
Treaty shall be sought to be resolved by the Board having regard
to the objects and purposes of this Treaty, the principles set out in
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Article 3 and the spirit of amicable fraternal relations between the
two States Parties.
2. If a dispute cannot be resolved by the Board and its continuance
affects or threatens to affect the actual or future implementation of
this Treaty, it shall be referred to the Council.
3. The Council shall make every effort to resolve the dispute in a spirit
of compromise, and without prejudice to any underlying position of
either State Party.
4. If the dispute has not been resolved by the Council within 12 months
of being referred to the Council under paragraph 2, or such other
period as the Heads of State may decide, the Council or either State
Party may refer it to the Heads of State for their decision.
Article 49: Settlement of unresolved disputes between the States
Parties
1. The provisions of Article 52 shall apply
a) if the Heads of State agree in writing that a dispute referred
to them under paragraph 48 concerns a matter of policy or
administration and the dispute has not been resolved by the
Heads of State within 12 months of its referral to them, or
such additional time as they agree; or
b) if arbitral proceedings under paragraph 2 below leave a substantial dispute between the parties unresolved by reason, either
expressly or implicitly, of the fact that such dispute concerns a
matter of policy or administration.
2. In any case not covered by sub-paragraph 1(a), if the dispute has
not been resolved by the Heads of State within six months of the
reference under paragraph 4 of Article 48, and unless the States
Parties have otherwise agreed, either State Party may give notice
to the other State Party (the "referral") to refer the dispute to an
arbitral tribunal ("the Tribunal") for resolution.
3. The Tribunal shall be constituted in the following manner:
a) Each State Party shall, within 60 days of the referral, appoint
one arbitrator and the two arbitrators so appointed shall within
60 days of the appointment of the second arbitrator appoint a
national of a third State as third arbitrator who shall act as
President of the Tribunal;
b) If a State Party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 60 days
of the referral, or the two arbitrators fail to appoint a third
arbitrator within 60 days of the appointment of the second, either State Party may request the President of the International
Court of Justice to fill the vacancy by appointing a national of
a third State;
c) If the President of the International Court of Justice is a national of or habitually resident in the territory of a State Party
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or is otherwise unable to act, the appointment shall be made by
the next most senior judge of the Court who is not a national
of either State Party and who is available to act;
d) The Tribunal shall apply the UNCITRAL Rules, and on any
point not covered by those Rules shall determine its own procedure, unless the States Parties have otherwise agreed;
e) The Tribunal pending its final award may on the request of
a State Party issue an order or orders indicating the interim
measures which must be taken to preserve the respective rights
of either State Party or prevent the aggravation or extension of
the dispute;
f) Unless the States Parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall
sit at The Hague and the administering authority for the arbitration shall be the Secretariat of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.
4. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on the States
Parties.
5. The States Parties shall carry out in good faith all decisions of the
Tribunal including any orders for interim measures. Any question as
to the implementation of a decision may be referred to the Tribunal,
or if the same tribunal is no longer in existence and cannot be
reconstituted, to a new Tribunal constituted in accordance with
paragraph 3.
The provisions quoted above apply different settlement procedures to disputes arising between (1) between the Joint Authority and private interests; (2) arising in
the work of the Joint Authority or the Joint Ministerial Council; and (3) between
the States Parties. This categorisation of disputes – and the progressive application
of varied dispute settlement procedures – serves the useful function of preventing
disputes from automatically being escalated to an inter-State level.
When drafting dispute settlement procedures, an important issue to consider is
the relationship between (1) dispute settlement procedures in a provisional joint
management framework; and (2) the dispute settlement mechanism set out in LOSC
Part XV.63 More specifically, it is important to consider the effect of LOSC Part
XV Section 1 and LOSC Article 281 in particular, which provides as follows:
Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the parties
63

LOSC Part XV is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.5.
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a. If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek
settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice,
the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement
between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
b. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies
only upon the expiration of that time-limit.
As noted in Chapter 2.5.1, the effect of this provision is that States Parties may have
recourse to LOSC compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures where no
settlement has been reached under an alternative procedure, ‘unless agreement between the parties excludes any further procedure.’ The scope of LOSC Article 281
of LOSC was a central issue in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, which related to a
unilateral decision by Japan to exceed national catch limits for southern bluefin tuna
determined under the framework of the Convention for the Conservation for Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).64 Australian and New Zealand alleged that Japan’s
actions were in breach of several obligations arising under LOSC and applied to
ITLOS for provisional measures prior to the establishment of an arbitral tribunal
constituted in accordance with Article 287 and Annex VII of the Convention.
ITLOS considered that an Annex VII arbitral tribunal would have prima facie jurisdiction over the disputes and prescribed a series of provisional measures.65 A
central question considered by the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal was the interaction
between compulsory dispute settlement procedures in LOSC and the consent-based
dispute settlement mechanisms set out in CCSBT Article 16.66 The Tribunal re64

See Dean Bialek, ‘Australia and New Zealand v Japan: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case’, 1 Melbourne
Journal of International Law 8 (2000).
65
See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan) (Provisional
Measures) (Order of 27 August 1999), [28], [29], 38 International Legal Materials 1624 (1999).
66
Signed 10 May 1993, entered into force 20 May 1994, 1819 UNTS 359. Article 16 of the Convention establishes a consent-based dispute settlement procedure, providing as follows: 1. ‘If any
dispute arises between two or more of the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Convention, those Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the
dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement
or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved
shall, with the consent in each case of all parties to the dispute, be referred for settlement to
the International Court of Justice or to arbitration; but failure to reach agreement on reference
to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration shall not absolve parties to the dispute
from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means
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jected Japan’s argument that the CCSBT functioned as a lex specialis excluding the
application LOSC and noted that:
it is commonplace for international law and State practice for more than
one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute. There is no reason why
a given act of a State may not violate its obligations under more than
one treaty. There is frequently a parallelism of treaties, both in their
substantive content and in their provisions for settlement of disputes
arising thereunder.67
However, the Tribunal concluded that the drafting of CCSBT Article 16 reflected
an intent to ‘exclude the application to a specific dispute of any procedure of dispute resolution that is not accepted by all parties to the dispute.’ Accordingly, the
Tribunal applied Article 281 of LOSC in finding that compulsory procedures set out
in Part XV Section 2 of the Convention were not available in the context of the
dispute.68
The Southern Bluefin Tuna award employs a low threshold for excluding the application of compulsory procedures set out in Part XV Section 2 of LOSC. The
Tribunal acknowledged that Article 16 of the CCSBT does not ‘expressly and in so
many words exclude the applicability of any procedure’ but was willing to imply an
exclusion of such procedures despite the lack of express language to that effect.69
Accordingly, claimant coastal States that wish to ensure recourse to the compulsory
and binding procedures set out in LOSC Part XV are advised to include specific
language to that effect in a provisional joint management framework. However,
such language would not ensure the availability of LOSC Part XV procedures if a
referred to in paragraph 1 above. 3. In cases where the dispute is referred to arbitration, the
arbitral tribunal shall be constituted as provided in the Annex to this Convention. The Annex
forms an integral part of this Convention’.
67
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Award of 4 August 2000) [52], 119 International Law Reports 508, 548. Cf the approach
to overlapping subject matter jurisdiction adopted in The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United
Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) (Order of 31 December 2001) [49]-[52], 41 International Legal
Materials 405 (2002). See also Bernard Oxman, ‘Complementary Agreements and Compulsory
Jurisdiction’, 95 American Journal of International Law 227-312 (2001); Barbara Kwiatowska,
‘Ireland v. United Kingdom Mox Plant Case: Applying the Doctrine of Treaty Parallelism’, 18
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1 (2003).
68
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Award of 4 August 2000) [59]. For a debate concerning the merits of the Tribunal’s
argument, see Colson and Hoyle cf Kwiatkowska, above n 95 on page 66.
69
Ibid, [56].
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claimant coastal State made a subsequent declaration pursuant to LOSC Part XV
Section 3.70

4.10 Choice of constituent instrument
A provisional joint management framework can be constituted in a variety of ways.
Key choices to be made by the claimant coastal States in this context are: (1) what
degree of formality and corresponding political expectation should be associated
with the provisional joint management framework?; (2) should the framework be
established using a single instrument or multiple instruments?; (3) if multiple instruments are used, what features of the framework should be established under each
instrument? The following paragraphs discuss a variety of options for addressing
these choices:

4.10.1 Formal inter-State treaty or agreement
This approach involves the creation of international legal obligations between the
claimant coastal States in a formal manner.71 In comparison to the alternative
options discussed below, it represents the highest degree of commitment between
claimant coastal States, and requires the most amount of effort to establish, amend,
replace or modify. For representative examples see the: Argentina – Uruguay 1973
Agreement concerning the Río de la Plata (Chapter 3.3.2); Guinea-Bissau – Senegal
1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement and the 1995 Protocol (Chapter
3.3.8); Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001 Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9); Australia
– Indonesia 1989 Treaty (Chapter 3.6.1); Australia – East Timor 2002 Timor Sea
Treaty and 2006 CMATS (Chapter 3.6.2); and Antarctic Treaty (Chapter 3.7.3).
70

As noted in Chapter 2.5.3, the optional exclusion set out in LOSC Article 298 allows coastal
States involved in disputes concerning OCAs to insulate themselves from the compulsory and
binding dispute settlement procedures set out in LOSC Part XV Section 2.
71
For examples of what commonly represents ‘formality’ in this context, see Anthony Aust, Modern
Law and Treaty Practice (2000).

268

When negotiating a formal treaty or agreement concerning OCA management, it is
important to ensure that its language is carefully calibrated to provide a degree of
flexibility to the claimant coastal States, so that OCA management practices can be
adapted in response to unforeseen developments.72 A commonly used approach for
retaining flexibility in a formal instrument is to delegate specific modalities of OCA
management to an institution (see Chapter 4.8) or subsequent agreement (which
may then feature a less formal constituent instrument). For a detailed example of
this approach see Articles 36 – 46 of the Nigeria – Sao Tome and Principe 2001
Treaty (Chapter 3.3.9). Article 38.2 of the 2001 Treaty provides for example that:
the States Parties on the recommendation of the Authority shall agree
necessary measures and procedures to prevent and remedy pollution of
the marine environment resulting from development activities in the
Zone.
Several States have elected to establish a framework agreement concerning provisional joint OCA management, which is then supplemented by a specific agreement
after further rounds of negotiations. See for example the Guinea-Bissau – Senegal 1993 Management and Cooperation Agreement and the 1995 Protocol (Chapter
3.3.8).73 An advantage of this approach is that it enables the claimant States to establish a phased approach to OCA management, where broad principles are agreed
as a foundation of trust and cooperation, paving the way for challenging specific
issues to be addressed at a later date.
In this context it is important to note that commercial entities are demonstrably
reluctant to invest in major infrastructure development in OCAs unless a provisional joint management framework provides a relatively high degree of stability
and certainty.74 In comparison to less formal approaches discussed below, a formal inter-State treaty or agreement is more difficult to change and less vulnerable
to domestic political pressures, and is consequently better suited to provide such
72

For detailed guidance concerning treaty drafting see Aust, above n 71 on the previous page.
See also the Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement of 1990 (Chapter 3.6.7),
which for the present purposes are categorised as an inter-State legal agreement avoiding formal
language (see below).
74
For further discussion see Schofield (ed), above n 313 on page 158.
73
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assurances. It is illustrative that none of the frameworks surveyed in Chapter 3 concerning petroleum development were constituted without a formal inter-State treaty
or agreement, or an inter-State legal agreement couched in more informal terms (see
below).

4.10.2 Inter-State legal agreement avoiding formal language
As a matter of international law, the formal characterisation of an agreement may
be indicative, but is not determinative, of its legal character.75 Article 2 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties76 defines the word ‘treaty’ to mean:
an international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation ...
Discussing the meaning of this provision, Aust observes that:
the name does not, in itself, determine the status of the instrument; what
is decisive is whether the negotiating states intended the instrument to
be (or not to be) legally binding. Thus, just as one should never judge
a book by its cover, one should not assume that the name given to an
international instrument automatically indicates its status ...77
Accordingly, it is open to claimant coastal States to create an legally binding instrument that is couched in terms that, from a political perspective, de-emphasise
the nature of obligations contained in the instrument. Commonly used instrument
titles in this context include: ‘exchange of letters’, ‘joint declaration’, and ‘memorandum of understanding’.78 Given the political tensions that are often associated
with overlapping maritime claims, this approach is frequently used to establish OCA
management frameworks. For a representative examples of State practice see the:
Malaysia – Thailand 1979 MoU and supplemental agreement of 1990; Iran – United
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See Aust, above n 71 on page 268.
Signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331.
77
Aust, above n 71 on page 268, 20.
78
For further discussion see Aust, above n 71 on page 268.
76
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Arab Emirates (Sharjah) 1971 MoU (Chapter 3.4.1); and Malaysia – Vietnam 1992
MoU concerning hydrocarbon development (Chapter 3.6.8).
The advantages and disadvantages of agreements avoiding formal language are similar to those discussed above concerning formal instruments. However, it is important
to note that informal terminology may give rise to misunderstandings concerning the
legal status of an international instrument.79 Regardless of the terms in which an
instrument is couched, claimant coastal States are advised to reach a clear mutual
understanding of the instrument’s legal implications.

4.10.3 Non-binding inter-State agreements
This approach involves the creation of an instrument at an inter-state level that is
deliberately drafted to avoid the creation of legal obligations between the claimant
coastal States. For representative examples of State practice see: 2002 Declaration
concerning the South China Sea (Chapter 3.6.5); the surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established between Argentina – United Kingdom concerning the
Southern Atlantic Ocean (Chapter 3.3.1); and the Japan – PRC 2008 Cooperation
Consensus concerning the East China Sea (Chapter 3.5.1).
In comparison to the previously discussed options, a non-binding inter-State agreement enables claimant coastal States to retain more flexibility concerning their future conduct. Because of the flexibility they offer claimant coastal States, such
agreements provide limited certainty for external stakeholders (e.g. international oil
and gas companies) who may wish to invest in resource-development in the relevant
OCA.

79

Recalling his experience in the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Aust,
above n 71 on page 268, draws attention to instruments that: (1) were about to be
signed when it was discovered that the States parties disagreed about whether or not
they were legally binding; and (2) had already been signed when the States parties discovered that they disagreed about whether or not the instruments were legally binding. See also: Mark Scully, ‘Choose your instrument’ (November 17, 2004), available at
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/workshops/treaties_global/scully2.html>.
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As mentioned previously, claimant coastal States are advised to reach a clear mutual understanding regarding the legal implications of the relevant international
instrument. When the legally binding character of an instrument is disputed, each
claimant coastal State risks an adverse finding if the dispute is referred to an international court or tribunal. For example, in Qatar v. Bahrain, the International
Court of Justice held, contrary Bahrain’s submission, that minutes of a meeting
(recording that both States had ‘agreed’ on the matters documented) represented a
legally binding agreement between both States.80

4.10.4 Executive understandings and operational agreements
This approach involves the development of an agreed position or patterns of behaviour between the respective executive governments of the claimant coastal States,
without creation of a specific instrument that reflects the consensus reached. See
for example several of the surveyed bilateral cooperative arrangements established
between Canada – United States (Chapters 3.2.1, 3.3.4 and 3.7.2). A key advantage
of this approach is the flexibility that it provides to the relevant claimant coastal
States, in addition to the discrete nature of executive understanding and operational
agreements. In particular, it allows cooperative frameworks to be established on a
dynamic basis between specific government agencies. Executive understandings and
operational arrangements may also build trust and good relations between claimant
States, laying a foundation for more formal cooperative frameworks. A key potential disadvantage is the associated lack of certainty and transparency, which may,
depending on the relevant circumstances, be inimical to effective OCA management.

80

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment of 1 July 1994, 1994 ICJ Rep 112. At paragraph [23] of the Judgment,
the Court emphasised that ‘international agreements may take a number of forms and be given
a variety of names ...’. The agreement in question related to methods of dispute settlement –
the meeting minutes were found to enliven the Court’s jurisdiction over the case.
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4.10.5 Coordinated enactment of national legislation
This approach involves the harmonisation of domestic legislation in each of the
claimant coastal States, in accordance with an executive understanding or operational agreement. For example, both governments may agree informally to designate
a marine park in an OCA under domestic legislation, thereby establishing coordinated management in absence of a written international instrument. See also the
hydrocarbon moratorium established by Canada – United States (Chapters 3.3.4
and 3.7.2). Coordinated enactment of national legislation maintains flexibility at
an international level, combined with a degree of certainty and transparency at a
domestic level. In the author’s view, this combination of characteristics make it an
attractive (and under-utilised) basis for provisional joint OCA management.
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5 Conclusion
The primary objective of this thesis has been to develop a template set of legal
and policy options for coastal States to engage in provisional joint management of
OCAs in a manner that fully utilises their rights, and is consistent with their obligations, under international law. Before focusing on this primary objective, several
sub-objectives were pursued. Through examination of relevant international law,
Chapter 2 sought to identify the scope of coastal State entitlements to manage activity within OCAs. Chapter 3 surveyed current State concerning the provisional
joint management of OCAs in order to identify: (1) specific design features of provisional joint management frameworks; and (2) the extent to which these frameworks
provide for the full utilisation of coastal State rights by enabling the functionally
comprehensive management of OCAs. Drawing on the responses developed in previous Chapters, Chapter 4 addressed the primary research objective, discussing methods for achieving functionally comprehensive OCA management, and recommending different potential design features of prospective provisional joint management
frameworks.
The remaining paragraphs of this Chapter outline the key conclusions of the thesis
concerning: (1) management of OCAs under international law; (2) design features
of current State practice concerning OCA management; and (3) the legal and policy options available to coastal States to engage in provisional joint management
of OCAs. The final Section recommends several issues that would benefit from
future research. It also contains recommendations for coastal States that are ac-
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tively engaged in the provisional joint management of OCAs, or the negotiation of
prospective provisional joint management frameworks.

5.1 Management of overlapping claim areas under
international law
Within each zone of national jurisdiction recognised by the LOSC, a coastal State
is entrusted with a package of exclusive rights to manage human activity in one
or more of the following six functional contexts, namely: artificial structures, environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational
safety and resources exploitation. This thesis has demonstrated that provisions of
international law concerning the assertion of these rights within OCAs are general
in nature, emphasising restraint, peaceful cooperation and commitment to negotiations. They do not establish a detailed or functionally comprehensive template
for the provisional and cooperative implementation within an OCA of the functional components of coastal State jurisdiction. Rather, international law defers
to claimant coastal States to reach agreement enabling them to manage activity
within OCAs on a functionally comprehensive basis (thereby fully utilising their
coastal State rights under international law).
In the absence of such a management agreement, international law does not establish
clear entitlements to undertake provisional management of an OCA on a unilateral
basis. Within an OCA arising from territorial sea claims, LOSC Article 15 proscribes
such action in the broadly defined context of ‘historic title or other special circumstances’. In relation to the contiguous zone, the LOSC Article 33 does not contain
specific obligations concerning the provisional management of OCAs or the delimitation of overlapping claims. Concerning archipelagic waters, LOSC Articles 47(5)
and (6) limit the impact of archipelagic baseline claims on the rights and interests
of neighbouring States but do not contain specific obligations concerning overlapping claim areas or maritime delimitation. Within an OCA arising from claims to
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an EEZ and/or continental shelf, LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) each contain two
obligations that simultaneously attempt to promote and limit activity undertaken
or authorised by the claimant coastal States. Unilateral management of an OCA is
constrained, but not prohibited, by the requirement to make ‘every effort to enter
into provisional arrangements of a practical nature’ and by the requirement to make
‘every effort ... not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.’
The Guyana–Suriname Award provides some analytical guidance to coastal States
concerning the interpretation and application of LOSC Articles 74(3) and 83(3) to
specific factual circumstances.
The dispute settlement framework set out in LOSC Part XV – and in particular
the popular optional exclusion set out in LOSC Article 298 – allows coastal States
involved in disputes concerning OCAs to insulate themselves from the Convention’s
compulsory and binding dispute settlement procedures. Consequently, in the absence of consent between the relevant claimant coastal States, there is limited scope
for international court and tribunals to prescribe modalities for OCA management
in particular cases. Furthermore, any territorial sovereignty disputes associated with
an OCA fall beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the Convention’s compulsory
and binding dispute settlement procedures.

5.2 Management of overlapping claim areas in
current State practice
The thesis has identified a wide variety of frameworks for the provisional joint management of OCAs. Through development of these frameworks, claimant coastal
States have taken important steps towards (1) supplementing applicable provisions
of international law and (2) establishing a sound legal basis for the management
of such spaces. Indeed, many of the surveyed provisional joint management frameworks facilitate, or contemplate, further cooperation concerning the implementation
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within the relevant OCA of functional components of jurisdiction attributed by the
LOSC to the relevant claimant coastal States.
The thesis has also identified great variation in the functional coverage of surveyed
provisional joint management frameworks. Several frameworks may be characterised
as functionally comprehensive, containing provisions allocating coastal State competence and/or jurisdiction within the relevant OCA for a complete set of functional
contexts. These frameworks establish a clear basis for the claimant coastal States
to implement, within the relevant OCA, LOSC rights and obligations concerning:
artificial structures, environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime
security, navigational safety and resource exploitation. Other provisional joint management frameworks exhibit clear functional gaps that may undermine the ability
of claimant coastal States to engage in management of the relevant OCA in one or
more functional contexts. Key functional gaps evident in the surveyed provisional
joint management frameworks include the following:
No allocation of competence in certain functional contexts (i.e. a functionally limited
allocation of competence):
Several of the surveyed frameworks focus on the cooperative management of specific
resources or the cooperative exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in functionally
specific contexts. Cooperation in other functional contexts is either contemplated in
very general terms, not referred to, or deferred to subsequent agreement. Functional
contexts not addressed in these frameworks remain subject to relevant provisions of
international law which, as this thesis has demonstrated, do not establish a detailed
framework for implementation within an OCA of coastal State jurisdiction.
No allocation (or clear allocation) of functional competence:
Several of the surveyed frameworks contain general commitments to engage in, or
discuss the establishment of, cooperative management of an OCA but do not specifically allocate functional components of coastal state jurisdiction within the area
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concerned. They do not add clarity to the general and ambiguous provisions of
international law concerning the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction within OCAs.
No allocation of functional competence to certain claimants:
Several of the surveyed frameworks allocate certain functional competencies to the
relevant parties, but do not provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by other coastal
States asserting claims to all of part of the relevant OCA. In such circumstances, ambiguities of the international legal framework concerning the exercise of coastal State
jurisdiction within OCAs continue to impact upon relations between all claimant
coastal States and management of the relevant OCA.
No allocation of functional competence concerning non-claimant States:
Finally, several of the surveyed frameworks allocate jurisdiction between claimant
States on an inter-se basis only and hence do not provide a clear basis for the exercise
of coastal State jurisdiction within the relevant OCA in relation to vessels flagged
to third States.

5.3 Legal and policy options for managing
overlapping claim areas
Drawing on an examination of relevant international law and current State practice,
the thesis has proposed that functionally comprehensive OCA management can
only be achieved through development of a provisional joint management framework
having the following two characteristics:
• Comprehensive participation: The framework must involve all of the relevant
claimant coastal States;
• Comprehensive allocation of functional competence: The framework must enable each of the claimant coastal States to clearly identify the circumstances
(and locations) in which they are entitled (or not entitled) to implement LOSC
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rights and obligations concerning: artificial structures, environmental protection, marine scientific research, maritime security, navigational safety and resource exploitation.
The thesis has demonstrated that there is enormous scope for calibrating a provisional joint management framework to suit the specific circumstances of claimant
coastal States in a manner that remains consistent with the above characteristics.
It outlines varied legal and policy options for designing the following features of a
prospective provisional joint management framework: duration of the framework;
spatial coverage of the framework; interaction of the framework with existing jurisdictional claims; choice of constituent instrument(s); mechanism for allocating
jurisdiction; mechanism for allocating resources and revenues; institutional aspects
of cooperation; and dispute settlement procedures. Each of the proposed options
are consistent with the objective of functionally comprehensive OCA management.

5.4 Recommendations
The world’s oceans and seas cannot be managed effectively unless coastal State
authority is asserted to the maximum permissible extent on a functionally comprehensive basis throughout OCAs. The research presented here suggests that current
OCA management efforts fall considerably short of that objective. The extent to
which they fall short remains an open question. The author has presented an initial
global sketch of current high-level legal and policy frameworks, supplemented by
snippets of secondary information concerning their implementation. An important
task for the future will be to comprehensively assess the de facto implementation and
functional coverage of OCA management frameworks in specific regional contexts.
Another important task for the future is to develop regionally specific proposals for
filling functional gaps in OCA management frameworks. As an initial step toward
that end, the author encourages coastal States that assert overlapping maritime
claims to review the variety of legal and policy options that are identified and dis-
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cussed in this thesis. None of the proposed options represent an easy solution to compelling political and strategic issues that in many cases impede further cooperation
concerning the management of particular OCAs. Rather, they are non-prescriptive
template sketches that provide a basis for further discussion and concrete policy development. Critically, the proposed options illustrate that it is possible for claimant
coastal States to work together, to develop flexible and creative solutions for managing the valuable maritime spaces that they share.
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